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Abstract
Despite an increase in interstate conflict, including manipulation of information and civil
populations by state actors in gray zone campaigns, the study of resistance has concentrated on
intrastate conflict. A detailed literature review of resistance was conducted, revealing
researchable gaps in understanding of the topic, including: the resistance movements from a
security studies and interstate conflict perspective, the resistance as a form of interstate conflict
from the perspective of Russian and Chinese security leaders, and the integrated deterrence
options in gray zone campaigns as a strategy of international conflict prevention. Two
complementary studies were conducted to explore the identified areas. These studies were based
on three theories: 1) resistance theory, 2) combat power theory, and 3) deterrence theory. The
first complementary study involved utilizing quantitative methods to analyze the NAVCO 2.0
dataset of global resistance movements from 1945-2006. The positivist analysis explored
relationships between resistance movement variables and combat power theory, identifying
variables significantly associated with progress and success in resistance campaigns. The
quantitative findings informed the second interpretivist complementary study that utilized
content analysis of primary sources, scholarly articles, and news sources to explore resistance
from the perspective of Russian and Chinese security leaders in the contemporary period of
2006-2022. Overall, the complementary studies described in this dissertation are situated within
international conflict resolution studies, exploring resistance movements as a form of strategic
interstate conflict and integrated deterrence as a strategy of international conflict prevention.
Keywords: resistance, conflict prevention, integrated deterrence, gray zone, Russia, China
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Research indicates a rise in the success of non-violent resistance movements as a form of
intrastate conflict from 1945-2006 (Chenoweth & Stephen, 2011). This period was influential to
the practice and study of resistance and included the rise of key resistance movement leaders and
scholars, such as Martin Luther King Jr., Nelson Mandela, Ernesto Laclau, Frank Parkin, and
Gene Sharp. The early 2000s continued with the advent of “Color Revolutions”, which are highprofile resistance movements challenging national governments. Color Revolutions of the 2000s
included the Orange Revolution in former Soviet Ukraine and the Jasmine Revolution in China.
These movements are the subject of significant academic scholarship, highlighting the key
elements of “people power”, and the effectiveness of resistance movements as a means of
conflict resolution.
The efficacy of Color Revolutions garnered the attention of national governments,
including those of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China (President of
Russia, 2022; Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Indonesia, 2022).
Reports indicate that these regimes felt threatened by the Color Revolutions, however, they saw
an opportunity to employ the element of people power as a form of interstate conflict. In the
years following the Color Revolutions, from 2006-2022, the Russian and Chinese regimes
appropriated resistance paradigms to prioritize population-centric and information-centric
irregular approaches as a means of achieving national security objectives below the level of
armed conflict. These approaches took the form of people movements, which became strategic
tools of the state to threaten, or bring about, regime change or to compete for territory within
gray zone campaigns, or efforts occurring between the space of peace and war (Freier, 2016).
These efforts often include appropriating the lexicon of resistance, such as Russian information
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efforts to coin their gray zone activities in the Ukraine in 2014 as the “Russian Spring” following
the popularization of the term “Arab Spring” in 2012, and other historical events to refer to antigovernment social movements (Lankina & Watanabe, 2017). Ongoing aggressive Russian
activities focused on the Ukraine and Chinese activities focused on Taiwan indicate continued
maturation and operationalization of these gray zone activities. The most recent U.S. National
Security Strategic Guidance document captures the relevance and urgency of better
understanding and addressing these forms of conflict, by calling the security sector to “develop
capabilities to better compete and deter gray zone actions” (Biden, 2021, p. 14).
The term gray zone encompasses a range of interstate conflict situated between the war
and peace (Freier, 2016; Pomerantsev, 2015). A key characteristic of gray zone activity is that it
intends to harm another state while remaining below the legal thresholds of open warfare
(Brands, 2015; Cambridge, 2022). Gray zone activities take many forms, including information
warfare, economic coercion, political warfare, legal warfare, disguised forces, and manipulation
of populations (Hicks et al., 2019). The activities associated with the gray zone are not
necessarily new. Russia leveraged many of these activities during the Cold War (Freier, 2016;
Hoffman, 2018; Votel et al., 2016). However, the maturation and operationalization of these
activities by both Russia and China present a unique set of simultaneous and complex security
challenges (Carment & Belo, 2020; Chan, 2021; Hicks et al., 2019; Hoffman, 2018; Layton,
2021).
Multipolar conflict between powerful nations is an increasingly dominant characteristic
of the 21st century global security environment. From the perspective of U.S. defense officials,
the emergence of multipolar conflict is “the central challenge to U.S. prosperity and security”
(U.S. Department of Defense, 2018, p. 2). Likewise, updated Russian and Chinese national
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defense strategies focus on aggressive, multi-prong competition with the United States (Heath et
al., 2016; Katzman, 2019; Oliker, 2016). While competition between nations is not a new
phenomenon, the updated national security strategies of Russia and China place increasing
emphasis on approaches that blend the use of conventional military force with population-centric
efforts, including the use of proxies, information, and appropriation of resistance movements as
means to compete short of open conflict (Lee, 2016). These approaches often leverage resistance
movements with goals of anti-occupation or regime change. However, despite the relevance of
resistance to security studies, leading resistance scholars note, “the serious study of strategic
nonviolent action has remained something of a pariah within security studies” (Chenoweth &
Stephan, 2011, p.17). These realities have driven the security discourse to seek better
understanding of this form of conflict (Hicks et al., 2019; Hume et al., 2016; The Evolution of
Hybrid Warfare, 2017). This pursuit includes calls to “aggressively adapt key institutions,
concepts, and capabilities for persistent gray zone campaigning” (Hume et al., 2016).
The principal theories to understand state actor appropriation of resistance movements
are combat power theory and resistance theory. Combat power theory, derived from the work of
British military theorist J.F.C Fuller, provided a positivist framework to examine how resistance
movements work from a security sector perspective as a form of unconventional warfare
(Boslego, 1995; Fuller, 1926). Combat power theory is widely used within security sector
discourse as a means of measuring and describing the means and capacity to conduct security
operations. The written doctrines of many countries codify combat power theory, including those
of the United States, Russia, and China (Anderson & Engstrom, 2009; Martin, 2013;
Montgomery, 2014; Roberts, 2015; U.S. Joint Chiefs, 2016; Vest, 2017). Combat power
represents the totality of capability that an organization can put forth for a specific duration and
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purpose. It is a theory of organizational capacity that, despite the name, is not limited to combat
undertaken by military forces (Cox et al., 2018).
Resistance theory provided an interpretivist framework to examine how groups threaten
or bring about political change using civil populations (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2012; Sharp
1973). Scholars define resistance as a “type of political activity that deliberately or necessarily
circumvents normal political channels and employs non-institutional (and often illegal) forms of
action against an opponent…to mobilize publics to oppose or support different policies, to
delegitimize adversaries, and to remove or restrict adversaries’ sources of power” (Chenoweth &
Stephan, 2012, p. 12). The study situated resistance movements as a type of social movement
and a form of unconventional warfare (Chenoweth & Stephen 2012; Dudouet, 2015; Sharp
1990). Deterrence theory provided an additional framework, emphasizing conflict prevention, to
explore options to deter interstate conflict that appropriates resistance movements (Väyrynen,
1997). Chapter 2 provides additional exploration of the three frameworks of this study.
The present study encompassed two complementary studies exploring resistance. The
first complementary study utilized quantitative methods and employed combat power theory to
analyze global resistance movements from the formative period of 1945-2006 as coded in the
NAVCO 2.0 dataset. The analysis explored resistance combat power variables significantly
associated with progress and success in resistance campaigns with the goals of regime change,
territorial secession, or anti-occupation. The quantitative findings informed the second
complementary study.
The second study utilized qualitative methods, including content analysis, and the
framework of resistance theory to explore the appropriation of regime change and antioccupation resistance methods by Russia and China in the contemporary period of 2006-2022.
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The qualitative findings provide theorists and practitioners insight into the critical variables that
were significantly associated with success and progress in resistance movements, allowing for
deepened understanding resistance as a form of interstate conflict.
Overall, the research studies presented in this dissertation are situated within the literature
pertaining to international conflict resolution studies, exploring resistance movements as a form
of strategic interstate conflict, and deterrence as a strategy of conflict prevention (Väyrynen,
1997). The study further includes considerations of conflict management alongside reassurance
and diplomacy (Lebow 2022). The study focused on the analysis of archival data and documents
and did not include human research. Taken together, the theories, methodologies, data collection,
and data analysis result in an interpretivist study of state actor appropriation of resistance as a
form of interstate conflict.
Problem Statement
Research has shown an increase in the use of resistance methods by state actors in gray
zone campaigns that represent a form of interstate conflict, however, the study of resistance has
largely been concentrated on resistance in the form of intrastate conflict with moral or principled
usage of nonviolent resistance by non-state actors against oppressive state actors (Howe, 2009).
Stated another way, the majority of scholarship pertaining to resistance examines the methods of
resistance (violent/nonviolent), rather than the specific goals/outcomes of resistance (e.g., regime
change/ territorial secession/anti-occupation). Accordingly, there are multiple gaps in the
literature regarding state appropriation of resistance as a form of interstate conflict. The primary
research gaps are as follows:
1. The literature lacks holistic study of resistance that does not center on bifurcation of
violent/non-violent methods, and without bias towards non-violent methods.
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2. The literature lacks research that utilizes combat power theory to examine resistance
from a security studies perspective to gain a better understanding of specific variables
significantly associated with success or progress of regime change, territorial
secession, and anti-occupation resistance campaigns during the formative period of
1945-2006 that are akin to the types of resistance movements appropriated by Russian
and Chinese security forces in the contemporary period 2006-2022.
3. The literature lacks research that utilizes combat power theory and resistance theory
to examine Russian and Chinese appropriation of resistance forces in the
contemporary period 2006-2022 as a form of unconventional warfare in deliberate
gray zone interstate conflict.
4. The literature lacks concepts for deterrence of Russian and Chinese appropriation of
resistance in gray zone campaigns as a strategy of international conflict prevention.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of the study was to expand understanding of resistance as a form of
interstate conflict. From a conflict prevention and security studies perspective, this study
examined the formative period of resistance from 1945-2006 to understand the variables
significantly associated with success and progress in three specific types of resistance
movements: regime change, territorial secession, and anti-occupation. These types of resistance
movements were appropriated by the regimes of Russia and the People’s Republic of China in
the contemporary period from 2006-2022. The specific purpose of this aspect of the study was to
explore these three types of resistance movement goals (e.g., regime change, territorial secession,
and anti-occupation) in detail, to discern nuanced differences in the variables associated with
their success or progress. By gaining a specific understanding of critical variables of these three
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types of resistance in the formative period, including the Color Revolutions, a security studies
basis was developed to further explore Russian and Chinese policies, doctrines, and actions
regarding the appropriation of resistance in the contemporary period from 2006-2022. Content
analysis of primary sources, scholarly articles, and news sources was employed to evaluate these
sources. The purpose of examining Russian and Chinese artifacts pertaining to the appropriation
of resistance in the contemporary period was to contribute to the understanding of the critical
factors in Russian and Chinese interstate conflict methods, to add to the literature regarding how
to prevent this form of interstate conflict, and to prompt further research on resistance from a
security studies perspective.
Research Objectives
The study has three objectives: (1) to explore resistance cognizant of and minimizing of
bias towards non-violent methods; (2) to advance exploration of specific critical factors,
including information activities, in regime change, territorial secession, and anti-occupation
resistance movements during the formative period of 1945-2006 and their influence on state
appropriation of resistance in contemporary interstate conflict; and (3) to contribute to the study
of resistance in conflict prevention and security studies discourse.
Significance of Study
The study makes three primary contributions to the fields of conflict resolution, political
science, and military science. First, the findings frame resistance movements from the
perspective of state actors within the context of international conflict as a form of interstate
conflict and social movement. Through this study, resistance literature is expanded beyond a
principled approach taken by non-state actors in intrastate conflict, and resistance is explored as
a viable form of proxy activity within a state actor’s interstate security strategy. As a result, the
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framing of this dissertation informs scholarly work regarding resistance movements into conflict
prevention, deterrence, and national security discourse.
Second, this study advances exploration of resistance methods in specific types of
resistance movements, including an emphasis on the information component of resistance.
Findings provide theorists and practitioners with insight into the variables significantly
associated with success and progress in specific types of resistance movements, which allows for
the identification of critical variables to defend or pursue when considering resistance as a form
of interstate conflict. The results of this investigation are particularly impactful to the field as the
first known study that includes both quantitative and qualitative investigation to explore the state
appropriation of resistance in the context of strategic, integrated deterrence. The analysis of
resistance as a form of interstate conflict and unconventional warfare benefits theorists and
contributes to the field of conflict resolution by adding to the body of knowledge regarding
international conflict and conflict prevention.
Finally, the findings of this study contribute to broadening and bolstering a deeper
understanding of the appropriation of resistance by Russian and Chinese government officials.
The results contribute to the literature and provide an opportunity for additional discovery and
learning among practitioners and the public regarding the appropriation of resistance and
provides considerations for deterrence.
The table below provides a summary of the general study components, including the
theories, methodologies, data collection procedures, and analyses incorporated in this study and
the key references for each element (see Table 1).
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Table 1
Summary of Study Components and References
General Component Specific Components

Key References

Theories

Resistance, combat power, Agan et al., 2019; Brodie, 1946; Chenoweth
deterrence
& Stephen, 2011; Cox et al., 2018; Dudouet,
2015; Hobbes, 1651; Jervis, 1976; King,
1958; Schelling, 1966; Scouras et al., 2013;
Sharp 1990; Smyth, & Mahnken, 2014;
Waltz, 1979; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff,
2014, 2018

Methodologies

Content analysis and
quantitative

Corbin & Strauss, 2007; Glaser & Strauss
1967; Krippendorf, 2019; Pallant, 2001

Data collection

Text mining, NAVCO 2.0
dataset

Carter et al., 2007; Chenoweth & Lewis
2013; Karatnacky & Ackerman, 2005;
Schock, 2005

Data Analysis

Content analysis, nonparametric design

Corbin & Strauss, 2007; Creswell & Clark,
2011; Krippendorf, 2019; Onwuegbuzie &
Collins, 2007; Pallant, 2001

Summary
Chapter 1 described the purpose, objectives, design, and significance of the study.
Chapter 2 provides a detailed literature review that provides the philosophical, theoretical, and
contextual foundations for the study. The literature review identifies four researchable gaps in
the literature regarding resistance as form of interstate conflict. The study addressed these four
researchable gaps with three research questions.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
Chapter 2 explores the scholarly literature relevant to the research investigation.
Specifically, this chapter provides an analysis of existing literature regarding combat power
theory, resistance theory, deterrence theory, and the appropriation of resistance by the Russian
Federation and the People’s Republic of China within gray zone campaigns. The purpose of the
chapter is to thoroughly present the body of knowledge related to the research problem, identify
researchable gaps in the literature, and clearly link these gaps to the research questions and
design of the study. The chapter is comprised of four topic areas arranged in the following
sequence: philosophical foundations, theoretical foundations, literature gap analysis, and
research recommendations. The keystone topics discussed are resistance theory, combat power
theory, and deterrence theory. The framework of this study builds upon Crotty’s (1998) research
design approach of conceptual nesting (Creswell & Clark, 2011). This approach begins with
identification of philosophical foundations, which informs the selection of theoretical
perspectives, which guide the methodical approaches and methods of data collection.
The literature review identified four researchable gaps. This chapter will illuminate these
gaps in the literature, provide a rationale for the inclusion of each concept, and link the literature
to the study’s research questions. The table below previews the relationships between literature
gaps, and research questions explored in this chapter (see Table 2).
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Table 2
Crosswalk of Literature, Gap Analysis, and Research Questions
Literature

Gap

Research Questions

Combat Power

Bifurcation between violent/nonviolent with bias towards nonviolent resistance
Research that utilizes combat power
theory to examine resistance from a
security studies perspective to gain
a better understanding of specific
variables associated with success or
progress of regime change,
territorial secession, and antioccupation resistance campaigns
during the formative period of
1945-2006 that are akin to the types
of resistance movements
appropriated by Russian and
Chinese security forces in the
contemporary period 2006-2022.

1. What are the significant
relationships between combat
power variables and
success/progress in resistance
campaigns during the formative
period from 1945-2006 whose
goals are regime change, territorial
secession, or anti-occupation?

Resistance

Research that utilizes combat power
theory and resistance theory to
examine Russian and Chinese
appropriation of resistance forces in
the contemporary period 2006-2022
as a form of unconventional warfare
in deliberate gray zone interstate
conflict.

2. How do the elements of combat
power significantly associated
with success/progress in resistance
movements from 1945-2006 help
us understand the doctrines,
words, and actions of Russian and
Chinese government officials
regarding state appropriation of
resistance for gray zone
campaigns from 2006-2022?

Deterrence

Concepts for deterrence of Russian
and Chinese appropriation of
resistance in gray zone campaigns
as a strategy of international
conflict prevention.

3. How can we better understand
options to deter Russian and
Chinese appropriation of
resistance for gray zone
campaigns?

Security Discourse

Philosophical Foundations
This section provides a brief overview of the philosophical foundations of this study,
which draw upon classical traditions and emphasizes ideas of pragmatism. This study employs

12
the ontological perspective that the concept of reality contains both singular and multiple
realities and the epistemological consideration that knowledge can be attained through reliable
sources of perception, introspection, memory, reason, and testimony (Steup, 2018). According to
Creswell and Clark (2011), both quantitative and qualitative data can provide valid sources of
knowledge, with qualitative considerations requiring the understanding that “worldviews can
change during a study…[and] may be tied to different phases in the project, and that researchers
need to honor and write about their worldviews in use” (p. 46). With respect to these
philosophical underpinnings, an appropriate design for this research study was chosen,
incorporating both quantitative and qualitative methods (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003). This
study design is further supported by Mertens (2007) transformative paradigm, which emphasizes
utilization of both qualitative and quantitative methods, as well as inclusion of implicit value
assumptions to better understand issues such as oppression and domination.
Theoretical Foundations
The classical theoretical foundations most influential to this study derived from the social
science fields of conflict resolution, sociology, and political science. This section briefly presents
these classical theoretical foundations to provide the basis for the working theories utilized in the
study and to account for the theoretical lens informing the researcher’s perspective and approach
to the study.
Stemming from the field of conflict resolution, this study examined state appropriation of
resistance as a form of interstate conflict. Conflict is “an expressed struggle in which two or
more interdependent parties are experiencing strong emotion resulting from a perceived
difference in needs or values” (Katz et al., 2011). Conflict is also, “the pursuit of incompatible
goals by different groups” (Ramsbotham et al., 2011, p. 30). Furthermore, the study situates

13
deterrence within international conflict resolution, as a strategy of interstate conflict prevention
(Väyrynen, 1997).
Considering the contributions of sociology, classical theorists expanded positivist
application of the scientific method to social science. This shift contributed to the theoretical
foundations of combat power theory, which is one of the central theories utilized in this study
(Carneiro, 1974).
From the political science field, theories from the subfields of comparative politics and
international relations influenced the study. In consideration of comparative politics, the study
positioned resistance movements as a form of social movement (Arreguin-Toft, 2005; Berna,
2008; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Lee, 2016; Schock, 2005; Weinstein, 2007; Wood, 2000;
2003). New social movement theorists associate the formation of social movements to qualitative
issues, not to class and socioeconomic issues as proposed by the social conflict theories of Marx
(Parkin, 1969; Buechler, 2000). According to these theorists, in post-industrial societies, social
movements with identity, self-actualization, and equality objectives are more likely to form.
These include civil rights, environmental, and nationalist movements (Parkin, 1969; Berna,
2008; Buechler, 2000). Aberle further identified four primary types of social movements that
were dependent on the scale and objective of the social movement and coined alternative,
redemptive, reformative, and revolutionary (Braham, 2013). The present study applied this lens
through the focus on resistance movements with regime change or territorial objectives, which
are classified as revolutionary social movements utilizing Aberle’s typology. Further, social
movement theory contributed critical theoretical foundations for resistance theory, which is the
second of the working theories utilized in this study. New social movement theory provides
theoretical insights to better understand resistance movements with nationalistic and identity
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objectives, such as resistance movements with goals of anti-occupation and regime change,
which are the focus of the present study.
From the international relations subfield, the study positioned deterrence paradigms and
state appropriation of resistance movements from a realist perspective. Realists view
international conflict as a struggle for power between state actors who will always prioritize their
self-interests above the interests of other states and seek to maximize their own power
(Morgenthau, 1973). Classical theorists associated with realism include Thucydides,
Machiavelli, Hobbes, Niebuhr, and Morgenthau. Later, neorealist thinking refined aspects of
realism; most notably identifying the primary interest of the state as self-preservation. Leading
neorealist theorist Kenneth Waltz articulated the dynamics of neorealism in terms of competition
between great powers (Korab-Karpowicz & Julian 2018). Waltz (1988) maintained that a
multipolar world is inherently more unstable than a bipolar world, as the risk of miscalculation
between great powers is much higher in a multipolar world. The emphasis on power and security
in realism leads to an emphasis on military matters: “realist theory, old and new alike, draws
attention to the crucial role of military technology and strategy among the forces that fix the fate
of states and their systems” (Waltz, 1988, p.70).
Military strategies have a key focus on deterrence. According to Waltz, “improving the
means of defense and deterrence relative to the means of offense increases the chances of peace.
Weapons and strategies that make defense and deterrence easier, and offensive strikes harder to
mount, decrease the likelihood of war” (Waltz, 1988, p. 71). Realism and neorealism provide the
classical theoretical foundations for deterrence theory, the third working theory utilized in this
study. Emphasis on military deterrence strategy within neorealism as a form of conflict
prevention supports the link between conflict resolution, international relations, and military
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science within this study and situates the topics of state appropriation of resistance and
deterrence within a multipolar context, as presented in this study.
This section briefly presented three classical theoretical perspectives that inform the
working theories that are central to the study. Classical positivist sociology theories provided the
foundation for combat power theory. Social movement theories, including new social movement
theory, provided foundations for Resistance theory. Conflict resolution and realist theories,
including neorealism, provided foundations for deterrence theory. Combat power theory,
resistance theory, and deterrence theory are the three working theories central to this study. The
next sections explore these three theories in detail.
Combat Power Theory
Combat power theory is widely used within security sector discourse as a method of
measuring and describing the means and capacity with which to conduct security operations
(Luo, 2016). Utilization of this theory is central to one of the objectives of this study, which is to
expand scholarly work regarding resistance movements into deterrence and national security
discourse. Combat power theory describes, “the total means of destructive and/or disruptive
force that a military unit can apply against the opponent at a given time” (U.S. Joint Chiefs of
Staff, 2018, p. 1-4). More simply stated, combat power is the full capability that an organization
can put forth for a specific duration and purpose. The written doctrines of many countries codify
combat power theory, including the United States, Russia, and China (Anderson & Engstrom,
2009; Martin, 2013; Montgomery, 2014; Roberts, 2015; U.S. Joint Chiefs, 2016; Vest, 2017).
Utilizing combat power theory as a positivist framework contributes to quantitative examination
of resistance as a deliberate means of achieving security objectives from a military science lens.
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Combat power theory is derived largely from the work of British military theorist, J.F.C.
Fuller (Fuller, 1926; Boslego, 1995). Fuller’s work emerged in the early twentieth century,
heavily influenced by Social Darwinism. Fuller’s ideas were valued within the historical context
of theorists seeking to reconcile emerging technologies, such as tanks and airplanes, with the
works of classical military theorists such as Clausewitz, Jomini, and Sun Tzu. Fuller maintained
that emerging technology would fundamentally alter the character of war. With the advent of
armored vehicles, he theorized that warfare would assume this new characteristic and become
armored in nature (Reid, 1995). Some scholars consider his volume, The Foundation of the
Science of War, to be one of the most significant theoretical military science contributions of the
twentieth century (Reid, 1985).
Critics of Fuller’s theories, including his contemporary, Liddell Hart, maintained that
Fuller’s overly positivist and numerical approach focused too much on technological
performance and did not adequately account for the intangible and humanistic nature of warfare
(Hart, 1944). In his prominent work, Thoughts on War, Hart critically noted, “the cult of
numbers is the supreme fallacy of modern warfare. The way it persists is testimony to the
tenacity of stupidity. Even Napoleon, the god of war old-style, declared: ‘In war it is not men,
but man who counts.’” (Hart, 1944, p. 69).
U.S. military theorists further adapted and refined Fuller’s and Hart’s concepts
throughout the twentieth century (Reid, 1985). In 1976, Huba Wass de Czege, a U.S. military
theorist, distilled Hart’s and Fuller’s concepts into four key elements: leadership, survivability,
firepower, and maneuver in his work, Understanding and Developing Combat Power. He
expressed Fuller’s technological emphasis in terms of firepower, survivability, and maneuver. He
expressed Hart’s humanistic emphasis in terms of leadership. His work, and the resulting
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development of professional doctrine and practice, including the manifestation of his principles
during the rapid defeat of Iraqi armed forces in 1991 by U.S. and Coalition forces during
Operation Desert Storm, proliferated the theory of combat power globally amongst academics
and practitioners.
In the late 20th century, as practitioners and scholars began to recognize the scope and
significance of the burgeoning “Information Age”, combat power theorists began to ask
questions similar to those posed by Fuller regarding the impact of new technology on the nature
of warfare (Franz, 1996; Kern, 2015). Accordingly, in 2017, theorists formally added
information as an element of combat power. Currently, combat power theorists recognize seven
dimensions of combat power: command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and
maneuver, protection, sustainment, and information (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018).
A similar non-military concept is organizational capacity. Organizational capacity is a
multidimensional organizational concept comprised of six dimensions: leadership, strategy,
structure/governance, skills, human capital, and accountability (Cox et al., 2018). However, as
Hart identified, there are limits to the positivist approach of Combat Power theory leveraged
within military science circles. An interpretivist approach, or the “art” of military matters,
continues to evolve in theoretical circles, with an increasing emphasis on “design” thinking
among security sector practitioners (Voelz, 2014). The dichotomy of these viewpoints is often
reflected in the use of the term, “military art and science” among security sector practitioners and
scholars (Voelz, 2014). This dichotomy influenced the methodological approach of this study, as
it is comprised of both a positivist quantitative study and a qualitative study.
Utilizing combat power theory as a framework, this study examined resistance utilizing
all seven elements of combat power. The study was conducted through a positivist military
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science lens to help explore a subject that is held largely within interpretivist social science
circles. Further, inclusion of combat power theory enabled a comparative framework to assess
the likelihood of operational success by exploring relative combat power indexed against an
adversary’s combat power (Martin, 2013; U.S. Department of the Army, 2015). The next
sections briefly present each dimension of combat power to enable a more detailed application
within the study.
Command and control. Command and control includes the exercise of authority and
direction by a leader to accomplish the organizational mission (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018).
The concept involves the management and synchronization of the other dimensions of combat
power to accomplish organizational objectives. Command and control represents the leadership
function associated with combat power.
Intelligence. Intelligence is the ability to understand the environment and enable the
organization to act inside the decision cycle of an adversary (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018). In
business terminology, it involves the ability to gather, analyze and share knowledge within the
organization about the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) related to the
organization and relative to its environment. Intelligence supports the decision-making ability of
the organization.
Fires. Fires involves the use of weapons and other systems to create specific effects in
the environment (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018). The concept of fires is often associated with
destructive effects; however, it also includes non-destructive effects. Non-destructive fires cause
an effect in the environment without necessarily causing physical damage, this can include
disruption of revenue streams, interruption or distortion of information flow, or reduction of an
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adversary’s will to compete. Fires are strongly associated with intelligence and movement and
maneuver functions of an organization.
Movement and Maneuver. The concept of movement and maneuver involves the
employment of people and resources to accomplish the organizational mission. Maneuver occurs
when movement and fires occur in concert with one another (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018).
Movement and maneuver activities are often observable acts associated with physical terrain.
However, the concept of maneuver broadly applies to actions taken to gain positional advantage
over an adversary and can involve positioning organizational strength against adversary
vulnerabilities or weakness.
Protection. Protection involves the preservation of the organization’s combat power
(U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018). This component includes physical protection of organizational
members and resources as well as the morale and well-being of the organization. Protection is
closely associated with an understanding of where the organization is vulnerable to adversary
offensive capabilities and strengths.
Sustainment. Sustainment involves the endurance and reach of the organization’s
combat power (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018). It includes the ability of the organization to
provide resources to its members to accomplish organizational objectives. It includes the ability
to recruit and maintain the membership of the organization. Sustainment activities integrate
closely with protection and maneuver functions.
Information. Information involves the deliberate management of information to change
or maintain perceptions, attitudes, and other elements that drive desired behaviors and to support
human decision-making (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018). U.S. military doctrine added
Information to the combat power framework in 2018, representing the first addition to the
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framework since its inception. Inclusion of Information was an acknowledgement of the impact
of the information age, including prolific use of communication technologies, such as social
media, on military operations. The addition of Information to the framework also indicated a
realization of the significant use of information by other nations, such as the Russian Federation
and the People’s Republic of China, to support their defense strategies (Grynkewich, 2018).
Of interest, when revealing the inclusion of Information as an element of combat power
in a leading U.S. defense professional journal, a senior U.S. defense official added emphasis to
the significance of the addition by opining, “within the changing environment, information may
prove to be the preeminent commodity and decisive factor in military operations” (Grynkewich,
2018). According to another article in the same defense journal, “the need for this addition to the
joint functions has become increasingly obvious to military leaders over time. It reveals itself in
the difficulty of addressing gray zone challenges, which often displace the strategic utility of
physical power” (Thomson & Paul, 2018). Another scholar described the increased prioritization
of information in gray zone campaigns by saying, “There is, of course, nothing new about using
information as a vital instrument of war. But in the past information tended to be a handmaiden
to action. Now the informational element appears to be as important as, if not more important
than, the physical dimension” (Pomerantsev 2015).
While security discourse increasingly views the information dimension of combat power
as central to gray zone approaches, the integration of information as an element of combat power
remains underdeveloped in comparison to physical maneuver (The Evolution of Hybrid Warfare,
2017). The design of this study placed an emphasis on exploring the role of information in
resistance campaigns.
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This study utilized combat power theory as a positivist framework to help transition
thinking related to resistance movements into security discourse. Of particular focus within this
study is the information component of combat power. The positivist nature of combat power
theory provides an appropriate theoretical framework to conduct a quantitative study focused on
the first researchable gap identified in the literature review: to improve understanding of
resistance movements from a security studies perspective.
Resistance Theory
Resistance theory is interpretivist. It is applicable at all levels of conflict, ranging from
interpersonal conflict (Scott, 1985), inter-organizational conflict (Sharp, 1980) and international
conflict (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014). This study situated resistance movements within
contentious politics as a form of political warfare (Agan et al., 2019; Steward, 2015; Tilly, 1997),
within comparative politics, as a type of social movement (Arreguin-Toft, 2005; Chenoweth &
Stephan, 2011; Lee, 2016; Schock, 2005; Weinstein, 2007; Wood, 2000; 2003), and within
military science as a form of unconventional warfare (Chenoweth & Stephen 2011; Dudouet,
2015).
Concepts of resistance in the context of warfare are not new. From a political warfare
perspective, Tilly defined contentious politics as “interactions in which actors make claims
bearing on someone else's interest, in which governments appear either as targets, initiators of
claims, or third parties” (1997). From an interstate armed conflict perspective, during the Cold
War, European populations prepared for organized resistance efforts in the event of a large-scale
Soviet invasion and occupation (Stringer, 2017; Sharp 1990). Post-Cold War, these concepts
largely faded from security discourse (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011), however they are beginning
to reemerge (Flanagan et al., 2019). Not all theorists agree that resistance, especially nonviolent
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resistance, is a form of unconventional warfare (Schock, 2003). These scholars maintain that
nonviolent resistance does not connect to security discourse, as it often is associated with pacifist
approaches selected for principled reasons, such as Mohandas Gandhi’s 1930 Salt March and
Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s leadership of the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s (Howes,
2009).
On the surface, there is merit to this viewpoint. King did derive his nonviolent approach
from his Christian faith and study of Gandhi’s tactics and classical theorists, including Marx,
Thoreau, Hobbes, Nietzsche and Rousseau (King, 1958). King himself wrote in in his first book,
Stride Toward Freedom, “the Christian doctrine of love operating through the Gandhian method
of nonviolence was one of the most potent weapons available to oppressed people in their
struggle for freedom” (King, 1958; 1960). However, a closer reading of King’s work reveals a
key distinction from critics of pacifism, such as Niebuhr. King noted that Niebuhr:
Interpreted pacifism as a sort of passive nonresistance to evil expressing naïve trust in the
power of love. But this was a serious distortion. My study of Gandhi convinced me that
true pacifism is not nonresistance to evil, but nonviolent resistance to evil…Gandhi
resisted evil with as much vigor and power as the violent resister…true pacifism is not
unrealistic submission to evil power…it is a courageous confrontation of evil by the
power of love. (King 1958, p. 98)
King further summarizes key distinctions related to resistance in this passage from his
first book:
First, it must be emphasized that nonviolent resistance is not a method for cowards; it
does resist. If one uses this method because he is afraid or merely because he lacks the
instruments of violence, he is not truly nonviolent. This is why Gandhi often said that if
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cowardice is the only alternative to violence, it is better to fight. He made this statement
conscious of the fact that there is always another alternative: no individual or group need
submit to any wrong, nor need they use violence to right the wrong; there is the way of
nonviolent resistance. This is ultimately the way of the strong man…for while the
nonviolent resister is passive in the sense that he is not physically aggressive toward his
opponent, his mind and emotions are always active, constantly seeking to persuade his
opponent that he is wrong.” (King, 1958, p. 102)
The distinctions made by King here are critical and go to the heart of framing of
resistance in this paper. First, King emphasized the use of resistance as a rational, practical, and
strategic option, debunking the view that resistance is a passive choice of only/last resort. King’s
viewpoint contradicts the assertion of some security studies scholars that “the idea that resistance
leaders might choose nonviolence as a strategic choice may be considered naïve or implausible”
(Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). Second, King explored the nature of resistance characterized by
trade-offs between violent and nonviolent tactics, both requiring vigor, energy, and courage. This
perspective is an important consideration for this research as it seeks to understand resistance as
a holistic concept, not conceptually cleaved into bifurcated areas of study. Third, in the last
sentence of the quoted paragraph, King emphasized the importance of the mind, emotions, and
persuasion in resistance movements. The roles of information and cognitive campaigning are a
significant focus area of this study.
As highlighted by Dr. King (1958), scholars often characterize resistance movements by
the degree to which the movement employs violent or nonviolent tactics (Caney, 2015).
Interestingly, the literature review indicated a bias towards violent means in resistance literature
from within military science discourse, as compared to a bias towards non-violent means in
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resistance literature from within social science discourse. In recent years, leading scholars have
begun to discern that the success rates of nonviolent resistance movements have steadily
increased, while the success rates of violent movements have steadily decreased (Chenoweth,
2012; Cramer, 2015; Nepstad, 2011).
Scholars define resistance as a “type of political activity that deliberately or necessarily
circumvents normal political channels and employs non-institutional (and often illegal) forms of
action against an opponent…to mobilize publics to oppose or support different policies, to
delegitimize adversaries, and to remove or restrict adversaries’ sources of power (Chenoweth,
2011, p. 12). Stated another way, “At the heart of resistance are people who choose to oppose
government authority. Resistance begins in the human heart and later expresses itself through
protests, demonstrations, strikes, clandestine organizations, underground newspapers, sabotage,
subversion, guerrilla warfare, and eventually civil war” (Agan et al., 2019). There are a host of
terms often used in concert with resistance such as insurgency, revolution, coup, rebellion, and
insurrection. The key distinction between these various forms of uprising is the centrality of the
civil population. A coup typically involves the use of a violence by a state’s institutions,
typically the military, to change the state’s ruling regime. Whereas in a resistance movement,
members of the civil population are the key actors, not state institutions.
The present study considers resistance as a form of unconventional warfare characterized
by the mobilization of members of the civil population to challenge the power of a regime. Like
resistance scholars, military science theorists categorize resistance by the centrality of the role of
the civil population. U.S. doctrine defines resistance as “an organized effort by some portion of
the civil population of a country to resist the legally established government or an occupying
power and to disrupt civil order and stability” (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014). Furthermore,
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similar to resistance scholars, military theorists consider state support to resistance as a form of
unconventional warfare (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010; 2011). Unconventional warfare is
defined as “operations and activities that are conducted to enable a resistance movement or
insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating
through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area” (U.S. Joint
Chiefs of Staff, 2014). Interestingly, this definition aligns closely with the explicit assertion by
Chenoweth (2011) that civil resistance is a form of unconventional warfare. Further, the
definition unambiguously addresses the two major objectives of resistance movements that are a
focus of this study: regime change and competition for territory. U.S. doctrine further defines
unconventional warfare as a form of irregular warfare, which is “a violent struggle among state
and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s)” (U.S. Joint
Chiefs of Staff, 2016; Ucko, 2020). The last definition presupposes violence as a central
characteristic of unconventional warfare, as do many scholars in the security sector (Abrahms
2006; Arreguin-Toft 2005; Byman & Waxman 2000; Horowitz & Reiter 2001; Lyall & Wilson
2009; Pape 2005; Stoker 2007). Interestingly, the literature review indicated a bias towards
violent means in resistance literature from within military science discourse, as compared to a
bias towards non-violent means in resistance literature from within social science discourse. The
bifurcation and bias between violent and non-violent means of resistance, as opposed to a
holistic view of resistance is a gap in the literature. The figure below depicts the nesting of
resistance within security studies discourse (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1
Security studies resistance taxonomy

The interpretivist nature of resistance theory provides an appropriate theoretical
framework to conduct a qualitative study to better understand, discover, and learn about the
Russian Federation’s and the People’s Republic of China’s appropriation of resistance
methodologies.
Deterrence Theory
Deterrence theory is the third working theory utilized in this study. The study situates
deterrence within international conflict resolution as a strategy of conflict prevention (Väyrynen,
1997). Deterrence theory has been a critical component of conflict prevention paradigms for a
long time and remains central and relevant to contemporary security scholars and conflict
prevention practitioners (Mazarr, 2018). In 2021, The U.S. Secretary of Defense referred to
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deterrence as “the cornerstone of defense” when describing a recent evolution of deterrence
theory called integrated deterrence (Austin, 2021). Integrated deterrence concepts build upon
leading deterrence theories such as deterrence by punishment, deterrence by denial, crossdomain deterrence, robust deterrence, extended deterrence and tailored deterrence. The following
section reviews these concepts and considers evidence that existing deterrence paradigms do not
sufficiently address state appropriation of resistance as a method of gray zone campaigning by
state actors.
Deterrence is one of five distinctive conflict prevention strategies: reassurance,
inducement, deterrence, compellence, or preemption (Väyrynen, 1997). Reassurance and
inducement are positive strategies that leverage diplomacy, incentives, and rewards, whereas
deterrence, compellence, and preemption are negative strategies that leverage costs on an
adversary (Väyrynen, 1997). According to U.S. military doctrine:
Deterrence prevents adversary action through the presentation of a credible threat of
unacceptable counteraction and belief that the costs of the action outweigh the perceived
benefits…deterrence stems from an adversary’s belief that the opponent’s actions have
created or can create an unacceptable risk to the adversary’s achievement of objectives,
thus the contemplated action cannot succeed, or the costs are too high. Therefore, a
potential aggressor chooses not to act for fear of failure, risk, or consequences. (U.S.
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2017)
Of note, the use of italics is intentional to highlight the centrality of cognition and
perception to deterrence paradigms. Influencing adversary cognition is a critical element of
deterrence theory (Davis, 2014; Jervis et al., 1985). The cognitive component of deterrence
theory is key to understanding the difference between deterrence by denial and defensive
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strategies. Kroenig and Pavel (2002) highlighted the criticality of influencing adversary decisionmaking in deterrence, “defensive policies are designed to fend off an opponent in the event of an
attack and deterrence policies intend to convince an adversary not to attack in the first place.”
There are two prominent components of deterrence theory found within the literature deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial (George & Smoke, 1989; Mazzar, 2018).
Deterrence by punishment. Deterrence by punishment aims to prevent adversary action
by threatening an adversary with overwhelming adverse counteraction in response to the
contemplated action (George & Smoke, 1989). U.S. deterrence strategy has been punishment
focused for decades. Traditional nuclear deterrence emphasizes the nuclear triad (e.g.,
intercontinental missiles, long-range bombers, and submarine-launched missiles) as the means of
punishment (CATO, 2013; Futter & Williams, 2016). A well-known concept related to nuclear
deterrence by punishment is mutual assured destruction (MAD). Under MAD, deterrence
stemmed from the threat of mutually catastrophic punishment between the United States and
Soviet Union (Brodie, 1973).
Scholars note these nuclear-centric deterrence paradigms have limitations and credibility
problems. According to Jervis (2009), “the stability that MAD was supposed to provide actually
would have allowed U.S. adversaries to use force below the nuclear level whenever it was to
their advantage to do so.” Undeterred Russian Federation gray zone aggression in the Ukraine in
2014 provided a prime example of this assessment.
A contemporary variation of deterrence by punishment is cross-domain deterrence.
Cross-domain deterrence involves the threat of punishment “from one domain to prevent attacks
from another” (Scouras et al., 2014). The cross-domain deterrence approach has potential for
broad application across multiple domains, especially in the cyber domain, as “deterrence
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through cyberspace by means of cyberspace is limited due to its inherent character and purpose”
(Trujillo, 2014). An example might be preventing an adversary from conducting a nuclear attack
by threatening attack in the cyber domain. Extended deterrence seeks to expand the U.S.
“nuclear umbrella” of prevention to non-nuclear allies, often including forward staging of U.S.
nuclear and conventional forces (Chubin, 2009). However, scholars point out that extended
deterrence lacks credibility, “or, as it was often put, how could an American president credibly
persuade his Soviet counterpart that he was prepared to risk Chicago for Hamburg?” (Pifer et al.,
2010).
Efforts by the United States to develop non-nuclear long-range strike capability, known
as conventional prompt global strike (CPGS), might address some of these credibility concerns
by providing additional conventional means for the U.S. to conduct deterrence by punishment. In
2012, the U.S. undersecretary of Defense for Policy, noted that programs like CPGS could help
strengthen U.S. non-nuclear forces as a part of U.S. deterrence paradigms (Woolf, 2017). Some
argue in comparison to the Cold War, in the current multipolar global security environment, it is
getting harder for the United States to punish multiple near peers (Wess, 2015). Taken together,
these factors highlight limitations of deterrence by punishment and help situate deterrence by
denial concepts.
Deterrence by denial. Deterrence by denial focuses on denying an adversary the benefits
of the contemplated action, as opposed to punishing the adversary (George & Smoke, 1989;
Wess, 2015). This approach increases the adversary’s perceived risk of failure (Kroenig & Pavel,
2012). Two of the primary ways to achieve deterrence by denial are to make an objective hard to
take or hard to keep (Wess 2015). Analysts noted to “achieve denial; one has to have the
demonstrable warfighting capability to win in the conflict” (Koffman, 2016). Therefore, denial
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concepts aimed at making an objective hard to take often call for the forward staging of largescale conventional forces, sometimes referred to as ‘robust deterrence’ (Chubin, 2009; Koffman,
2016). These activities often include large-scale exercises and “shows of force” aimed at
demonstrating the U.S.’s capability and will to amass overwhelming conventional power,
thereby threatening adversary failure of the contemplated aggression.
However, some analysts characterize conventional denial as a no-win situation when
facing a near peer adversary. Analysts noted that if the U.S. positioned sufficient conventional
force to win against a nuclear-armed adversary, it might result in escalation to nuclear conflict
(Jervis, 1976; Koffman, 2016). Both the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China
have stated such approaches to escalation management (Chase & Chan, 2016; Sokov 2014).
Conversely, if the U.S. fails to position sufficient conventional force to win, it does not present a
credible deterrent. Stated another way, “making the U.S. Army presence more robust in a
militarily untenable situation [does not] translate into more robust deterrence, [but rather] a
greater liability” (Koffman, 2016). As experienced by the U.S. military in Iraq and Afghanistan,
large-scale ground forces can present lucrative targets to irregular forces. Additionally, adversary
advancements in anti-access area denial capabilities, combined with anti-western sentiments and
political sensitivities to basing or forward staging U.S. forces, challenge the deployment of largescale conventional forces for deterrence means (Chubin, 2009). Finally, resource and political
constraints, especially long-duration, large-scale deployments of land forces, may curb U.S.
conventional denial options (Shlapak & Johnson 2016). Another approach to deterrence by
denial is to make adversary objectives harder to keep, rather than harder to take; essentially
making them, a ‘bitter pill’ once swallowed (Wess, 2015). These deterrence concepts include
imposing costs on occupation forces through resistance forces (Sharp, 1990). These concepts of
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deterrence by denial through resistance forces are relevant to the research questions and research
objectives.
Tailored deterrence. Another approach to deterrence is tailored deterrence. It emerged
after the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR; U.S. Department of Defense, 2006)
identified shortcomings in traditional deterrence concepts and called for a “fully balanced,
tailored capability to deter both state and non-state threats” (Bunn, 2007). According to some
scholars, tailored deterrence is a distinct approach because it is “actor specific” and emphasizes
deep understanding of adversary cognition with the intention to influence the adversary
(Schneider & Ellis, 2011). Tailored deterrence includes concepts for deterrence in the cyber
domain (Kramer & Teplinsky, 2013) and deterrence of non-state actors (Kroenig & Pavel 2012).
Overall, tailored deterrence was an effort to advance deterrence theory beyond the
generalizable, punishment-centric Cold War approach. Tailored deterrence advocates saw this
evolution of deterrence concepts as necessary to better address emerging areas of conflict
including space, cyber, and multi-domain warfare. Tailored deterrence concepts began to shift
strategic deterrence discourse beyond nuclear punishment-centric dominated paradigms and
towards the contemporary emerging concept of integrated deterrence.
Integrated deterrence. Integrated deterrence aims to go beyond tailored deterrence by
bringing to bear all elements of national and allied power, including diplomatic, information,
military, financial, intelligence and law enforcement means (DIMEFIL) to achieve deterrence by
punishment or denial (Austin, 2021; Cronk, 2021; Oskarsson, 2017). These concepts are similar
to those described in Chinese concepts of ‘strategic integrated deterrence’ (Chase & Chan,
2016). However, critics of integrated deterrence question the credibility and effectiveness of nonmilitary means to influence Chinese and Russian decision-making (Spoehr, 2021).
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Current deterrence paradigms do not specifically address gray zone campaigning or state
appropriation of resistance (Green etal, 2017; Crombe etal, 2021; Hicks etal, 2019; Jones, 2019;
Robinson, 2020; Delafield etal, 2022). The table below provides a summary of the various forms
of deterrence discussed in this section (see Table 3).
Table 3
Existing Deterrence Matrix

Nuclear

Punishment

Denial

Triad

Extended

Conventional Global Strike

Robust

Cyber/Space

Cross-domain Tailored

Gray Zone

Gap

Gap

Security Discourse - Great Powers Competition (Russia and China)
The most recent U.S. National Security and Defense Strategies (2018; 2021) established
new priorities and approaches for U.S. security discourse with significant focus on the Russian
Federation and the People’s Republic of China. The first paragraph of the most recent Interim
National Security and Defense Strategy (2021) places emphasis on the “growing rivalry with
China and Russia”, and the 2018 strategy is characterized as “compete, deter, win.” In the first
sentence, the 2018 document establishes the primacy of deterrence to U.S. defense strategy, “The
Department of Defense’s enduring mission is to provide combat-credible military forces needed
to deter war and protect the security of our nation. Should deterrence fail, the Joint Force is
prepared to win” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2018). It clearly articulates that the “central
challenge to U.S. prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term strategic competition
with [China and Russia]” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2018). The strategy emphasizes how
state actors, including the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China are “using
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other areas of competition short of open warfare to achieve their ends (e.g. information warfare,
ambiguous or denied proxy operations, and subversion). These trends, if unaddressed, will
challenge our ability to deter aggression” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2018). The 2018 strategy
explicitly states a strategic shift towards interstate conflict, “Inter-state strategic competition, not
terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security” (U.S. Department of Defense,
2018). The 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance further highlighted this shift and
focused on deterrence of gray zone activities, “we will develop capabilities to better compete and
deter gray zone actions (U.S. White House, 2021).
Russian Federation security discourse codifies gray zone concepts (Bowen, 2021;
Koffman, 2021; Thomas, 2019). Russian gray zone methods have evolved but are not new. The
most recent innovations began to emerge in 2000, as Russia sought to counterbalance U.S.
conventional military superiority and prevent additional Color Revolutions from challenging the
Russian Federation regime. In 2000, Russian doctrine included the use of limited nuclear strike
to defend against large-scale conventional forces. This strategy, referred to as “escalate to deescalate” (Sokov 2014), marked a shift towards an integrated approach, instead of keeping
nuclear, conventional, and irregular methods separate.
The Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation, General Valery Gerasimov
(2013), published one of the most influential Russian writings on this subject, “The Value of
Science is in the Foresight”. In this article, Gerasimov notes that “the very ‘rules of war’ have
changed” with an emphasis on nonmilitary means of interstate conflict as demonstrated by the
Color Revolutions (Gerasimov, 2013). Noteworthy in the article was an emphasis on information
warfare and the blended use of violent and nonviolent methods. In context, scholars understand
this article as Gerasimov’s attempt to describe the methodologies employed by the West, not a
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prescription for future Russian activity (Hoffman, 2007; 2009; Solmaz, 2022). However, during
influential presentations to the Academy of Military Science in 2013, Gerasimov called for the
development of “new-type” warfare methods and practices that would incorporate his
observations eleven times (Thomas, 2019). The next year, Russian activities began in the
Ukraine that blended information, military, and population-centric means to foment population
uprisings with a goal of regime change in Crimea and Donbas. While Russian security discourse
continues to emphasize traditional nuclear deterrence, the Russian Federation places significant
emphasis on evolving “new-type” means of deterrence and defense (Russian Federation, 2020).
The ongoing Russian gray-zone conflict methodologies in the Russo-Ukrainian War from 20142022 are reflective of Gerasimov’s influence on Russian security discourse, doctrine, and
decision-making (Leonhard & Phillips, 2016; Malyarenko & Kormych 2022; Newton 2018).
Security discourse of the People’s Republic of China codifies gray zone concepts that
appropriate civil resistance movements. Under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP), China conducts a wide range of gray zone activities characterized as “active defense”,
influenced by the early works of Mao Zedong, the Color Revolutions, and more recent civil
resistance movements in Hong Kong (2014) and Taiwan (2014) known as the Umbrella and
Sunflower Movements (Lin, 2015; Mattis & Joske, 2019; U.S. Department of the Army, 2021).
CCP leadership viewed the Color Revolutions as a threat to their regime and national
interests (Chen 2010; Keyue 2021; Reuters 2019; Sheng & Qingqing 2021). Under the Great
United Front (大统战) concept, the CCP revitalized the United Front Work Department as a
“magic weapon” to appropriate and control social groups and social movements in support of
Chinese government security objectives (Cordesman, 2021; Hala & Lulu, 2018; Kynge et al.,
2017; Lee & Hung, 2014; Mattis & Joske, 2019; Xinhua, 2022). Additionally, Chinese
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“unrestricted warfare” strategy asserts “the battlefield is everywhere”, therefore, “nonmilitary
tools are becoming equally prominent and useful for the achievement of previously military
objectives” (Mazarr, 2015, p.83; Liang & Xiangsui, 1999). China’s doctrine of “The Three
Warfares” encourages high-volume cognitive campaigning by employing legal, psychological,
and media warfare alongside conventional and irregular warfare (Burke et al., 2020;
Pomerantsev, 2015).
Furthermore, China’s strategic deterrence paradigm includes the use of irregular
deterrence by denial as a fifth pillar alongside nuclear, conventional, space and cyber
capabilities. Chinese doctrine refers to this as People’s War. It calls for “using a country’s
population to draw an enemy deeper inland, where the population can then use mobile and
guerilla warfare to bleed the enemy dry” (Chase & Chan, 2016; U.S. Department of the Army,
2021). China also utilizes its civilian population as a means of interstate conflict in the South
China Sea. The Chinese government co-opts civilian fishing crews and then provides them with
“satellite-based marine radios that help China to surveil and picket the South China Sea and
harass “trespassing’ vessels” (Erickson & Kennedy, 2015; Freier, 2016). This approach enables a
denial strategy without directly confronting the United States militarily. Taken together, the
Chinese appropriation and exploitation of civilian populations, resistance, and information takes
many challenging forms. As within deterrence theory, these gray zone forms of interstate conflict
are largely unaddressed by existing deterrence paradigms.
Researchable Literature Gaps
A review of the literature pertinent to this study highlighted four primary gaps in
knowledge.
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1. The literature lacks holistic study of resistance that does not center on bifurcation of
violent/non-violent methods, and without bias towards non-violent methods.
2. The literature lacks research that utilizes combat power theory to examine resistance
from a security studies perspective to gain a better understanding of specific variables
significantly associated with success or progress of regime change, territorial
secession, and anti-occupation resistance campaigns during the formative period of
1945-2006 that are akin to the types of resistance movements appropriated by Russian
and Chinese security forces in the contemporary period 2006-2022.
3. The literature lacks research that utilizes combat power theory and resistance theory
to examine Russian and Chinese appropriation of resistance forces in the
contemporary period 2006-2022 as a form of unconventional warfare in deliberate
gray zone interstate conflict.
4. The literature lacks concepts for deterrence of Russian and Chinese appropriation of
resistance in gray zone campaigns as a strategy of international conflict prevention.
Research Questions
The present study addresses the four identified literature gaps through consideration of
three research questions.
1. What are the significant relationships between combat power variables and
success/progress in resistance campaigns during the formative period from 1945-2006
whose goals are regime change, territorial secession, or anti-occupation?
2. How do the relationships between elements of combat power and the
success/progress in resistance movements in the formative period from 1945-2006
help us understand the doctrines, words, and actions of Russian and Chinese
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government officials regarding state appropriation of resistance for gray zone
campaigns in the contemporary period from 2006-2022?
3. How can we better understand options to deter Russian and Chinese appropriation of
resistance for gray zone campaigns?
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction
The research methodology included a two-stage, complementary, dynamic mixed
methods design suited to address the three research questions of the study (Creswell & Clark,
2011). In the first complementary study, quantitative methods were employed to analyze the
NAVCO 2.0 dataset of global resistance movements from 1945-2006. The analysis explored the
relationships between combat power variables and progress/success in resistance campaigns. The
quantitative findings identified critical resistance variables. These variables informed a second
complementary study that utilized qualitative content analysis of primary sources, scholarly
articles, and news sources to explore the appropriation of resistance by the Russian Federation
and the People’s Republic of China from 2006-2022. The nature of relationship between the
quantitative and qualitative samples is multilevel, as the quantitative sample focuses
predominantly on tactical characteristics of a broad range of resistance movements, and the
qualitative sample focused more on the strategic characteristics of state appropriated resistance
movements (Onwuegbuzie & Collins, 2007). The selected methods of analysis involved
evaluation of existing data and archival sources and did not require human subject research.
Complementary Study #1: Quantitative Methodology
The first complementary study quantitatively explored the first research question utilizing
combat power theory and nonparametric statistical analysis: What are the relationships between
combat power variables and success/progress in resistance campaigns during the formative
period from 1945-2006 whose goals are regime change, territorial secession, or anti-occupation?
The quantitative methods employed support the exploratory purpose of the study by examining a
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large quantitative dataset to identify key resistance variables during the formative period of
1945-2006.
Data Collection and Sampling
The data set analyzed in this study was derived from the Nonviolent and Violent
Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) Data Project 2.0 (Chenoweth & Lewis 2013). The NAVCO
Data Project is a research effort led by the University of Denver Sie Cheou-Kang Center of
International Security and Diplomacy. According to the University of Denver, the NAVCO
project “is an attempt to provide researchers with data to understand the causes, dynamics, and
outcomes of nonviolent mass campaigns” (University of Denver, 2013). The NAVCO 2.0 dataset
was selected for this study for its completeness, rigor and applicability to the research questions.
The NAVCO 2.0 data set codes 57 variables across 250 resistance campaigns annually
from 1945-2006, spanning 1,162 total campaign years. In total, the dataset is comprised of 1,726
unique cases and 98,382 data points. The dataset is coded by tactical choices of resistance
movements and the ways opponent governments and third-party actors respond to resistance
movement choices (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013). The formula provided by Tabachnick and Fidell
(2013) to determine the needed sample size for significance is N > 50 + 8m (m = number of
independent variables). According to this formula, only 506 cases would be required for
significance in this study. Therefore, the sample size of 1,726 cases exceeds the requirement to
achieve significant scientific value.
It its completeness, the NAVCO 2.0 dataset is a compilation of disparate datasets
regarding social movements and resistance campaigns. The data related to nonviolent campaigns
derived from three sources (Carter et al., 2007; Karatnacky & Ackerman, 2005; Schock, 2005).
A panel of a dozen experts in nonviolent conflict and social movements reviewed the
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compilation of these data sources for completeness and appropriateness. The data related to
violent campaigns primarily derived from five sources. These sources are: The Correlates of War
(COW) dataset (Gleditsch, 2004), the Encyclopedia of Armed Conflict (Clodfelter, 2002), Kalev
Sepp’s list of major counterinsurgency operations (2005), Lyall and Wilson’s (2008) dataset on
insurgencies, and Fearon and Laitin’s data set on civil wars (2003). Regarding the rigor of the
data set, since its public release in 2013, the NAVCO 2.0 dataset has been peer reviewed and
utilized in several studies (Anisin, 2016; Bethke, 2017; Chenoweth, 2018; Kirisci & Demirhan,
2019; Stewart, 2015; Thurber, 2013; 2018; Tompkins, 2015).
Regarding the applicability of the dataset to the research question, the population from
which the sample is drawn includes resistance movements between 1945 and 2006 with at least
1,000 observed participants with goals of overthrowing the existing regime or expelling foreign
powers. The sampling procedures provide a representative sample through purposive, diversity,
and non-probability sampling. Distinguishing features of the dataset relevant to the research
questions are inclusion of (a) variables pertaining to the nature of the resistance movement
(primarily violent or non-violent); (b) the yearly progress of the resistance movement (status quo,
visible gains short of concessions, limited concessions, significant concessions or complete
success); and (c) resistance campaign goals (regime change, significant institutional reform,
policy change, territorial secession, greater autonomy, or anti-occupation).
Multiple alternative datasets were explored, including the Transnational Social
Movement Organization Dataset (Smith & Wiest, 2012), the Strategies of Resistance Data
Project (Cunningham et al., 2020), the Revolutionary and Militant Organizations Dataset
(Acosta, 2019), the Global Nonviolent Action Database (Lakey, 2016), the Global Digital
Activism Data Set (2014), the Social Conflict Analysis Database (Salehyan et al., 2012), and the
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Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (Boschee et al., 2015). These alternative data sets were
not suitable for the current study due to concerns with completeness of the data set and relevance
to the research questions.
Not all of the variables in the NAVCO 2.0 data set were relevant to the research
questions or theoretical lens of this study. These variables focused on resistance movement
diversity and social change objectives that were outside of the scope of this study. Many of the
variables coded resistance movement diversity, including the number of new organizations in the
campaign, unity amongst resistance sub-groups, gender diversity, age diversity, class diversity,
urban-rural diversity, ideological diversity, party diversity, regional diversity, ethnic diversity,
and religious diversity. Other variables coded in the data set included social change objectives:
educational system, social welfare system, judiciary system, human rights, discrimination, and
repression. The table below provides a crosswalk of 15 of 57 variables in the NAVCO 2.0
dataset relevant to combat power theory (see Table 4).
Table 4
Combat Power Elements coded in NAVCO 2.0 Dataset
Combat Power Element

NAVCO 2.0 Dataset Variables

Command and Control

campaign leadership structure (1)

Intelligence
Fires
Maneuver

existence of a radical flank, security force defectors to resistance (2)

Protection

public official defectors to resistance (1)

Sustainment

state support for campaign, diaspora support for campaign, NGO support
for campaign, foreign support (5)

Information

resistance media campaign, resistance traditional media, resistance new
media, domestic media coverage, international media coverage (6)
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The study further selected 9 of the 15 combat power variables as independent variables in
the study based on their specific relevance to the research questions. The variables chosen were:
(1) security forces defection, (2) state defection, (3) international traditional media coverage, (4)
domestic traditional media coverage, (5) resistance movement outreach to traditional media, (6)
resistance movement creation of social media system, (7) resistance movement creation of
traditional media system, (8) whether a radical flank exists within the resistance movement, and
(9) whether or not the campaign has formal overt support from foreign nations.
The selected variables have directly connections to the underpinnings of this study,
however, the relevance of four of these variables might be less intuitive, including (1) security
defectors; (2) state defectors; (3) radical flank; and (4) foreign support. Regarding the first of
these variables, a security force defection is defined in the NAVCO codebook (Chenoweth &
Lewis, 2013) as, “people formerly associated with the state, who publicly announce their support
for the campaign.” These individuals, or “security officials”, are those associated with the
official police or military apparatus. Often, these individuals are generals or military leaders, but
they can include police that follow state directives to crackdown on the resistance. For the
second variable, state defectors represent “people formerly associated with the state, who
publicly announce their support for the campaign. This means that former state officials formally
or tacitly support the campaign.” The third variable, radical flank is defined as “a group that
adopts extremist rhetoric and violent strategies to pursue their goals.” Finally, foreign support is
defined as, “other states have voiced their support for the opposition campaign, provided arms to
insurgents or provided them with other material resources and support” (Chenoweth & Lewis,
2013). In consideration of their definitions, each of these terms is related to the considerations of
resistance emphasized in this study.
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The variable “camp_goals” in the NAVCO 2.0 data set codes key data regarding
resistance movement objectives (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013). This variable coded six possible
resistance campaign goals: (1) regime change; (2) significant institutional reform; (3) policy
change; (4) territorial secession; (5) greater autonomy; and (6) anti-occupation. The study
examined three of the six coded campaign goals due to their direct relevance to the research
questions: regime change, territorial secession, and anti-occupation. The study did not include
the other three campaign goals in this study, as they are primarily associated with domestic,
principled resistance movements, which are not within the scope of this study. Within the
NAVCO 2.0 dataset, the campaign goal of “regime change” is coded as “0” and is defined as “a
goal of overthrowing the state or substantially altering state institutions to the point that it would
cause a de facto shift in the regime’s hold on power” (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013). Within the
NAVCO 2.0 dataset, the campaign goal of “territorial secession” is coded as “3”. The campaign
goal of “anti-occupation” is coded as “5” and defined as “conflicts waged against a foreign
power” (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013). These data fields closely align with the U.S. military
definition of unconventional warfare as “operations and activities that are conducted to enable a
resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying
power” (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014).
Another variable from the NAVCO 2.0 essential to the scope and focus of the data
analysis and the purpose of this study on resistance is “primary method”. This variable coded the
primary methods of a resistance campaign. A campaign that is primarily violent in nature is
coded “0”, while a campaign that is primarily nonviolent is coded “1”. Analyzing these
distinctions is critical to answering the research questions and addressing the purpose of this
study: to address gaps in the literature of examining resistance from a security studies
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perspective. Further, this emphasis provides additional intellectual space for contemplation and
examination of violent resistance as a deliberate strategic choice by nation states and moves
beyond implicit bias against violent resistance by researchers focused on examining resistance
from a non-violent bias.
Two variables from the NAVCO 2.0 were dependent variables in the study: “success”
and “progress.” These variables coded the outcomes of the resistance campaign. “Success” was
coded as a “1” and represented movements that achieved campaign outcomes within one year of
peak activity. “Progress” coded into separate categories: status quo (“0”), visible gains short of
concessions (“1”), limited concessions achieved (“2”), significant concessions achieved (“3”),
complete success (“4”) and (“-99”) for unknown. As noted in the previous paragraphs, this study
examined the success or progress, coded as described in this paragraph, of resistance campaigns
with the goal of regime change, territorial secession, or anti-occupation. The tables below depict
the variables explored in this study.
The first of the tables directly describes the coding of variables pertaining to combat
power elements (see Table 5).
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Table 5
Selected Combat Power Elements coded in NAVCO 2.0 Dataset
Combat Power
Element

Combat Power
NAVCO 2.0 Variable
Radical flank

Variable Description

Domestic traditional media
coverage

ordinal: 0 (primarily violent
campaign), 1 (no radical flank), 2
(radical flank)
nominal binary: 1 (yes), 0 (no) or 99 (unknown)
ordinal: 0 (little to none), 1
(moderate), 2 (high), -99 (unknown)

Resistance movement outreach
to traditional media
Resistance movement creation
of social media system

nominal binary: 1 (yes), 0 (no) or 99 (unknown)
nominal binary: 1 (yes), 0 (no) or 99 (unknown)

Sustainment

Resistance movement creation
of traditional media system
International traditional media
coverage
Resistance foreign support

Protection

State defection

nominal binary: 1 (yes), 0 (no) or 99 (unknown)
ordinal: 0 (little to none), 1
(moderate), 2 (high), -99 (unknown)
nominal binary: nominal binary: 1
(yes), 0 (no) or -99 (unknown)
nominal binary: 1 (yes), 0 (no) or 99 (unknown)

Maneuver
Security forces defection

Information

The next table details the coding of the variables pertaining to resistance movement
outcomes (see Table 6).
Table 6
Resistance Movement Outcomes coded in NAVCO 2.0 Dataset
Movement Outcomes

NAVCO 2.0 Dataset Variables

Progress

ordinal: 1 (status quo), 1 (visible gains short of concessions, 2
(limited concession achieved), 3 (significant concessions achieved),
4 (complete success), -99 (unknown)
nominal binary: nominal binary: 1 (yes), or 0 (no)
ordinal: 0 (regime change), 1 (significant institutional reform), 2
(policy change), 3 (territorial secession), 4 (greater autonomy), 5
(anti-occupation), -99 (unknown)

Campaign Success
Stated Goals of the
Campaign
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The final table lists the variables of resistance movement methodologies and their
associated NAVCO coding (see Table 7).
Table 7
Resistance Movement Methodologies coded in NAVCO 2.0 Dataset
Movement Method

NAVCO 2.0 Dataset Variables

prim_method

Denotes the primary type of resistance method used in a campaign
year. nominal binary: 0 (primarily violent campaign), 1 (primarily
nonviolent)

Data Analysis
The quantitative study of this dissertation explored the resistance-focused variables of the
NAVCO data set in three stages without privileging the method of resistance (i.e.,
violent/nonviolent) during the analysis. Rather, the analysis focused on the relationships between
the elements of the movement (e.g., combat power variables) and the outcomes of the movement
(i.e., success or progress). By examining progress as an ordinal variable, this analysis provided a
deeper understanding of the relationship between different combat power variables at varying
levels of success. This first stage analysis provided a macro understanding of key combat power
variables associated with success and progress without regard to resistance methodologies (i.e.,
violent/nonviolent) or campaign goals (e.g., regime change, anti-occupation).
A second stage of analysis focused on the aspect of the research question to examine
resistance movements with specific goals: regime change or anti-occupation. As in the first
stage, this analysis did not bias or bifurcate between violent and nonviolent resistance
movements. Through this open consideration, the findings provide a fuller understanding of the
relationships between combat power variables and specific resistance campaign goals, which are
the focus of this study.
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Finally, the study analyzed three specific data fields within the NAVCO 2.0 dataset with
particular relevance to the research focus on Russian Federation appropriation of resistance
movements. Specifically, the researcher examined three specific resistance movements: (1) Rose
Revolution in Georgia in 2003; (2) Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2002-2005; and (3) Tulip
Revolution in Kyrgyzstan in 2005. These resistance movements informed Russian formulation of
resistance appropriation methods.
The study explored the relationships between 57 variables in a dataset comprised of 1,726
cases using non-parametric statistical techniques. The dataset is suitable for non-parametric
analysis based on assumptions of independence and expected frequencies. Regarding
independence, the data collection is not a repeated-measures design. Regarding expected
frequencies, no expected values should be below five when using 2 x 2 tables, and no more than
20% of values should be below five when using larger tables (Field, 2013).
To explore relationships between a dichotomous nominal variable and an ordinal
variable, the study utilized a Chi-square test for independence linear-by-linear results
(Mangiafico, 2018). Statistical significance was calculated at the traditional alpha level of p < .05
(Field 2013; Pallant 2011). The results of Chi-square tests were reported using the following
format:

2 (df, n=) =, p =, phi =. Phi coefficient was .10 for small effect, .30 for medium effect

and .50 for large effect (Pallat 2016). The following table depicts the chi squared tests conducted
in the study (see Table 8).
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Table 8
Chi Squared Tests Between Nominal and Ordinal Variables
Combat Power Variable
(Independent)

nominal x nominal

Outcome
(Dependent)
Progress
ordinal: 1 (status quo), 1
(visible gains short of
concessions, 2 (limited
concession achieved), 3
(significant concessions
achieved), 4 (complete
success), -99 (unknown)
nominal x ordinal

nominal x nominal

nominal x ordinal

nominal x ordinal

nominal x nominal

nominal x ordinal

nominal x ordinal

nominal x nominal

nominal x ordinal

nominal x ordinal

nominal x nominal
nominal x nominal

nominal x ordinal
nominal x ordinal

nominal x ordinal
nominal x ordinal

Success
nominal binary: 1
(yes), or 0 (no)

Resistance movement
outreach to traditional
media (nominal)
Resistance movement
creation of social media
system (nominal)
Resistance movement
creation of traditional
media system (nominal)
Security forces defection
(nominal)
State defection (nominal)
Resistance foreign
support (nominal)
International traditional
media coverage (ordinal)
Radical flank (ordinal)
Domestic traditional
media coverage (ordinal)

Campaign Goal
ordinal: 0 (regime
change), 3 (territorial
secession), 5 (antioccupation), -99
(unknown)

nominal x ordinal

ordinal x nominal
ordinal x nominal
ordinal x nominal

To explore relationships between two ordinal variables, the study utilized Spearman’s rho
(ρ) tests (Pallant 2016; see Table 9). The results of Spearman’s rho were reported using the
following format: There was a [negative or positive] correlation between the two variables, r(df)
= [r value], p = [p-value]. The strength of correlation interpreted as follows: r = .10 to .29
(small), r = .30 to .49 (medium), and r = .50 to 1.0 (large; Field, 2013).
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Table 9
Spearman’s Rho (ρ) Tests Between Ordinal Variables
Combat Power
Variable
(Independent)

International
traditional media
coverage (ordinal)
Radical flank
(ordinal)
Domestic traditional
media coverage
(ordinal)

Outcome
(Dependent)
Progress
ordinal: 1 (status quo), 1 (visible gains
short of concessions, 2 (limited
concession achieved), 3 (significant
concessions achieved), 4 (complete
success), -99 (unknown)
ordinal x ordinal

Campaign Goal
ordinal: 0 (regime change), 3
(territorial secession), 5 (antioccupation), -99 (unknown)

ordinal x ordinal

ordinal x ordinal

ordinal x ordinal

ordinal x ordinal

ordinal x ordinal

Complementary Study #2: Content Analysis
In the second complementary study, qualitative methods and resistance theory enabled
further exploration of the relationships identified in the first study. Complementary study #2
addressed the second research question: how do the relationships between combat power
variables and success/progress in resistance movements from 1945-2006 help us understand the
doctrines, words, and actions of Russian and Chinese government officials regarding state
appropriation of resistance for gray zone campaigns from 2006-2022? Deterrence theory enabled
additional exploration of the third research question: how can we better understand options to
deter Russian and Chinese appropriation of resistance for gray zone campaigns?
Complementary Study #2 utilized content analysis techniques. Content analysis “is a
research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful
matter) to the contexts of their use” (Krippendorf, 2019, p. 24). This definition allows “content to
emerge in the process of a researcher analyzing a text relative to a particular context”
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(Krippendorf, 2019, p. 24). From an epistemological perspective, this approach maintains that
texts can be read from numerous perspectives and derive multiple meanings and inferences
(Krippendorf, 34, 2019). The epistemological orientation aligns with this study, which is an
exploratory study to address gaps in the literature by increasing the understanding of resistance
movements from the perspective of state actors, not only from the perspective of non-state
actors, which currently predominates the literature. Content analysis places emphasis on
abductive logic to derive inferences, including extrapolations, trends, patterns, and differences
(Krippendorf, 2019).
The components of content analysis are unitizing, sampling, coding, reducing, inferring,
and narrating (Krippendorf, 2019). In content analysis, there are three kinds of units: (1)
sampling units; (2) recording/coding units; and (3) context units defined by physical, syntactical,
categorical, prepositional, and thematic distinctions. The study utilized relevance/purposive
sampling and statistical sampling theory to derive significance level of 0.05, requiring 29 units in
the sampling population (Krippendorf, 2019, p. 125). The table below provides a summary of the
primary sources examined in this study pertaining to Russian Security Discourse (see Table 10).
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Table 10
Primary Sources: Russian Security Discourse 2006-2022
Author (Date)

Title

Source

Gerasimov,
Valery (2013)

The Value of Science is in
the Foresight

https://www.armyupress.army.mil/portals/7/militar
yreview/archives/english/militaryreview_20160228_
art008.pdf

Gerasimov,
Valery (2018)

Thoughts on Future Military
Conflict

https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/ArmyPress-Online-Journal/documents/2019/Gerasimov2019.pdf

Putin, Vladimir
(2022)

Joint Statement of the
Russian Federation and
People’s Republic of China

http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5770

Putin, Vladimir
(2021)

National Security Strategy of http://scrf.gov.ru/media/files/file/l4wGRPqJvETSk
the Russian Federation
UTYmhepzRochb1j1jqh.pdf
https://www.ndc.nato.int/research/research.php?ico
de=704

Brychkov, A.S.
(2017)

Color Revolutions in Russia:
Possibility and Reality

https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/Hot%2
0Spots/Documents/Russia/Color-RevolutionsBrychkov-Nikonorov.pdf

Cordesman,
Anthony (2014)

Russia and the “Color
Revolution”

https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/legacy_files/files/publication/140529_Russi
a_Color_Revolution_Summary.pdf

Putin, Vladimir
(2021)

On the Historical Unity of
Russians and Ukrainians

https://static.poder360.com.br/2022/03/Article-byVladimir-Putin-On-the-Historical-Unity-ofRussians-and-Ukrainians.pdf

Putin, Vladimir
(Mar. 18, 2014)

Transcript: Putin says Russia
will protect the rights of
Russians abroad

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/transcriptputin-says-russia-will-protect-the-rights-ofrussians-abroad/2014/03/18/432a1e60-ae99-11e3a49e-76adc9210f19_story.html

Putin, Vladimir
(Feb. 24, 2022)

Address by the President of
the Russian Federation

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67
843

Gerasimov,
Valery (2018)

The Development of
Military Strategy under
Contemporary Conditions.
Tasks for Military Science

https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/ArmyPress-Online-Journal/documents/2019/OrensteinThomas.pdf

In addition to the primary sources reviewed in the content analysis, several scholarly
articles were analyzed (see Table 11).
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Table 11
Scholarly Articles: Russian Security Discourse 2006-2022
Author (Date)

Title

Source

Thomas, Timothy Russian Military Thought:
L (2019)
Concepts and Elements

https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publicatio
ns/pr-19-1004-russian-military-thought-conceptselements.pdf

Kofman, Michael
etal (2021)

Russian Military Strategy:
Core Tenets and Operational
Concepts

https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/pdf/RussianMilitary-Strategy-Core-Tenets-and-OperationalConcepts.pdf

Sokov, Nikolai
(2020)

Russia Clarifies Its Nuclear
Deterrence Policy

https://vcdnp.org/russia-clarifies-its-nucleardeterrence-policy/

Hinkle, Katherine Russia's Reactions to the
(2017)
Color Revolutions

https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/52991

Bowen, Andrew
(2021)

Russian Armed Forces:
Military Doctrine and
Strategy

https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/IF11625.pdf

Bērziņa, Ieva
(2014)

Color Revolutions:
Democratization, Hidden
Influence, or Warfare?

https://www.naa.mil.lv/sites/naa/files/document/1_
WP2014%20Color%20revolutions.pdf
National Defense Academy of Latvia

Nikitinа, Yulia
(2014)

The "Color Revolutions" and https://www.jstor.org/stable/26326387?seq=1
"Arab Spring" in Russian
Official Discourse

Fisher, Sarah
(2014)

Sovereign Democracy:
Russia’s Response to the
Color Revolutions

https://ir.library.louisville.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1062&context=honors

Bouchet, Nicolas
(2016)

Russia’s “militarization”
of colour revolutions

https://ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/specialinterest/gess/cis/center-for-securitiesstudies/pdfs/PP4-2.pdf

Mitrokhin,
Nikolay (2015)

Infiltration, Instruction,
Invasion:
Russia’s War in the Donbass

https://spps-jspps.autorenbetreuung.de/files/07mitrokhin.pdf

Shapovalova,
Natalia and
Jarábik, Balázs
(2018)

How Eastern Ukraine Is
https://carnegieeurope.eu/2018/09/12/how-easternAdapting and Surviving: The ukraine-is-adapting-and-surviving-case-of-kharkivCase of Kharkiv
pub-77216

Lastly, to ensure a comprehensive analysis of data, news reports pertaining to security
discourse in Russia were included in the content analysis (see Table 12).
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Table 12
News Reports: Russian Security Discourse 2006-2022
Author (Date)

Title

Source

Nikolsky, Alexei
(2022)

Russia-Led Military Bloc
Will Not Allow ‘Color
Revolutions’ in Post-Soviet
Countries – Putin

https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/01/10/russ
ia-led-military-bloc-will-not-allow-colorrevolutions-in-post-soviet-countries-putin-a76000

BBC (April,
2014).

Ukraine: Pro-Russians storm
offices in Donetsk, Luhansk,
Kharkiv

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe26910210

Reuters (April,
2014)

Protests in eastern Ukraine
aimed at bringing in Russian
troops, warns PM

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisisstorm-idUSBREA350B420140407

Sputnik
International
(2015)

'Slavic Brotherhood'
https://sputniknews.com/20150903/slavicExercises Aimed at Crushing brotherhood-russia-serbia-belarusPotential Maidan Scenario
1026549545.html

BBC (April 7,
2014)

Ukraine crisis: Protesters
declare Donetsk 'republic'

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe26919928

France 24 (2022)

From the Maidan protests to
Russia's invasion: Eight
years of conflict in Ukraine

https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20220228from-the-maidan-protests-to-russia-s-invasioneight-years-of-conflict-in-ukraine

BBC (May 11,
2014)

Ukraine rebels hold
referendums in Donetsk and
Luhansk

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe27360146

DW (Feb. 21,
2022)

Russia recognizes
independence of Ukraine
separatist regions

https://www.dw.com/en/russia-recognizesindependence-of-ukraine-separatist-regions/a60861963

Euromaidan
Press (Sept. 1,
2014)

The Russian Spring and Its
Outcome

https://euromaidanpress.com/2014/09/01/therussian-spring-and-its-outcome/

Radio Free
Europe (Dec. 3,
2004)

Russia: Putin Defends
Reforms, Condemns
'Revolutions'

https://www.rferl.org/a/1056558.html

Roth, Andrew
(2014)

Russia Tourists Stir the
Protests

https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/04/world/europ
e/russias-hand-can-be-seen-in-the-protests.html

Regarding Chinese Security Discourse, similar procedures were used to evaluate primary
sources, scholarly articles, and news reports to achieve a comprehensive view. The table below
describes the primary sources included (see Table 13).
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Table 13
Primary Sources: Chinese Security Discourse 2006-2022
Author (Date)
Ministry of
Foreign
Affairs of
PRC (2022)
Embassy of
the PRC in
the USA
Xinhua
Sept. 25, 2021

Xinhua
Jan. 13, 2021
Xinhua (Dec. 12,
2020)
Sheng, Yang and
Qingqing, Chen
(Apr. 15, 2021)
China Daily
(2019)
Embassy of the
People’s
Republic of
China in the
Republic of
Indonesia (2022)
China Daily
(2014)
Global Times
(Dec. 2, 2021)

Title
Wang Yi Speaks with
Russian Foreign Minister
Sergey Lavrov on the Phone

Source
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/
202201/t20220111_10480941.html

The State of Democracy in
the United States

http://www.chinaembassy.org/eng/zgyw/202112/t20211205_104625
35.htm
http://www.news.cn/english/202109/25/c_1310208553.htm

National Security Office of
Central Gov't Says U.S.
Plotting to Wage "Color
Revolution" In Hong Kong
Mainland spokesperson
rebuts DPP's slander on
united front work
Xi Focus: Xi stresses
building holistic national
security architecture
West-backed color
revolution a ‘top threat’ to
China's national, political
security
Hong Kong 'color
revolution' signs seen
President Xi Jinping Held
Talks with Russian President
Vladimir Putin

Hong Kong's color
revolution
US Wages Global Color
Revolutions to Topple Govts
For the Sake Of American
Control

http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/202101/13/c_139664665.htm
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/202012/12/c_139584669.htm
https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202104/1221182.
shtml

https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201909/06/WS5d
71ac70a310cf3e3556a085.html
https://china.usc.edu/russia-china-joint-statementinternational-relations-february-4-2022

https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hkedition/201410/15/content_18739914.htm
https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202112/1240540.
shtml

The scholarly articles included regarding Chinese security discourse are outlined in the
following table (see Table 14).
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Table 14
Scholarly Articles: Chinese Security Discourse 2006-2022
Author (Date)
Bowe, Alexander
(2018)

Title
China’s Overseas United
Front Work

Hsiao, Russell
(2021)

Political Warfare Alert: CCP
Updates United Front
Regulations Expanding
Foreign Influence Mission
China’s United Front
Strategy And Taiwan
China’s Reaction to the
Color Revolutions: Adaptive
Authoritarianism in Full
Swing
Securitizing the Colour
Revolution: Assessing the
Political Role of Triads in
Hong Kong’s Umbrella
Movement
Spring 2021 Activities by
China’s United Front
Bureaucracy for Taiwan
The Third Magic Weapon:
Reforming China’s United
Front
China's Grand Strategy
Trends, Trajectories, and
Long-Term Competition
Preserving National
Security, the Xi Jinping Way
Learning from Russia: How
China used Russian models
and experiences to
modernize the PLA
‘Entice the Enemy’s Best
and Wisest’: China’s War of
Stealth

Dreyer, June
(2018)
Chen, Titus
(2010)

Lo, Wing T
(2021)

Dotson, John
(2021)
Marris and Joske
(2019)
Scobell, Andrew
et al (2020)
Mankikar, Kalpit
(Jan. 2022)
Singh, Mandip
(Sept. 23, 2020)

Dimon, Liu
(2021)

Source
https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/
China's%20Overseas%20United%20Front%20Wor
k%20%20Background%20and%20Implications%20for%
20US_final_0.pdf
https://globaltaiwan.org/2021/02/vol-6-issue3/#RussellHsiao02102021

https://taiwaninsight.org/2018/02/19/chinas-unitedfront-strategy-and-taiwan/
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=1644372

https://academic.oup.com/bjc/article/61/6/1521/626
1040

https://globaltaiwan.org/2021/06/vol-6-issue-11/.

https://warontherocks.com/2019/06/the-thirdmagic-weapon-reforming-chinas-united-front/
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR27
98.html.
https://www.orfonline.org/research/preservingnational-security-the-xi-jinping-way/
https://merics.org/en/report/learning-russia-howchina-used-russian-models-and-experiencesmodernize-pla
https://cepa.org/entice-the-enemys-best-and-wisestchinas-war-of-stealth/

Lastly, the news reports pertaining to Chinese security discourse that were included in the
content analysis are described (see Table 15).
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Table 15
News Reports: Chinese Security Discourse 2006-2022
Author (Date)

Title

Source

Yisheng, Zhang
(2021)

World Insights: What lurks
behind U.S.-advocated
"color revolutions?"

http://www.news.cn/english/202112/16/c_1310376299.htm

Business
Standard (2019)

Instigation Of ‘Coloured
Revolutions', Ousting of
Legitimate Govts Reasons
For World Turmoil: China

https://www.business-standard.com/article/ptistories/instigation-of-coloured-revolutions-oustingof-legitimate-govts-reasons-for-world-turmoilchina-119102100948_1.html

Ranade, Jayadeva Xi Jinping and CCP
June 11 , 2021
Leadership Wary of Colour
Revolution before 20th Party
Congress

https://www.vifindia.org/article/2021/june/11/xijinping-and-ccp-leadership-wary-of-colourrevolution-before-20th-party-congress

Dorfman, Zach
(July 27, 2018).

How Silicon Valley Became
a Den of Spies

https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/07/
27/silicon-valley-spies-china-russia-219071.

Cole, Michael
(Jan. 7, 2017)

Pro-Unification Groups,
Triad Members Threaten
Hong Kong Activist Joshua
Wong, Legislators in Taiwan

https://sentinel.tw/pro-unification-hk-tw/

Ping, Xin (April
6, 2022)

NED Stands For Anything
But Democracy

https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202204/06/WS6
24ce8a4a310fd2b29e55308.html

Lopez, Linette
(June 15th, 2015)

China Has Taken Up
Russia's Deepest Fear

https://www.businessinsider.com/china-has-takenup-russias-deepest-fear-2015-6

Ma, Lawrence
(May 28th, 2020)

HK National Security
Legislation Will Thwart
Color Revolution Attempts

https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-05-28/HKnational-security-legislation-will-thwart-colorrevolution-attempts-QRFz7IeLra/index.html

Mudie, Luisetta
(July 14th, 2020)

China Says Hong Kong
Primaries Show Attempt at
'Color Revolution'

https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/primaries07142020120324.html

Ranade, Jayadeva Spectre of ‘Colour
(2021)
Revolution’ Worries PLA

https://www.sanjhamorcha.com/page/37/

Data Collection and Sampling
The qualitative component of this study utilized a non-random sampling scheme for data
collection. Initial purposive sampling was derived through analysis of three specific cases from
the first stage NAVCO 2.0 dataset to emphasize the Russian formulation of resistance
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appropriation methods, including: (a) Rose Revolution in Georgia; (b) Orange Revolution in
Ukraine; and (c) Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan. These Color Revolutions drove Russian
adaptation of security discourse to include violent and nonviolent resistance methods in a gray
zone campaign. Through a process of pattern matching, text mining, and explanation building of
the data on these Color Revolutions, this study explored the Russian development of a gray zone
approach to address the Color Revolutions, which Russia operationalized in the Ukraine in 2014.
The data collection relevant to the study of Russian gray zone methods derived 30 sampling units
centered on Russian security discourse regarding the Ukraine from 2006-2022. Furthermore, the
research derived 30 sampling units centered on Chinese security discourse regarding Color
Revolutions from 2006-2022.
Multiple sources of evidence helped ensure validity and reliability in this study. As
highlighted by Yim (2014), news accounts are excellent sources of data; however, they were
thoroughly reviewed and corroborated by the researcher before being included in the data
collection for this study. The sampling units are texts derived from: (a) primary sources of
Russian and Chinese policy, doctrine, and official statements; (b) scholarly articles related to
Russian and Chinese policy, doctrine, and official statements; and (c) news reports of Russian
and Chinese actions and decisions. The data collection derived from public, English-text internet
websites in three categories: (a) government websites of the People’s Republic of China, the
Russian Federation, and the U.S.; (b) bounded, recorded, repeatable text mining of variable
strings using a search engine; and (c) selected news websites that pass validity and reliability
testing. The parameters for inclusion are dates (2006-2022).
The methodology includes content analysis of documentary evidence through
identification of author bias and data triangulation methods. The qualitative data set is comprised
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of 60 sources of documentary evidence independently coded for this study. The data collection
methodology was a three-step process: (1) scanning based on sampling criteria and relevance to
research questions; (2) detailed reading based on relevance to research questions; and (3)
decision to select or reject the sample based on relevance to research question (Krippendorf,
2019). Utilizing this data collection methodology, the researcher examined more than 300
documents in order to derive the 60 documents utilized in the study.
Data was separated into three categories: (1) government primary sources; (2) scholarly
articles directly analyzing primary source documents; and (3) news reports. The researcher
conducted data collection in English language, which limited collection to translated primary
source materials from Chinese or Russian language. One way to address this limitation was to
conduct data collection from English language scholarly articles, which presented data translated
from primary source documents. Of note, several English language media outlets, including the
Daily Times and China Daily, are government media publications, not independent media
reports, and were collected and coded as government sources, not media sources.
Data Analysis
The researcher analyzed the sample population utilizing problem-driven analysis, and
factor analysis. Once collected, the samples were coded according to established coding
instructions to reduce the data to manageable representations. Next, the researcher abductively
inferred contextual phenomena utilizing resistance theory as a framework, building upon the
variables of combat power that were associated with success or progress in the first
complementary study, to generate critical factors through the content analysis. Finally, the
findings of the study resulted in a narrative answer to the research questions to facilitate
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increased understanding of the phenomenon of information and resistance appropriation methods
by the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China (Krippendorff, 2019, p. 88).
Ethical Considerations
This research study comprised analysis of existing data sources and did not involve
human subject research, limiting potential ethical concerns. An essential ethical consideration
given the nature of this study is identification of potential researcher bias, including confirmation
bias, as the researcher has spent over twenty years in the military working in the field of
resistance movements. The researcher took active and reflective measures to identify, record, and
account for any potential bias in the research. These steps permitted the researcher to conduct the
data collection and analysis in an objective manner.
Trustworthiness. The quality of this research design aligned with the four tests of
empirical social research: (1) construct validity; (2) internal validity; (3) external validity; and
(4) reliability. To ensure construct validity, the content analysis utilized multiple sources of
evidence, including primary sources and scholarly journals. The researcher achieved internal
validity through pattern matching and addressing rival explanations.
Summary
This study focused on four literature gaps that centered on additional research on
nonviolent methods and resistance movements from a security studies perspective (Chenoweth &
Stephan, 2011). Further, the study was designed to support the goal of U.S. national security
analysts to better understand Russian and China’s gray zone strategies to help “aggressively
adapt key intuitions, concepts, and capabilities for persistent gray zone campaigning” (Hume et
al., 2016). Three theories provided the theoretical framework for this study: resistance theory,
combat power theory, and deterrence theory. Quantitative methods analyzed global resistance
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movements from 1945-2006, identifying resistance variables significantly associated with
progress and success in resistance campaigns. Additionally, qualitative methods explored the
appropriation of resistance methods by Russia and China from 2006-2022. The resulting research
conclusions support security sector leaders in understanding critical variables of Russian and
China’s appropriation of resistance and inform deterrence strategies to address these activities.
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Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
Chapter four provides an overview of the results of the complementary quantitative and
qualitative investigations included in this study.
Complementary Study #1: Quantitative Results
Complementary study #1 focused on the first research question: what are the
relationships between combat power variables and success/progress in resistance campaigns
during the formative period from 1945-2006 whose goals are regime change, territorial
secession, or anti-occupation?
This research question was addressed utilizing nonparametric quantitative methods to
analyze global resistance movements from 1945-2006 coded in the NAVCO 2.0 dataset. The
following table depicts the findings of the chi squared tests conducted in the study (see Table
16).
Table 16
Results: Chi Squared Tests Between Nominal and Ordinal Variables
Combat Power
Variable
(Independent)

Outcome
(Dependent)
Overall Success
(nominal)

Overall Progress
(ordinal)

Success Campaign
Goal (ordinal)

Resistance
movement
outreach to
traditional media
(nominal)

2 (2, n = 1591)

2 (1, n = 1590)

= 3.056, p =
.217, phi = .044

= 4.872, p =
.027, phi = .113

Resistance
movement
creation of social

2 (2, n = 1194)

2 (1, n = 1194)

= 1.91, p = .385,
phi = .040

= 1.915, p =
.166, phi = .096

0: 2 (1, n = 684) =
4.482, p = .034, phi
= .081
2
3:  (1, n = 298) =
.451, p = .502, phi =
.107
5: 2 (1, n = 327) =
.083, p = .774, phi =
.076
0: 2 (1, n = 523) =
.339, p = .560, phi =
.060

Progress Campaign
Goal
(ordinal)
0: 2 (1, n = 683) =
.167, p = .683, phi =
.147
2
3:  (1, n = 298) =
1.609, p = .256, phi =
.184
5: 2 (1, n = 327) =
.015, p = .903, phi =
.283
0: 2 (1, n = 523) =
.167, p = .683, phi =
.144
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Combat Power
Variable
(Independent)

Outcome
(Dependent)
Overall Success
(nominal)

Overall Progress
(ordinal)

media system
(nominal)

2 (2, n = 1461)

2 (1, n = 1461)

= .895, p = .639,
phi = .025

= 2.233, p =
.135, phi = .098

Security forces
defection
(nominal)

2 (2, n = 1459)

2 (1, n = 1459)

= 60.82, p =
.001, phi = .204

= 13.133, p =
.001, phi = .228

State defection
(nominal)

2 (2, n = 1459)

2 (1, n = 1459)

= 58.839, p =
.001, phi = .201

= 8.438, p =
.004, phi = .249

Resistance
foreign support
(nominal)

2 (1, n = 1633)

2 (1, n=1634) =

= 3.331, p =
.068, phi = .045

5.429, p = .020,
phi = .121

Resistance
movement
creation of
traditional media
system (nominal)

Success Campaign
Goal (ordinal)
3: 2 (1, n = 204) =
.483, p = .487, phi =
-.049
5: 2 (1, n = 223) =
.511, p = .475, phi =
-.048
2
0:  (1, n = 612) =
.178, p = .673, phi =
.051
3: 2 (1, n = 266) =
1.290, p = .256, phi
= .070
5: 2 (1, n = 333) =
2.755, p = .097, phi
= .091
2
0:  (1, n = 573) =
2.462, p = .117, phi
= .251
2
3:  (1, n = 300) =
4.131, p = .042, phi
= .220
5: 2 (1, n = 307) =
2.002, p = .157, phi
= .081
0: 2 (1, n = 573) =
.431, p = .511, phi =
.218
2
3:  (1, n = 300) =
4.291, p = .038, phi
= .234
5: 2 (1, n = 307) =
.113, p = .737, phi =
.054
0: 2 (1, n = 675) =
.512, p = .474, phi =
.028
2
3:  (1, n = 336) =
1.105, p = .293, phi
= .057
5: 2 (1, n = 348) =
2.613, p = .106, phi
= .087

Progress Campaign
Goal
(ordinal)
3: 2 (1, n = 204) =
2.873, p = .090, phi =
.321
5: 2 (1, n = 223) =
.905, p = .341, phi =
.077
2
0:  (1, n = 612) =
.261, p = .610, phi =
.133
3: 2 (1, n = 266) =
.606, p = .436, phi =
.086
5: 2 (1, n = 333) =
8.391, p = .004, phi =
.162
2
0:  (1, n = 572) =
6.674, p = .010, phi =
.279
2
3:  (1, n = 301) =
4.309, p = .038, phi =
.432
5: 2 (1, n = 307) =
2.671, p = .102, phi =
.224
0: 2 (1, n = 572) =
4.153, p = .042, phi =
.285
2
3:  (1, n = 301) =
4.976, p = .026, phi =
.322
5: 2 (1, n = 307) =
.835, p = .361, phi =
.251
0: 2 (1, n = 675) =
2.117, p = .146, phi =
.171
2
3:  (1, n = 337) =
2.503, p = .114, phi =
.092
5: 2 (1, n = 348) =
1.049, p = .306, phi =
.161
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Combat Power
Variable
(Independent)

Outcome
(Dependent)
Overall Success
(nominal)

International
traditional media
coverage
(ordinal)

2 (1, n = 1678)

Radical flank
(ordinal)

2 (1, n = 1704)

Domestic
traditional media
coverage
(ordinal)

2 (3, n = 1504)

Overall Progress
(ordinal)

= 2.605, p =
.107, phi = .152

= 101.002, p =
.001, phi = .273

= 2.664, p =
.103, phi = .086

Success Campaign
Goal (ordinal)
0: 2 (2, n = 706) =
20.979, p = .001, phi
= .172
3: 2 (2, n = 334) =
15.809, p = .001, phi
= .218
2
5:  (2, n = 349) =
38.700, p = .014, phi
= .156
0: 2 (2, n = 709) =
82.696, p = .001, phi
= .342
3: 2 (2, n = 347) =
31.101, p = .001, phi
= .299
2
5:  (2, n = 357) =
128.851, p = .001,
phi = .101
2
0:  (3, n = 633) =
4.939, p = .176, phi
= .088
3: 2 (3, n = 288) =
5.657, p = .130, phi
= .140
5: 2 (2, n = 300)
=2.954, p = .228, phi
= .099

Progress Campaign
Goal
(ordinal)
0: 2 (12, n = 706) =
65.029, p = .001, phi
= .303
3: 2 (8, n = 335) =
38.171, p = .001, phi
= .338
2
5:  (8, n = 349) =
26.309, p = .001, phi
= .275
0: 2 (8, n = 708) =
166.303, p = .001,
phi = .485
3: 2 (8, n = 348) =
52.130, p = .001, phi
= .387
2
5:  (8, n = 357) =
46.169, p = .001, phi
= .360
2
0:  (21, n = 633) =
23.026, p = .028, phi
= .191
3: 2 (2, n = 289) =
24.558, p = .017, phi
= .292
5: 2 (2, n = 357) =
18.485, p = .018, phi
= .248

Note. Success Campaign Goal variable are coded as 0 (regime change), 3 (territorial secession),
5 (anti-occupation). Progress Campaign Goal variables are coded as 0 (regime change), 3
(territorial secession), 5 (anti-occupation).
The following table provides the results of the Spearman’s rho (ρ) tests conducted
between ordinal variables of the study (see Table 17).
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Table 17
Results: Spearman’s rho (ρ) Tests Between Ordinal Variables
Combat Power
Variable
(Independent)

Outcome
(Dependent)
Overall Success

International traditional
media coverage
(ordinal)
Radical flank (ordinal)
Domestic traditional
media coverage
(ordinal)

Overall Progress
ordinal:

Success
Campaign Goal
(ordinal)

Progress
Campaign
Goal
(ordinal)

r = .260, n = 1679,
p < .001
r = .346, n = 1711,
p < .001
r =.168, n = 1711,
p < .001

Note. Success Campaign Goal variable are coded as 0 (regime change), 3 (territorial secession),
5 (anti-occupation). Progress Campaign Goal variables are coded as 0 (regime change), 3
(territorial secession), 5 (anti-occupation).
Three of nine combat power variables were associated with success of all resistance
movements at a statistically significant level. These variables are: (1) radical flank; 2 (1, n =
1704) = 101.002, p = .001, phi = .273; (2) security force defectors; 2 (2, n = 1459) = 60.82, p =
.001, phi = .204; and (3) state defectors; 2 (2, n = 1459) = 58.839, p = .001, phi = .201.
Statistical significance calculated at the traditional alpha level of p < .05 (Pallant, 2011). Phi
coefficient evaluated .10 for small effect, .30 for medium effect and .50 for large effect (Pallant,
2016). The association between success and the existence of a radical (violent) flank was the
strongest of the three, interpreted as medium effect. Additionally, crosstab analysis of the entire
data set indicated that only 191 of 1,704 (11.2%) coded resistance years were purely nonviolent
movements, meaning that the primary method of the movement was coded as nonviolent in the
data set, and the movement did not have a radical (violent) flank.
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This analysis provided initial insights regarding RQ#1: what are the relationships
between combat power variables and success/progress in resistance campaigns during the
formative period from 1945-2006 whose goals are regime change, territorial secession or antioccupation? While this first stage of analysis does not answer the question completely, notably
lacking the fidelity of variables associated specifically with the campaign goals of regime
change, territorial secession, or anti-occupation, it does provide an initial framework for a macro
understanding of the variables associated with success/progress of all resistance movements in
the data set. This analysis begins to improve understanding of resistance movements from a
security studies perspective by expanding understanding of resistance beyond a principled
approach that is biased towards emphasis on non-violence. Findings shift to a more holistic
understanding that allows for consideration of practical implications of a blended use of violent
and non-violent methods in resistance movements. This insight is valuable to provide context
and discern whether the variables associated with success/progress of the specific types of
resistance movements of this study (i.e., regime change, territorial secession, or anti-occupation)
have common or distinct variables associated with their success/progress and to provide a
baseline for comparison and discussion in the next chapter.
The next step in the first stage of analysis was to examine overall progress (vs. success)
of resistance movements. This analysis revealed a broader range of variables associated with the
progress of resistance movements. The elements of combat power that were statistically
significant in their association with overall progress of resistance movements (violent and
nonviolent) included: (1) existence of a radical flank r = .346, n = 1711, p < .001; (2)
international media coverage (3) state defectors (4) security force defectors (5) domestic media,
and (7) foreign support. Interestingly, the analysis of progress in resistance movements resulted
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in a higher association with the radical flank variable to the medium level at r = .346 (see Table
18). This analysis helps to improve the understanding of resistance movements beyond the
bifurcated approach, which tends to overly simplify resistance movements as either violent or
nonviolent, instead pointing to an understanding of the blended nature of resistance movements.
In addition, this analysis supported the association between the variables representing defections
(e.g., security forces and public leaders) and information activities indicated in the literature.
Table 18
Resistance Combat Power Variables Associated with Overall Success and Progress
Foreign Security
Support Defectors
Success
.204**
Progress .121*
.228**
**p < .01; *p < .05

State
Int’l
Domestic Media
Radical
Defectors Media Media
Outreach Flank
.201**
.273**
.249**
.260** .168**
.113*
.346**

The second stage of analysis focused on examining resistance movements with specific
goals of regime change, territorial secession, or anti-occupation goals. As in the first stage, this
stage of analysis examined the data set holistically, not bifurcated between violent and
nonviolent resistance methods. The analysis indicated both similarities and variance in combat
power variables associated with success/progress in regime change, territorial secession, and
anti-occupation movements. In other words, an oversimplified answer to RQ#1, seeking to
understand which variables are associated with success/progress, would be “it depends,” or
varies, with the goals of the movement. Each movement had a unique set of combat power
variables associated with success/progress. This level of fidelity and insight is additive to the
literature, which generally places analytical emphasis on the method of the movement
(violent/nonviolent), not the goals of the movement.
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There were however, two variables significantly associated with success and progress
with all three types of movement goals: (1) radical flank; and (2) international media coverage.
The association and effect between the radical flank variable and progress in a regime change
movement was the highest observed in the study 2 (8, n = 708) = 166.303, p = .001, phi = .485.
Similarly, the association between the radical flank variable and progress in territorial secession
(2 (8, n = 348) = 52.130, p =.001, phi = .387) and anti-occupation goals (2 (8, n = 357) =
46.169, p = .001, phi = .360) were among the most significant in the study.
It is noteworthy that progress in resistance movements with a goal of regime change the
violent flank variable has a higher effect (phi = .485) than movements with a goal of territorial
secession (phi = .387) or anti-occupation (phi = .360). In addition, within the dataset, the violent
flank variable is found more in regime change movements (n = 706) than territorial secession (n
= 335) or anti-occupation movements (n = 349). As noted in the previous paragraph, the regime
change variable is associated with the highest effect on success (phi = .273) and associated with
progress (r = .346) of all movement goals. Taken together, the first stage of analysis indicates the
combat power variable of radical flank is significantly associated with success/progress in the
study. The next chapter explores these findings in detail.
International media coverage is the second variable significantly associated with success
and progress among all three movement goals. The association and effect between the
international media variable and progress were among the most significant in the study. The
association and effect between the international media variable and progress in a territorial
secession movement was the most significant at 2 (8, n = 335) = 38.171, p = .001, phi = .338.
The association and effect with a regime change movement was 2 (12, n = 706) = 65.029, p =
.001, phi = .303 and anti-occupation movement was 2 (8, n = 349) = 26.309, p = .001, phi =
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.275. Of interest, there was not a significant relationship identified between the international
media variable and all movements. This variable is uniquely associated with the success of
regime change, territorial secession, and anti-occupation movement goals. The next chapter
explores these findings in detail.
Beyond sharing a significant relationship with the regime change and international media
variables, success and progress of each movement goal had a unique combination of significant
relationships with combat power variables. The success of regime change movements was
significantly associated with (1) resistance outreach to the media; (2) international media
coverage; and (3) the radical flank variable. However, the progress of regime change movements
was significantly associated with (1) security force defections; (2) public/state leader defections;
(3) international media coverage; and (4) the radical flank variable (see Table 19).
Table 19
Combat Power Variables Associated with Success & Progress in Regime Change
Radical
Flank
Success
.342**
Progress
.485**
**p < .01; *p < .05

Security
Defectors
.279*

State
Defectors
.285*

Int’l Media
.172**
.303**

Media
Outreach
.081*

The success of territorial secession movements was significantly associated with (1)
security force defections; (2) public leader defections; (3) international media coverage; and (4)
the radical flank variable. However, the progress of territorial secession movements was
significantly associated with (1) security force defections; (2) public leader defections; (3)
international media coverage; and (4) the radical flank variable (see Table 20).
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Table 20
Combat Power Variables Associated with Success & Progress in Territorial Secession
Radical
Flank
Success
.299**
Progress
.387**
**p < .01; *p < .05

Security
Defectors
.220*
.432*

State
Defectors
.234*
.322*

Int’l
Media
.218**
.338**

Media
Outreach

Resistance
Trad. Media

The success of anti-occupation movements was significantly associated with (1)
international media coverage and (2) the radical flank variable. However, the progress of antioccupation movements was significantly associated with (1) international media coverage; (2)
radical flank; and (3) the establishment of resistance traditional media (see Table 21).
Table 21
Combat Power Variables Associated with Success & Progress in Anti-Occupation
Radical
Flank
Success
.101**
Progress
.360**
**p < .01; *p < .05

Security
Defectors

State
Defectors

Int’l
Media
.156*
.275**

Media
Outreach

Resistance
Trad. Media
.162*

The analysis yielded numerous relationships valuable in addressing RQ#1 and meeting
the study objectives of providing additive understanding for both scholars and practitioners. For
example, the establishment of resistance traditional media is uniquely significant to progress in
anti-occupation resistance movements. At the same time, anti-occupation movements uniquely
did not have a significant relationship with security or state defectors. The fidelity of variables
significant to success and progress in different movement goals specifically addresses RQ#1 and
is additive to the literature. The next chapter explores these findings in detail.
The third stage of analysis utilized the findings from the first two stages to analyze three
specific data fields within the data set focused on Russian Federation appropriation of resistance
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movements. The study examined three specific campaigns from the NAVCO 2.0 dataset: (a)
Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2001-2004; (b) Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003; and (c)
Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan in 2005. These resistance movements are highly relevant to the
research questions because these movements contributed to the Russian formulation of resistance
appropriation methods. This section of the paper presents findings from the analysis of these data
fields indexed against the findings from the first two stages of this analysis, specifically
exploring the degree to which the individual data fields regarding the Orange (Ukraine), Rose
(Georgia), and Tulip (Kyrgyzstan) Revolutions are consistent with the findings of the first two
stages of analysis. Stage three utilized the same analytical approach as stage one and two,
exploring relationships between nine variables of combat power with three resistance outcomes:
success, progress, and goals (regime change, territorial secession, or anti-occupation).
Color Revolution Success Findings
According to stage 1 analysis, the combat power variables significantly associated to
success of all resistance movements (i.e., violent and nonviolent) included (1) existence of a
radical flank; (2) security force defectors; and (3) state defectors. The selected individual Color
Revolution datasets are consistent with these findings. Of the three selected resistance
movements, two achieved complete success. One of these two, the Tulip Revolution, contained
two of three variables significantly associated with success in stage one analysis: a radical flank
and state defectors. The other movement that achieved success was the Rose Revolution. This
movement contained two of three variables significantly associated with success in stage one
analysis: security defectors and state defectors. Overall, these stage three findings are consistent
with the findings from stage one analysis that the existence of a radical flank, security defectors,
and state defectors are associated with resistance movement success.
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Color Revolution Progress Findings
According to stage one analysis, the combat power variables significantly associated with
progress of all resistance movements are (1) existence of a radical flank; (2) security force
defectors; (3) domestic media coverage; (4) state defectors; (5) international media coverage; (6)
foreign support; and (7) resistance movement media outreach. Of the three selected movements,
only one, the Orange Revolution, was a multi-year movement with graduated levels of progress.
Examining the details of this multi-year movement yielded valuable insights. In the years where
the Orange Revolution achieved little or no progress (2001, 2002, 2003), the movement
contained three out of seven of these variables. Interestingly, in the year where the Orange
Revolution achieved the most progress (2004), the movement contained six out of seven of these
variables. The addition of security defectors, state defectors, and foreign support in 2004 were
the additive variables in the most successful year of the movement, which resulted in the
achievement of significant concessions. This finding is consistent with the results from the stage
one analysis.
Color Revolution Additional Findings
Analysis of the selected data regarding the Orange, Rose and Tulip Revolutions in the
stage three analysis yielded additional insights beyond those identified in stage one and two. It is
important to note that stage three analysis examined six selected resistance years out of the 1,726
resistance years coded in the NAVCO 2.0 dataset. The dataset coded the four-year duration of
the Orange Revolution and the one-year durations of both the Rose and Tulip Revolutions for six
resistance years. The study examined the six selected resistance years for their relevance to the
research questions focused on understanding Russian appropriation of resistance, not necessarily
their statistical significance.
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The study identified two patterns within the six resistance years selected. First, of the
three resistance years where significant success or progress was achieved (Georgia in 2003,
Ukraine in 2004, and Kyrgyzstan in 2005), all three movements contained resistance traditional
media, resistance new media, and resistance outreach to traditional media (see Table 22).
Additionally, in the years with little or no progress in the Orange Revolution (Ukraine 2001,
2002, 2003) the movement did not contain resistance traditional media capability. However, in
the year the Orange Revolution achieved significant concessions (2004), the movement added
resistance traditional media capability. The stage one and two analyses did not identify each of
these relationships between resistance information activities and success or progress of the
movement. While these findings are not necessarily statistically significant, they do provide
insight specific to the research questions regarding Russian experiences with resistance that have
informed the Russian approach to the appropriation of resistance.
Table 22
Combat Power Variables Present in Selected Color Revolution Campaigns

Ukraine
(2001)
Ukraine
(2002)
Ukraine
(2003)
Ukraine
(2004)
Georgia
(2003)
Kyrzstan
(2005)

Primary Rad. Goal Resist.
Nature Flank
Trad.
Media
NonNo
Reg. No
Violent
Chg.
NonNo
Reg. No
Violent
Chg
NonNo
Reg. No
Violent
Chg
NonNo
Reg. Yes
Violent
Chg
NonNo
Reg. Yes
Violent
Chg
NonYes Reg. Yes
Violent
Chg

Resist.
New
Media
Yes

Resist. Sec.
Media Dfect
Oreach
Yes
Yes

State Dom. Frgn Intl
Dfect Med. Spt
Med

Progress

No

High No

High

0

Yes

Yes

No

No

High No

Mod

1

Yes

Yes

No

No

High No

Mod

0

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

High Yes

High

3

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

High Yes

High

4

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Mod Yes

Mod

4

The table below is a tabulation of the analysis of regime change, territorial secession, and
anti-occupation resistance movements analyzed in complementary study #1 (see Table 23).
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These findings do not bifurcate or bias between violent/nonviolent methods. These factors
provide the primary focus for data collection and data analysis in complementary study #2, in
which content analysis explored Russian and Chinese actions, words, and security discourse
from 2006-2022 using abductive logic to derive inferences, including extrapolations, such as
trends, patterns, and differences (Krippendorf, 2019).
Table 23
Variables Associated w Success/Progress: Regime Change, Secession & Anti-Occupation
Rad.
Flank

Resist.
Trad.
Media

Resist.
Media
Oreach
.081*

Sec.
Dfect

State
Dfect

Dom.
Media

Foreign
Supt

Int’l
Media

Regime C
Success

.342**

Regime C
Progress

.485**

.279*

.285*

.303**

T Secession
Success

.299**

.220*

.234*

.218**

T Secession
Progress

.387**

.432*

.322*

.338**

Anti – O
Success

.101**

Anti – O
Progress

.360**

Overall
Success

.273**

Overall
.346**
Progress
**p < .01; *p < .05

.172**

.156*

.162*

.275**

.113*

.204**

.201**

.228**

249**

.168**

.121*

.260**
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Complementary Study #2: Qualitative Results
Complementary study #2 utilized qualitative methods to explore the contemporary period
of 2006-2022 from the perspective of Russian and Chinese security leaders. The aim of the study
was to answer Research Question #2: How do the elements of combat power significantly
associated with success/progress in regime change, territorial, or anti-occupation resistance
movements in the formative period from 1945-2006 help us understand the doctrines, words, and
actions of Russian and Chinese government officials regarding state appropriation of resistance
for gray zone campaigns in the contemporary period from 2006-2022? To answer this question,
the researcher indexed the statements, doctrines, and actions of Russian and Chinese security
leaders against the combat power variables that were significantly associated with
success/progress in resistance movements based on the findings of complementary study #1.
These variables were (1) radical flank; (2) resistance traditional media; (3) resistance outreach to
media; (4) security defectors; (5) state defectors; (6) domestic media coverage; (7) foreign
support; and (8) international media coverage.
Complementary study #2 examined the Russo-Ukrainian War and resistance movements
from the perspective of Russian security leaders as documented in Russian security discourse,
scholarly works, and media reports. Russian approaches in Ukraine in 2014 were heavily
influenced by lessons learned from the Ukrainian Orange Revolution from 2001-2004. A key
precipitating event to Russian aggression in Ukraine in 2014 was the Ukrainian ‘Revolution of
Dignity’ in late 2013. The Revolution of Dignity, commonly referred to as Euromaidan, was a
successful regime change movement characterized by some scholars as a “continuation of the
Orange Revolution” (Shveda et al., 2016). President Putin viewed the resulting Kiev regime
change as a threat to Russian interests. However, instead of responding with traditional military
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force, Putin initially responded to the successful resistance movement by battling it with other
popular resistance movements. Consistent with the findings in complementary study #1, Russian
agents employed a blend of information activities and violent resistance methods, including the
use of a Russian outlaw motorcycle gang known as the “Night Wolves,” to support a resistance
movement in the Donbas region of the Ukraine (Losh, 2016). Consistent with the findings in
complementary study #1, Ukrainian security force defectors were a key element in the success of
the Russian-backed resistance forces (Lanoszka, 2016). Interestingly, in response to international
criticism of Russian activities in Ukraine, President Putin highlighted that Moscow must take
defensive measures against “another Color Revolution”. He noted, “We have to do all that is
needed to ensure that similar things never happen in Russia” (BBC, 2014).
Complementary study #2 also examined the Color Revolutions and resistance movements
from the perspective of Chinese security leaders as documented in Chinese security discourse,
scholarly works, and media reports.
In examining the 60 documents collected for the qualitative study, three themes emerged:
(1) regime fear of the Color Revolutions; (2) regime shift to information warfare; and (3) regime
adaptational actions. During the coding process, subcategories emerged for each of these themes.
During the data analysis and abductive process, the researcher iteratively examined each
document through this coding frame. The table below depicts the coding frame (see Table 24).
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Table 24
Coding Frame
Category

Sub-categories

1 Fear of Color
Revolutions

a. Regime fear of regime change
b. Regime fear of cultural change
c. Regime fear of U.S. intent/capability

2 Shift to Information
Warfare

a. Justification for Information Warfare
b. Methods of Information Warfare

3 Adaptational Action

a. Defensive Measures
b. Offensive Measures
c. Appropriation of democracy itself

In the next section, the researcher discusses each of these themes and categories in detail.
The information begins with a presentation of the results of the content analysis of thirty archival
and scholarly documents identified in the data collection phase that met inclusion and analysis
criteria representing the experiences and viewpoints of Russian Federation security leaders in the
contemporary period from 2006-2022. The researcher then presents the results of the data
collection and analysis of the experiences and viewpoints of security leaders of the People’s
Republic of China in the contemporary period.
Russian Regime Category #1 – Fear of Color Revolution
Within category #1, the study identified three subcategories: (1) fear of regime change;
(2) regime fear of cultural change; and (3) regime fear of own population. The researcher then
presents exemplars of quoted material from the data set for each of the sub-categories.
Subcategory #1 – Regime fear of regime change. The content analysis indicated that
the Color Revolutions, especially the Orange Revolution in the Ukraine, jarred senior leaders in
the Russian Federation. They were fearful that the Russian regime might be overthrown next. In
the years immediately following the Orange Revolution up to the present time (2006-2022),
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Russian security leaders, foremost among them, the top ranking political and military leaders of
the Federation, President Putin and General Gerasimov, spoke and wrote veraciously on the
subjects of understanding and preventing becoming a victim of a Color Revolution. Another
round of Color Revolutions that swept through the Middle East beginning in 2010, known as the
Arab Spring, exacerbated these fears. In 2004, referring to the Orange Revolution in Ukraine,
Putin noted his “worries” regarding regime change via Color Revolutions, “As it concerns the
entire post-Soviet area, what worries me, first of all, are attempts to resolve political issues in an
unlawful way," Putin said. "This is the most dangerous thing. It is very dangerous to [attempt] to
create a system of permanent revolutions," (Putin, 2004). The fear of the sudden demise of the
Russian regime due to a Color Revolution is evident in the following speech that the Chief of the
General Staff of the Russian Federation, General Gerasimov, gave to senior Russian military
leaders in 2013, "The experience of military conflicts—including those connected with the socalled color revolutions in North Africa and the Middle East—confirms that a perfectly thriving
state can, in a matter of months and even days, be transformed into an arena of fierce armed
conflict, become a victim of foreign intervention, and sink into a web of chaos, humanitarian
catastrophe, and civil war,” (Gerasimov, 2013). In a 2014 statement, referring to the Euromaidan
Revolution in the Ukraine, Putin described the regime change stemming from popular protests as
a coup, “those who stood behind the latest events in Ukraine had a different agenda: they were
preparing yet another government takeover; they wanted to seize power and would stop short of
nothing. They resorted to terror, murder and riots. Nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes and
anti-Semites executed this coup,” (Putin, 2014). A 2017 article published in the premier Russian
professional military journal, The Journal of the Academy of Military Science describes Color
Revolution regime change as an implosion, “color revolutions are the result of miscalculations of
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the government on internal and external policies, when the existing protest capability is increased
from outside to the point of explosion that could bury the government under the ruins”
(Brychkov, 2017). Finally, in a 2022 statement, Putin used the following emotion-laden words to
describe the regime change in Ukraine following the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution:
Radicals and neo-Nazis were open and more and more insolent about their ambitions.
They were indulged by both the official authorities and local oligarchs, who robbed the
people of Ukraine and kept their stolen money in Western banks, ready to sell their
motherland for the sake of preserving their capital. To this should be added the persistent
weakness of state institutions and the position of a willing hostage to someone else's
geopolitical will (Putin, 2022)
Subcategory #2 – Regime fear of cultural change. The content analysis indicated that
senior leaders in the Russian Federation frequently cited a fear of cultural change driven by
external elements as part of their overall fear of regime change through Color Revolutions. In a
major 2014 speech focused on events in Ukraine, Putin highlighted the negative impact of Color
Revolutions on national culture, “There was a whole series of controlled ‘colour’
revolutions…Standards were imposed on these nations that did not in any way correspond to
their way of life, traditions, or these peoples’ cultures. As a result, instead of democracy and
freedom, there was chaos, outbreaks in violence and a series of upheavals” (Putin, 2014).
Russian security leaders also note that the Color Revolutions “imposed Western conceptions of
democracy on Russian civilians, and this interference is an attempt to influence Russia’s political
philosophies and institutions” (Fisher, 2014). The 2021 National Security Strategy of the Russian
Federation provides almost four pages of emphasis on preserving Russian “cultural sovereignty”
and the “defense of traditional Russian spiritual-moral values, culture and historical memory”
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(Russian Federation, 2021). In a 2022 speech preceding the invasion of Ukraine, Putin lamented
cultural changes stemming from the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution,
Let me remind you that the new ‘Maidan’ authorities first tried to repeal the law on state
language policy. Then there was the law on the ‘purification of power', the law on
education that virtually cut the Russian language out of the educational process… but the
fact is that the situation in Ukraine today is completely different because it involves a
forced change of identity. And the most despicable thing is that the Russians in Ukraine
are being forced not only to deny their roots, generations of their ancestors but also to
believe that Russia is their enemy. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the path of
forced assimilation, the formation of an ethnically pure Ukrainian state, aggressive
towards Russia, is comparable in its consequences to the use of weapons of mass
destruction against us. (Putin, 2022)
In this vein, the emphasis on protecting “cultural and civilizational diversity” is
noteworthy in this 2022 Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People Republic of
China,
The sides believe that the advocacy of democracy and human rights must not be used to
put pressure on other countries. They oppose the abuse of democratic values and
interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states under the pretext of protecting
democracy and human rights, and any attempts to incite divisions and confrontation in
the world. The sides call on the international community to respect cultural and
civilizational diversity and the rights of peoples of different countries to selfdetermination. (Joint Statement, 2022)
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Subcategory #3 – Regime fear of U.S. intent/capability via Color Revolutions. The
content analysis indicated that senior leaders in the Russian Federation fear the intent and
capability of western powers, mainly the United States, regarding Color Revolutions. Russian
security leaders root this fear in the efficacy of the Color Revolutions at enacting regime change
in former Soviet states, fear of the combination of regime change movements and U.S.
conventional military power, and fear of incursion or dominance by the U.S. It is clear from the
collected data that Russian security leaders are convinced that the U.S. orchestrated the Color
Revolutions and is eager to harm Russia by exploiting the “protest potential of the population”
(Kofman, 2021).
In 2014, the Russian Ministry of Defense conducted its third Moscow Conference on
International Security. Russian analysis of U.S. will and capability to foment regime change
through a combination of Color Revolution tactics and traditional military power featured
prominently throughout the conference. Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Lavrov opened the
conference with an explicit claim that the U.S. and Europe used Color revolutions to “serve their
own interests, impose their own values, and end in creating new global tensions” (Cordesman,
2014). He was followed by General Gerasimov who provided an overview of the methodologies
and locations of Color Revolutions, stating that Color revolutions are “a form of non-violent
change of power in a country by outside manipulation of the protest potential of the population in
conjunction with political, economic, humanitarian and other non-military measures”. Slides
from General Gerasimov’s presentation are reproduced as dataset exemplars (Cordesman, 2014;
see Appendix Figure A1).
Following General Gerasimov’s presentation, the Minister of Defense of Belarus
provided similar content that emphasized the role of the external actors, namely the U.S., through
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nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Noteworthy in the presentation is the conclusion that
that the international community (UN) is ineffective in addressing these matters, thereby
necessitating proactive military countermeasures by Russia and Belarus. The slides of the
presentation depicted below indicate significant deliberation regarding U.S. capability and intent
to foment Color Revolutions and cooperation on the issue between Russia and Belarus. Depicted
on slide 6 and slide 9 of the presentation are the corporate logos of private American security
firm Blackwater, later renamed Academi (Cordesman, 2014; see Appendix Figure A2).
Following the presentation by the Minister of Defense of Belarus, a senior leader from
the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces provided a presentation that further underscored
the framing of Color Revolutions as a form of U.S. “aggression” alongside traditional U.S.
military activity. The presentation depicts Color Revolutions as a form of warfare and a threat to
Russian security, thereby justifying Russian military action against Color Revolutions
(Cordesman, 2014; see Appendix Figure A3).
In addition to the exemplars in Appendix A, the theme of Russian fear of U.S. intent and
capability to foment Color Revolutions as a form of regime change featured prominently
throughout the data set. In 2017, a senior Russian defense official wrote the following in a
leading Russian Defense periodical:
A special office was formed within the US Department of State in charge of staging and
managing “democratic revolutions” in any country chosen by the US Government. By
enacting this law all nations on the planet deemed “undemocratic” are considered as
unable to exercise their governance, thus needing US assistance. Chiefs of missions at US
consulates and embassies in sovereign countries are tasked with executing these
directives of the State Department. Liberal and pro-Western opposition groups as well as
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NGOs are forming part of what the US State Department on behalf of so-called
“international community” proclaims to be the “true” representatives of their people and
uses them to overthrow the undesirable government. In violation of fundamental
principles of international law and intergovernmental relations the United States are
denying the inalienable right of UN members to determine their own principles of
governance and form their governments. (Brychtov, 2017)
Throughout the examined period (2006-2022), Russian discourse became increasingly
pointed regarding fear of U.S. intent and capability to foment Color Revolutions as a form of
warfare. In 2004, Putin referred to the Color Revolutions as “attempts to address political
problems in an extralegal fashion” (Nikitina, 2014). In 2005, the Secretary of the Security
Council of Russia referred to them as, “regime change by nondemocratic and unconstitutional
means” (Nikitina, 2014). By 2014, Putin referred to the Color Revolutions as externally
provoked coups:
More and more often in the world today one hears the language of ultimatums and
sanctions. The very concept of national sovereignty is becoming eroded. Undesirable
regimes, countries that pursue their own policy or simply stand in the way of someone’s
interests, are being destabilized. For that purpose the so-called color revolutions are set in
motion; if one were to call things by their real names they are simply coups, provoked
and financed from outside. (Nikitina, 2014)
In 2015, Russia and Belarus began conducting military exercises called Slavic
Brotherhood, and rehearsed the use of military forces to “prevent unrest and agitation” from
Color Revolutions (Bouchet, 2016). In 2019, during an annual speech to senior Russian military
leaders at the Academy of Military Science, General Gerasimov made the following statement
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explicitly characterizing Color Revolutions a form of military operation and technology, “The
United States and its allies have specified an aggressive vector for their foreign policy. They
have developed military operations of an aggressive nature, such as “global strike” and “multisphere battle,” and are using the technologies of “color revolutions” and “soft power”
(Gerasimov, 2019).
Russian Regime Category #2 – Shift to Information Warfare
During the examined period, there was a marked shift in Russian security discourse
regarding the centrality of information in conflict. The first shift was towards identification of
the increasing role of information in contemporary conflict, including the Color Revolutions.
Later shifts included words and actions by Russian security leaders to justify and formulate both
defensive and offensive information measures. Within category #2, the study identified two
subcategories: (1) justification for information warfare; and (2) methods of information warfare.
The researcher presents exemplars of quoted material from the data set for each of the subcategories.
Subcategory #1 – Justification for information warfare. In his 2013 seminal diagnosis
of the Orange Revolution and prognosis for the future, “The Value of Science is in the
Foresight,” General Gerasimov formulated justification of information warfare as something
thrust upon Russia by the U.S. and the Color Revolutions,
The very ‘rules of war’ have changed. The role of nonmilitary means of achieving
political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power
of force of weapons in their effectiveness. The focus of applied methods of conflict has
altered in the direction of the broad use of political, economic, informational,
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humanitarian, and other nonmilitary measures—applied in coordination with the protest
potential of the population. (Gerasimov, 2013)
In the same document, Gerasimov further underscores the justification for information
warfare as a defensive measure to U.S. information and Color Revolution activity:
Asymmetrical actions have come into widespread use, enabling the nullification of an
enemy’s advantages in armed conflict. Among such actions are the use of special
operations forces and internal opposition to create a permanently operating front through
the entire territory of the enemy state, as well as informational actions, devices, and
means that are constantly being perfected. These ongoing changes are reflected in the
doctrinal views of the world’s leading states and are being used in military conflicts.
(Gerasimov, 2013)
In 2014 at the Moscow Conference on International Security, the Minister of Defense of
Belarus utilized the term ‘information confrontation’ as a key weapon against Color Revolutions
(Cordesman, 2014; see Appendix Figure A4):
In 2018, Gerasimov continued to link U.S. actions leveraging “internal protest potential
of the population” and the need for Russian activity in the “information sphere” in presentations
to Russian military leaders (Gerasimov, 2018). In 2019, the Deputy Chief of the Russian Military
Academy of the General Staff, stated, “that the use of information was now of utmost importance
in order to create the proper conditions for a victory, and that information means can even
achieve effects “comparable to the results of large-scale application of troops and forces”
(Kofman, 2021). The 2021 National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation also called for
increased Russian information activities domestically necessitated by western “informationalpsychological diversion” (Putin, 2021). Taken together, the data set indicates that Russian
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security leaders justified increasing manipulation and control of information as a response to
western provocations and the Color Revolutions.
Subcategory #2 – Methods of information warfare. Russian utilization of information
is not new; however, it accelerated during the examined period (2006-2022). Russian military
guidance focused on 2020 envisioned a transformation “from direct destruction to direct
influence…from war in the physical space to a war in the human consciousness…from war in a
defined period of time to a state of permanent war as the natural condition in national life”
(Berzins, 2014). Analysts point out the voluminous emphasis on information warfare in Russian
doctrine, including deception and misinformation, known as “Maskirovka” (Roberts, 2015).
Russian military theory and practice indicates, “The Russian view of modern warfare is based on
the idea that the main battlespace is the mind” (Berzins, 2014). This view of information warfare
results in a lens that “every business deal, retweet, and Instagram post becomes a way of
influencing…‘the psychoshpere’,” (Pomerantsev, 2015).
In the case of Ukraine, Russian information activities were meant to “destabilize Ukraine
psychologically and advance a narrative of the country as a ‘failed state,’ thus destroying the will
and support inside Ukraine,” (Pomerantsev, 2015). Furthermore, to create internal discord and
build pro-Russian sentiment, the campaign is likely to “manipulate existing cleavages to sow
internal dissension and foment local discord,” (Lanoszka, 2016). The explosion of social media
and communications technology enabled the rapid operationalization of these concepts.
Examples include the seemingly overnight proliferation of pro-Russian Facebook groups
“demanding the deployment of ‘little green men’ to support greater independence for Russian
and Polish speaking populations” (Lanoszka 2016). These Russian methods of information
warfare include a concept known as “reflexive control” likening information warfare to a
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computer virus, “to win in information warfare, it is necessary to infiltrate elements that obey
foreign commands into the command system of an adversary,” (Bērziņa, 2014).
Scholars identify four factors bearing on Russian choice of cognitive objectives to
support gray zone activities. These factors are ethnic heterogeneity, latent historical grievances,
weakness of local civil society, and regional complexity (Lanoszka, 2016). By focusing on these
factors, the information campaign, or cognitive campaign, seeks to build cognitive mass in
support of the overarching gray zone campaign. In this way, the cognitive campaign is the
central feature of the overarching gray zone campaign, not only supporting later physical
maneuver objectives, but making them “appear indigenously led,” to “create” the reason for any
campaign in the first place through “cognitive co-option,” (Lanoszka 2016). Russian aggression
in Ukraine highlighted the operationalization of well-developed strategies to integrate
information activities and resistance methodologies (Leonhard & Phillips, 2015; Putin, 2021).
Russian Regime Category #3 – Adaptational Action
Immediately following the Orange Revolution, 2005-2013, Russian security leaders took
numerous actions aimed at preventing a regime-change resistance movement inside Russia. Once
confident in protective measures taken to prevent a Color Revolution, from 2013-2022 Russian
security leaders began to focus on countering or appropriating resistance movements offensively,
“moving from securitizing the issue of anti-regime protests to militarizing it” (Bouchet, 2016).
Within category #3, the study identified three subcategories: (1) internal protective measures; (2)
militarization of resistance; and (3) appropriation of democracy itself. The researcher presents
exemplars of quoted material from the data set for each of the subcategories.
Subcategory #1 – Defensive Measures (Securitization). Fearing the possibility of a
successful regime-change resistance movement in Russia, Russian security leaders set about to
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better understand the Color Revolutions and to develop options to prevent or counter them.
Russian security leaders identified “the protest potential of the population” and “informationpsychological effects” as the critical elements to understand and control (Bērziņa, 2014;
Gerasimov, 2018). Following the Orange Revolution, from 2005-2014, Russian security leaders
focused actions in four areas to limit the ‘protest potential of the population’ inside of Russia: (1)
reduction of opposition parties; (2) redirecting of student social movement potential; (3)
restriction of foreign NGO influence; and (4) restriction of domestic media (Hinkle, 2017).
In 2005, Russia enacted electoral reform that resulted in reduction of opposition parties to
one, minimizing the possibility of contested election outcomes (Hinkle, 2017). Russian leaders
established a pro-regime national youth movement in 2005 to offset the student anti-regime
groups, which featured prominently in the Color Revolutions. The “Youth Democratic
Antifascist Movement”, commonly referred to as Nashi, meaning “Ours” was officially designed
to protect Russia’s sovereignty by defeating foreign and domestic threats to Russia, and to create
an active civil society. Nashi copied the color revolution youth movements by engaging in rallies
and marches with artistic and musical performances, dressing in costumes, and using social
media to advertise their presence (Bērziņa, 2014; Hinkle, 2017).
Additionally in 2005, Russian leaders created a state institution called the Civic Chamber
to mimic the role of mediator between Russian citizens and the regime that western NGOs
played during the Color Revolutions (Hinkle, 2017). In 2012, Russia passed the Foreign Agents
Law of 2012 requiring NGOs receiving foreign funding to self-identify as “NGOs, conducting
foreign agent functions” (Bērziņa, 2014; Nikitinа, 2014). In 2017, Russian security leaders
identified numerous NGOs by names as complicit in generating “protest potential” within
Russia, stating:
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We can see the connection between street protests and grants/fellowships offered by such
U.S. funds as Open Society, a George Soros Fund, Harvard University, Albert Einstein
Institute, International Republican Institute, National Democratic Institute, International
Center for Nonviolent Conflicts, International Institute for Strategic Studies in London,
and many others. Considerable funding for “color revolutions” was provided through
SEED (Support of East European Democracy), which is fiscally supported by the US
State Department. (Brychkov, 2017)
Following the Orange Revolution, Russian security leaders also began to exert more
control over the domestic media and social media (Hinkle, 2017). A 2022 report in the Moscow
Times noted that, “Putin has been a longtime critic of social media’s potential for influencing
young people and has recently taken more aggressive steps to limit the kind of content that can
be shared online, slapping multimillion-dollar fines on the likes of Google and Facebook”
(Nikolsky, 2022). To compete against the images and media coverage of anti-regime protestors
marching in the streets, Russian security leaders began to stage pro-regime rallies and
demonstrations. According to a leading scholar from the National Defence Academy of Latvia,
these rallies:
…make the situation more complicated, making the removal of an existing government
much more difficult. It is a simple, but powerful non-violent tool of resisting a colorrevolution, because there is a crowd against a crowd, and not the people against the
government. Pro-government protests also challenge the pattern of color revolutions by
raising a question – how many protesters are enough to force the government in power to
resign legitimately? (Bērziņa, 2014)
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This appropriation of resistance methodologies has proven to be an effective means of
subverting or preempting would be anti-regime change resistance efforts. Putin preemptively
used this tactic in the days after the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 when protests began to emerge
inside Russia and Russian military casualties began to mount. Images of tens of thousands
Russia citizens gathered in an enormous stadium waiving Russian flags as Putin spoke provided
effective pro regime images and headlines (Dixon, 2022).
Subcategory #2 – Offensive Measures. While domestic protective measures were being
emplaced, Russian security leaders began to develop methods and means to counter and
appropriate resistance methodologies. Previously elaborated upon sub-category analysis clearly
indicated that by 2013, Russian security leaders had formulated detailed concepts, plans, and
intentions to proactively leverage resistance methodologies as a ‘new type’ form of warfare. The
Russian conflict strategy is depicted in “The Role of Nonmilitary Methods in Interstate Conflict
Resolution,” published in 2013 by Gerasimov. The model is below (see Figure 2).
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Figure 2.
“The Role of Nonmilitary Methods in Interstate Conflict Resolution”

The model consists of “six stages of conflict development, each characterized by the
primacy of nonmilitary measures” (Leonhard & Phillips 2016, p.18). The six stages are (1)
covert origins; (2) escalations; (3) start of conflict activities; (4) crisis; (5) resolution; and (6)
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restoration of peace (Leonhard & Phillips, 2015). Gerasimov described the shift to gray zone
activities in the following way: “the focus of applied methods of conflict has altered in the
direction of the broad use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other
nonmilitary measures – applied in coordination with the protest potential of the population”
(Romanchyshyna, 2016).
A detailed description of the first stage, the initiation of conflict, is especially relevant to
the research question. Researchers describe the first stage as follows:
During the initial stage [covert origins], which will likely be protracted, political
opposition forms against the opposing regime. This resistance takes the form of political
parties, coalition, and labor/trade unions. Russia employs strategic deterrence measures
and conducts a broad, comprehensive, and sustained information warfare campaign to
shape the environment. (Leonhard and Phillips 2015)
Italicized for emphasis are three key characteristics of the first stage of Russian gray zone
activities, which are highly relevant to the research questions and findings from complementary
study #1 and study #2: resistance, strategic deterrence and information warfare. This model
provided a template for Russian military operations conducted in 2014 in the Donbas region of
Ukraine.
Following the 2013 Euromaidan regime change resistance movement in Kiev that
resulted in the replacement of a pro-Russian Ukrainian President with a pro-western one, Russian
forces began to operationalize a campaign of Color Revolution warfare, or interstate conflict
appropriating resistance methodologies in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. As depicted in
the model, these efforts began with the formation of pro-Russian political opposition in the
Donbas among disaffected segments of Ukrainian society. Russian agents then organized these
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disaffected individuals into protest groups. These protests groups included a small faction that
later broke away from the peaceful protests in the main square, and violently clashed with police
and stormed the regional government center. Consistent with the findings from study #1
regarding security force defectors, according to news reports, some Ukrainian police officers
refused to use force against the protestors and “moved away from the government building after
the pro-Russian supporters broke in” (BBC, 2014). Other reports indicated that as many as 5,000
police and 3,000 Ukrainian service members defected to join the separatists (Kofman et al,
2017). Consistent with the model was the use of covert or non-uniformed Russian agents inside
of Ukraine who provoked and supported the burgeoning separatist groups (Roth, 2014;
Shapovalova & Jarábik, 2018). The Ukrainian Interior Minister noted, “About 1,500 radicals
were in each region who spoke with clear Russian accents and whose activity was being
coordinated through foreign intelligence” (Reuters, 2014). He also directly “accused Russian
Vladimir Putin of orchestrating the ‘separatist disorder’” (Reuters, 2014).
Consistent with the model’s depiction of “information conflict” and the findings from
study #1, which indicated a significant relationship between information activities and
success/progress, the Russian operation involved several aspects of information warfare. Russia
blocked pro-Maidan and amplified pro-separatist content on the “two most popular social-media
platforms in Ukraine, VKontakte and Odnoklassniki, hosted on Russian servers” (Kofman et al,
2017). Further, Russia attempted to rally support for the incursion, both in Russia and in the
separatists regions, through the purposeful use of the historical terms “Novorossiya” (New
Russia) and “Russian Spring” in public messaging to generate a sense of legitimacy and
emotionality to the “cause” of reunification of Russia-speaking peoples (Kofman et al, 2017).
While these information efforts seemed to have had a galvanizing effect on those already
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committed to the separatist cause, they did not result in significant growth of popular support for
the cause, or large-scale protests among the general population (Kuzio, 2019). Nevertheless,
leaders of the pro-Russian movement called for a referendum of independence from Ukraine and
requested Russian military peacekeepers to protect them (BBC, 2014). After a few weeks of
continued protests and agitation, the separatist leaders proclaimed their secession from Ukraine
and the establishment of the People’s Republic of Donetsk and the People’s Republic of Luhansk
(BBC, 2014). Consistent with the model, a few months later Russian leaders escalated the
conflict with overt military force to conduct an incursion into these separatist areas under the
pretext of peacekeeping and protecting the Russian diaspora located there, initiating years of
armed conflict and casualties between Ukrainian forces and the pro-Russian separatists in the
Donbas region from 2015-2022, referred to as the Russo-Ukrainian War. These numerous
iterations revolving around resistance movements and the Color Revolutions all provide the
context and pretext for the large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Putin’s statement at
the outset of the invasion refer explicitly to these events and paradigms,
“This brings me to the situation in Donbass. We can see that the forces that staged the
coup in Ukraine in 2014 [Maidan] have seized power, are keeping it with the help of
ornamental election procedures and have abandoned the path of a peaceful conflict
settlement. For eight years, for eight endless years we have been doing everything
possible to settle the situation by peaceful political means. Everything was in vain. As I
said in my previous address, you cannot look without compassion at what is happening
there. It became impossible to tolerate it. We had to stop that atrocity, that genocide of
the millions of people who live there and who pinned their hopes on Russia, on all of us.
It is their aspirations, the feelings and pain of these people that were the main motivating
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force behind our decision to recognise the independence of the Donbass people’s
republics… In this context, in accordance with Article 51 (Chapter VII) of the UN
Charter, with permission of Russia’s Federation Council, and in execution of the treaties
of friendship and mutual assistance with the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Lugansk
People’s Republic, ratified by the Federal Assembly on February 22, I made a decision to
carry out a special military operation. The purpose of this operation is to protect people
who, for eight years now, have been facing humiliation and genocide perpetrated by the
Kiev regime. To this end, we will seek to demilitarise and denazify Ukraine, as well as
bring to trial those who perpetrated numerous bloody crimes against civilians, including
against citizens of the Russian Federation.” (Putin, 2022)
In addition to the manipulation and modification of resistance methodologies in the
Ukraine, the Russian military began advancing their capability to apply these methodologies in
other locations. In 2015, airborne and special forces from Russia, Belarus, and Serbia rehearsed
the utilization of military forces in a Color Revolution scenario in a neighboring country during
an exercise named ‘Slavic Brotherhood’ (Sputnik International, 2015). Referring to the exercise,
Gerasimov specifically verbalized the militarization of color revolutions, “seeing colour
revolutions as a form of warfare meant it was necessary to seek ways to use the military in
response” (Bouchet, 2016). Russia demonstrated this capability in 2022 when it deployed troops
to Kazakhstan to help quell protests and civil uprisings. Upon sending the Russian forces to
Kazakhstan, Putin stated, “We will not allow the realization of so-called color revolution
scenarios…unidentified “outside forces” interfering “in the internal affairs of our states...they
used well-organized and well-controlled militant groups… including those who had obviously
been trained in terrorist camps abroad,” calling Kazakhstan the target of “international terrorism”
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(Moscow Times, 2022). Noteworthy in the word choice of this statement is the purposeful
characterization of domestic protests as “international terrorism,” thereby further delegitimizing,
vilifying, and objectifying protestors as deserving of maximum use of military force. This point
was reinforced a month later, “Russia and China stand against attempts by external forces to
undermine security and stability in their common adjacent regions, intend to counter interference
by outside forces in the internal affairs of sovereign countries under any pretext, oppose colour
revolutions, and will increase cooperation in the aforementioned areas” (Putin, 2022). Taken
together, the data clearly depicts that Russian Federation security leaders have taken significant
steps to implement deliberate and detailed measures to protect the regime from being toppled by
a resistance movement, while at the same time, appropriating the lexicon and methodologies of
resistance movements as a form of interstate conflict in gray zone campaigns.
Subcategory #3 – Appropriation of democracy itself. This theme emerged from the
data set somewhat unexpectedly. The research questions centered on the appropriation of people
movements as a form of social movement and contentious politics. While the data set depicted
this appropriation, Russia has taken and manipulated people movements as tools of the state, it
has done so within a broader framework that appropriates and manipulates the key premises
underpinning people movements and the Color Revolutions. In particular, there is evidence of
appropriation of the principles of liberal democracy, free and independent media, and peaceful
protest. The statements and actions of Russian security leaders have attempted to redefine
democracy itself, appropriating and manipulating the signature value proposition of the West. A
joint statement of the Russian Federation and People’s Republic of China make this clear:
The sides share the understanding that democracy is a universal human value, rather than
a privilege of a limited number of States, and that its promotion and protection is a
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common responsibility of the entire world community. There is no one-size-fits-all
template to guide countries in establishing democracy. A nation can choose such forms
and methods of implementing democracy that would best suit its particular state, based
on its social and political system, its historical background, traditions and unique cultural
characteristics. It is only up to the people of the country to decide whether their State is a
democratic one. (Russia and China 2022)
Additionally, the dataset indicates that Russia’s adaptations and appropriation of
resistance methodologies deliberately exploit the principle of peaceful protest and human rights
embedded in western resistance paradigms. Russia’s adaptations purposefully intend to “break
the strategy of non-violent resistance...by escalating violence…adding a military dimension to
the concept of the “color-revolution”. In this way, it’s possible to resist strategic non-violence
which is at the core of the Western understanding of “color-revolutions” (Bērziņa, 2014). The
implications of this approach are horribly on display in Russian’s ongoing 2022 Ukraine
incursion, which have inflicted massive violence and suffering on the civil population of
Ukraine.
Taken together, the words and actions of Russian security leaders found in the data set
clearly indicated that the Russian Federation has the demonstrated intent, will, and capability to
leverage people movements and resistance methodologies as strategic tools of the state for
interstate conflict. Russia’s methods and approaches for doing so are consistent with the findings
in study #1, heavily influenced by the Color Revolutions, with emphasis on the combat power
variables of information, security/state defectors, and radical flank. Complementary to findings
of study #1, study #2 further indicated that other variables critical to the “protest potential” of a
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population include NGO activity, youth/student organization activity, oligarch influence, and
legal permissiveness.
Chinese Regime Category #1 – Fear of Color Revolution
Within category #1, the study identified three subcategories: (1) fear of regime change,
(2) regime fear of cultural change, and (3) regime fear of own population. The researcher
presents exemplars of quoted material from the data set for each of the sub-categories.
Subcategory #1 – Regime fear of regime change. This theme emerged from the China
dataset with different characteristics than the Russian dataset. The China dataset featured four
unique descriptors regarding regime change: “party”, “political security”, “law and order”, and
“mainland”. Chinese security discourse places specific emphasis on the security of the
Communist Chinese Party (CCP) more than is found regarding the United Russia Party in the
Russian dataset. The China dataset uniquely emphasized the concepts of “political security” and
“law and order” as distinguishing and desired characteristics of the regime. Additionally, much
of the Chinese security discourse is dedicated to the topics of PRC governance and control of
Hong Kong and Taiwan. Therefore, the regime views concerns about Color Revolutions starting
in Hong Kong or Taiwan almost existentially due to the possibility that these activities might
threaten the CCP in Beijing. The following government news report is an exemplar of these
characteristics, “some are related to the Hong Kong turmoil in 2019, which try to expand the
Western-backed color revolution from the special administrative region to the mainland… but
the color revolution that directly targets our political security is trying to harm the stability and
public order in our country, so it's much more serious and destructive," (Sheng, 2021).
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Another feature of descriptions of fear of regime change in the Chinese data set often
include descriptions of negative impacts on businesses. The following exemplar from a state
media outlet includes this feature as well as the previously identified features:
The director of the Chinese Association of Hong Kong and Macao Studies claimed that
"Occupy Central" was in essence a "Hong Kong version of a color revolution" which is a
conspiracy to undermine China's political system… these revolutions share one thing in
common - mass destruction and wanton disregard for the rule of law. The "Occupy"
campaign in Hong Kong has greatly affected social stability and taken a heavy toll on
businesses. The collateral damage caused by the campaign may be impossible to
calculate… Color revolutions usually have fancy names…but in reality, these movements
were poison laced with honey… The way "Occupy" evolved and unfolded, in retrospect,
strongly indicates that the protests were spurred on by external forces, who aim to trigger
a "color revolution" that ignites in Hong Kong but spreads to the mainland. (China Daily
2014)
Another interesting aspect that emerged from the China dataset is that much of the
Chinese discourse views resistance and the Color Revolutions through the lens of the Russian
experience. In other words, Chinese security leaders observed and learned from the Russian
experience and seemingly through dialogue with Russian counterparts. The following statement
from Chinese state media is an exemplar of this feature, “the main danger of color revolutions is
putting a country with all its people and resources under external control," Andrei Manoilo, a
professor of political science at Moscow State University, told the media in 2019 as turmoil
ensued in China's Hong Kong (Global Times, 2021).
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Subcategory #2 – Regime fear of cultural change. Regime fear of cultural change in
the Chinese dataset is characterized mostly by fear of ideological threats that would challenge the
dominant role of the CCP in society, as compared to fear of loss of ethnic, linguistic, or historical
identity found in the Russian dataset. A statement by the PRC Embassy in the United States is an
exemplar of this sentiment, they “brainwash local people with American values and make them
identify with America’s economic model and political system” (Embassy of PRC in USA,
2021). The following excerpt from a People’s Liberation Army memo is an exemplar of many of
the distinctive features of Chinese security discourse presented thus far, including emphasis on
the Party (CCP):
“Western hostile forces and a small number of "ideological traitors" in our country use
the network, and relying on computers, mobile phones and other such information
terminals, maliciously attack our Party, blacken the leaders who founded the New China,
vilify our heroes, and arouse mistaken thinking trends of historical nihilism, with the
ultimate goal of using "universal values" to mislead us, using "constitutional democracy"
to throw us into turmoil, use "color revolutions" to overthrow us, use negative public
opinion and rumours to oppose us, and use "de-partification and depoliticization of the
military" to upset us. (Lopez, 2015)
Subcategory #3 – Regime fear of U.S. intent//capability. Like Russia, Chinese security
leaders are convinced that the U.S. was the dominant external force behind the Color
Revolutions. Furthermore, their discourse indicates that they assess that Hong Kong and Taiwan
are under constant threat of a U.S. supported resistance movements, or Color Revolutions.
According to the Embassy of the PRC in the USA, “The US State Department openly admitted
playing a “central role” in these “regime changes” … In October 2020, the Russian Foreign

100
Intelligence Service revealed that the US planned to instigate “color revolution” in Moldova.
(Embassy of PRC in USA, 2021). Frequent articles on state media reinforce a fear of U.S.
intentions and activities to initiate resistance movements against the PRC, “A fact sheet on U.S.
interference in Hong Kong affairs released by the Chinese Foreign Ministry revealed that the
United States has been plotting to wage a "color revolution" in Hong Kong, the Office for
Safeguarding National Security of the Central People's Government in the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region (HKSAR) has said (Xinhua, 2021). According to another state media
outlet:
The color revolution is being used a major tactic to disrupt China's development, and it
seems like the last card that the US can play to stop China from realizing great
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation… It's not surprising to many that Western forces used
Hong Kong's open city status to incite color revolution through various channels,
including media outlets, student unions, political parties and labor unions by funding,
training, advising them or organizing illegal assemblies, protests and riots, all tactics that
could be found in the 2019 turmoil. (Global Times, 2021)
Chinese state media outlets are rife with reports on detailed allegations of how the U.S.
leverages and supports resistance movement such as this statement, “Xing said the typical pattern
of countries such as the United States that advance color revolutions include supporting
nongovernmental organizations, cultivating the opposition and their leaders, fueling public fury
through stunts and scandals, defying election results and supporting efforts to seize power (China
Daily, 2019). Yet another state media article is an exemplar of the detailed reporting of the role
of NGOs and student/youth groups in Color Revolutions:
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"NGOs" under the US government's control are often used to carry out long-term
infiltration in targeted countries. The infamous National Endowment for Democracy
(NED) of the US, a self-proclaimed "NGO" for instance, has been using state funding to
preach the hegemonic doctrine of the US government. As of 2016, NED had provided
some $96.52 million to at least 103 anti-China entities, including notorious separatist
groups, such as the World Uyghur Congress (WUC) and the Tibetan Youth Congress
(TYC). (Global Times, 2021)
Overall, there was much discourse regarding resistance movements and Color
Revolutions found in the dataset, indicating a topic of importance to Chinese security leaders.
Chinese Regime Category #2 – Shift to Information Warfare
Within category #2, the study identified two subcategories: (1) justification for
information warfare; and (2) methods of information warfare. The researcher presents exemplars
of quoted material from the data set for each of the sub-categories pertaining to the People’s
Republic of China.
Subcategory #1 – Justification for information warfare. The dataset indicated that
Chinese security leaders assess the availability of uncensored information on the internet,
particularly to youth, is a major vulnerability in the state security apparatus. An article featuring
concerns shared by People’s Liberation Army (PLA) leadership is a good exemplar of this
sentiment, “regarding Chinese President Xi Jinping’s warning that “some Western countries are
stepping up to instigate ‘colour revolutions’ in our country, stepping up the implementation of
online ‘Cultural Cold War’ and ‘political genetic modification’ projects in an attempt to root out
our military officers and soldiers and pull the military out of the party banner.” Xi Jinping
asserted that “The challenges we face in the field of ideology and political security are very

102
serious” and it is imperative “to first strengthen positive publicity and guidance of public
opinion... Consolidate and strengthen the mainstream ideological and public opinion... and guide
officers and soldiers to grasp correct standpoints and viewpoints” (Ranade, 2021). These
concerns are far more widespread than just the PLA, the CCP views the inability to control
information as an overall national security risk:
The internet and new social media platforms have also challenged the CCP’s control by
providing Chinese citizens with avenues through which to share information, vent
frustration, and organize protests. Leaders in Beijing are particularly sensitive to any
activities by foreign powers that might exacerbate threats to its control. China continues
to accuse foreign powers of inciting discontent in Hong Kong and among Chinese
internet users. (Scobell 2020)
These exemplars from the data set represent a consistent theme found in the words and
actions of Chinese security leaders. To protect the Party and the regime, they place significant
emphasis and resources on information warfare activities.
Subcategory #2 – Methods of information warfare. The doctrine of the Three
Warfares is central to China’s approach to seize the “decisive opportunity” (先机) through
cognitive campaigning (Kania 2016). The legal, psychological, and media components of the
strategy orient the cognitive objectives within the campaign. The goal of ‘legal warfare’ is to
“bend or rewrite the rules of the international order in China’s favor,” (Navarro 2016). The goal
of psychological warfare is to “deter, demoralize, or otherwise shock an opponent nation and its
civilian population and thereby discourage the opponent from fighting back,” (Navarro 2016).
The goal of media warfare is to “shape public opinion to accept China’s version of events,”
(Navarro 2016). Woven together in space and time, these three types of cognitive objectives
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generate significant cognitive mass in support of China’s gray zone campaigns. The following is
an example. If China engages in a territorial dispute within the South China Sea, it will:
First assert false [legal] territorial claims based on vague history…it next projects nonkinetic force in the form of flotillas of white-hulled civilian fleets [to intimidate]
…finally the Chinese Central Television Network repeatedly portrays a ‘peaceful China’
as a victim of foreign power domination only trying to right an historic wrong. (Navarro
2016)
Control of information is a prevailing theme in the data set. Thus, state control of media
outlets features prominently within Chinese security discourse. The following excerpt from a
scholarly assessment of how the Color Revolutions influenced Chinese policy and actions
provides a succinct description of how control of the media features heavily in the outcomes of
resistance movements:
Ideological fortification and political domination require cooperation of the mass media
to justify and disseminate pro-regime accounts, establishment scholars further argued.
Shockingly, witnessing the liberalizing processes during which pro-opposition media
took over and marginalized government-fed information in each instance of the Color
Revolutions, Chinese propaganda specialists emphatically reminded the top leadership of
the deadly risks incurred by overthrown regimes once censorship was lifted and unlimited
press freedom took effect. (Chen 2010)
As noted in the previous section, an interesting feature of the Chinese security discourse
is that it often views the Color Revolutions through the lens of the Russian experience. The
following excerpt from the dataset interestingly describes PLA learning from Russian
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experiences in Syria and Ukraine to integrate various elements of information warfare for greater
effectiveness:
Perhaps the PLA’s biggest takeaway from the Russian experience was the establishment
of the PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF). China’s military officers and strategists
are schooled in Russian thinking on “New Generation warfare” and have paid keen
attention to Russia’s success in Ukraine and Syria, where they identified the Russian
information warfare strategy as the key battle winning factor. The PLA has therefore
created one integrated structure, which is responsible for all military space, cyberspace
and electronic warfare (EW) operations and forms the core of China’s information
warfare force. (Singh, 2020)
Chinese Regime Category #3 – Adaptational Action
Within category #3, the study identified three subcategories: (1) internal protective
measures; (2) militarization of resistance; and (3) appropriation of democracy itself. The
researcher presents exemplars of quoted material from the data set for each of the subcategories
pertaining to the People’s Republic of China.
Subcategory #1 – Defensive measures. The dataset indicated that Chinese security
leaders have contemplated and implemented a range of internal measures to protect the regime
from Color Revolutions or resistance movements. President Xi has placed significant emphasis
on ‘comprehensive national security’ that “incorporates traditional security areas (e.g., political,
territorial, and military) alongside new areas, such as cultural and scientific security and of
China’s overseas interests and “political security” (Mankikar, 2022; Xinhua, 2020). This focus
included a new national security law for Hong Kong in 2020 that would “cut off "the invisible
hands" behind the chaos caused by foreign troublemakers… [by allowing for life imprisonment
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sentences] as an effective deterrence to those lawbreakers who endanger national security
(Sheng, 2021). China’s internal protective measures include laws limiting political activity, such
as election primaries, to prevent public discord and the potential for protests. This excerpt from a
media report is an exemplar of the sternness and seriousness to which Chinese security leaders
communicate internal protective measures:
China on Tuesday said last weekend's democratic primaries were an attempt at a "color
revolution" in Hong Kong. A spokesman for the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office
(HKMAO) under China's cabinet, the State Council, said the primaries represented an
"erosion" of the powers of the Hong Kong government and a "flagrant provocation ...
which must not be allowed." "Hong Kong has become a base for color revolution,
infiltration and subversive activities against Beijing," the spokesman said. "This was
illegal manipulation of the election ... and a blatant challenge to the ... national se curity
law for Hong Kong," a spokesman said in a statement posted to the HKMAO's official
website. "We strongly ... support the investigation and punishment of violators".
(Mudie, 2020)
Like Russia, China has identified western NGOs has a critical element to control to limit
resistance movements or Color Revolutions. The following statement from a Chinese
government expert, Yang Jin, an expert at the Institute of Russian, Eastern European and Central
Asian Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, on state media illustrates the shared
approach with Russia to restrict the influence of Western NGOs, "fighting color revolutions is an
important task for China and Russia to not just protect themselves but also safeguard regional
peace and stability. The two countries could cooperate on intelligence sharing, joint operations

106
against Western illegal NGOs that would create disinformation to hype instability and
cybersecurity," (Global Times, 2021).
Subcategory #2 – Offensive measures. The approach taken by Chinese security leaders
to leverage resistance movements as a form of interstate conflict varies significantly from Russia.
Whereas Russian security leaders developed detailed military concepts and capabilities to
replicate resistance movement methodologies to foment large-scale informational, political and
civil movements in the Ukraine, there are few indications in the dataset that China has
“militarized resistance” in the same fashion. Chinese gray zone activities are characterized by
“intimidation, coercion and veiled aggression” (Freier, 2016; Cordesman, 2021) across multiple
domains. To achieve this, China skillfully employs a “campaign-like approach to gray zone
competition and conflict that liberally mixes political, military and commercial instruments…as
weapons” (Freier, 2016). This approach includes using financial institutions, commercial
businesses and “disruptive and destructive” cyber activity to pressure and influence adversaries
when necessary (Freier, 2016). An example of this type of activity is when China “imposes an
economic boycott or bans Chinese tourism” as a means of financially coercing Japan to give-in
to Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea (Navarro, 2016).
China implemented a maritime variant of gray zone activities to implement its policy of
claiming territory in the South China Sea. Irregular means to operationalize the strategy include
leveraging commercial vessels, so called “Little Blue Men” to compliment commercial Chinese
Navy capacity to patrol the South China Sea (Erickson & Kennedy, 2015). To accomplish this,
China subsidizes civilian fishing vessels and then provides them with “satellite-based marine
radios that help China to surveil and picket the South China Sea and harass ‘trespassing’ vessels”
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(Freier, 2016). This approach helps enable a denial strategy without directly confronting the
United States militarily.
Additionally, China’s strategic deterrence paradigm includes the use of irregular
deterrence by denial as a fifth pillar alongside nuclear, conventional, space and cyber
capabilities. Chinese doctrine refers to this as “People’s War” as it calls for “using a country’s
population to draw an enemy deeper inland, where the population can then use mobile and
guerilla warfare to bleed the enemy dry,” (Chase & Chan, 2016). The doctrine of ‘People’s War’
highlights state actor use of anti-occupation resistance methodologies as a strategic choice
against another state actor.
The CCP response to an alleged western-backed Color Revolution in Kazakhstan in 2020
is illustrative. Simply stated, where Putin sent troops, Xi sent words:
President Xi Jinping has specifically sent a verbal message to President Tokayev,
publicly expressing that China firmly opposes any deliberate attempt by external forces to
provoke unrest and instigate a "color revolution" in Kazakhstan… and guard against
"color revolutions" and the "three forces" of terrorism, separatism and extremism. (PRC
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022)
Instead of militarization of resistance, the data indicated that China decided to leverage
people movements for interstate conflict via a more subtle political warfare approach called the
Great United Front to wage a “war of stealth” (Dimon, 2021). Mao initiated the United Front
methodology in 1939. However, in 2012 President Xi began revitalizing and reformulating the
approach as the ‘Great United Front’ to be a “magic weapon” to secure Chinese strategic
objectives (Marris & Joske, 2019). The Great United Front seeks to, “influence through
connections that are difficult to publicly prove and to gain influence that is interwoven with
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sensitive issues such as ethnic, political, and national identity, making those who seek to identify
the negative effects of such influence vulnerable to accusations of prejudice” (Bowe, 2018). Said
another way:
The United Front is a series of stratagems directed by the CCP and implemented by
swarms of agents and moles, often masquerading as dissidents, journalists, researchers,
academics, interns, maids, nannies, and chauffeurs, to gather information, but far more
critically and usefully, to spread disinformation; so enemies are misdirected, leading to
badly judged and self-destructive decisions. (Dimon, 2021)
Specifically applicable to the research questions, the Great United Front “oversees
influence operations targeting Taiwan and Hong Kong…to suppress independence movements,
undermine local identity, and promote support for Beijing’s political system” (Bowe, 2018).
Examples of United Front activity include orchestrating pro-China protests in San Francisco,
including transporting 6,000 – 8,000 protestors, to counter anti-China protestors gathered along
the Olympic Torch run route. This effort enabled a key propaganda objective for the PRC, as San
Francisco was the only city in the U.S. where the torch would pass through enroute to Beijing for
the Olympic Games (Dorfman, 2018). The United Front is associated with NGOs that promote
PRC policies, such as Confucius Institutes and Chinese Students and Scholars Associations. The
purpose of the Great United Front is to “co-opt the movements, organizations, and people that
provide social…goods and mobilize or manipulate them into aiding the Party in its endeavors”
(Bowe, 2018). Internationally, the China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Reunification
(CPPRC):
has at least 200 chapters in 90 countries, including 33 chapters in the U.S. The CPPRC
promotes China’s unification with Taiwan globally. In Taiwan, the United Front operates

109
through several organizations that “suppress independence movements, undermine
Taiwan’s government, and recruit politicians in Taiwan and third countries to advocate
for CCP policies. (Bowe, 2018)
In Australia and New Zealand, the United Front has “targeted a range of organizations
and actors and achieved significant success exerting political influence, controlling important
media outlets, and subverting narratives China believes to be unfavorable to its interests” (Bowe,
2018). While the theme of the Great United Front clearly emerged from the dataset, there is
much more to learn. The covert and seemingly innocuous nature of Great United Front activity
makes it difficult to fully assess and understand, “even among the majority of experts on China”
(Dimon, 2021).
Subcategory #3 – Appropriation of democracy itself. While the preceding Russia
section of study #2 discussed the significance of the joint statement issued by the President of
China and the Russian Federation in 2022 in detail, the China dataset revealed additional
distinctions of how the PRC has actively attempted to define and appropriate democracy in the
context of resistance movements. For example, Chinese state media reports in the dataset
revealed the juxtaposition of China claiming the centrality of ‘democracy’ while at the same
negatively casting civil participation in democratic practices, “democracy and the rule of law are
the two pillars that ensure Hong Kong is a rule-based society. The city's prosperity and stability
rest heavily on whether all stakeholders can find a solution that prevents the city being torn apart.
In this regard, no one can be completely protected by chaotic street politics, and law and order is
the best guarantee,” (China Daily, 2014). Similarly, a recent Chinese state media article
regarding the ongoing Russian incursion of Ukraine negatively characterizes U.S. democracy,
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while implicitly advancing an acceptance of the reality of multiple definitions of democracy and
implying a more preferable Chinese formulation of democracy:
While the plumes of smoke clouding Europe are yet to settle, the US is again seeking to
monopolize the definition of "democracy" to serve its political and hegemonic agenda. It
has been proven many times that democracy by the US standard is rarely based on the
will of the people but the US hegemony and self-interest. (Ping, 2022)
These exemplars from the dataset indicate a joint Russia-China effort to redefine and
appropriate the signature proposition of the West, liberal democracy, as a means of competing
with the U.S. by creating global conditions more favorable to Russian and Chinese autocratic
political systems.
Taken together, the words and actions of Chinese security leaders found in the data set
clearly indicated that the PRC has the demonstrated intent, will, and capability to leverage people
movements and resistance methodologies as strategic tools of the state for interstate conflict.
China’s methods and approaches for doing so are consistent with the findings in study #1,
heavily influenced by the Color Revolutions, with emphasis on the combat power variables of
information, and security/state defectors. However different from the Russian dataset, the combat
power variable of a violent radical flank did not significantly emerge from the dataset. Instead,
the Chinese methods of appropriation of resistance moves seems to preference subtle and nonviolent methods. Complementary to findings of study #1, study #2 of Chinese discourse
indicated additional variables associated with success/progress in resistance movements include
NGO activity, legal permissiveness, impacts on business, degree of deniability/stealth.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Discussion
The purpose of this study was to benefit theorists and practitioners by (a) learning more
about resistance methodologies from the formative (1945-2006) and contemporary (2006-2022)
periods, (b) increasing understanding from the perspective of Russian Federation and People’s
Republic of China security leaders of resistance as a form in interstate conflict, and (c) exploring
options to enhance integrated deterrence paradigms. The study resulted in findings that address
four researchable gaps in the literature centered on gaining better understanding of resistance
movements from a security studies perspective (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011) and to contribute
to the development of “capabilities to better compete and deter gray zone actions,” (Biden,
2021).
The research utilized two complementary studies to explore the research questions and
objectives. Complementary study #1 was a quantitative study of resistance movements during
the formative period 1945-2006. Complementary study #2 was a qualitative study of Russian
Federation and People’s Republic of China perspectives on resistance as a form of interstate
conflict in the contemporary period 2006-2022. The structure of the study linked literature, gaps,
and research questions as indicated below. In this chapter, the researcher will utilize this
framework to provide key takeaways from the study and provide implications. The researcher
will sequentially proceed through this framework beginning with a horizontal crosswalk of
resistance theory, gaps, questions, and findings followed by a similar horizontal crosswalk of
combat power theory and deterrence theory with elements of security discourse employed
throughout (see Chapter 1, Table 2).
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Combat Power Theory
The literature review highlighted key aspects of combat power theory necessary to inform
and frame the research. First, in structuring the research, the researcher paired the positivist
nature of combat power theory with research question #1. This formulation resulted in
complementary study #1. Utilization of combat theory was central to one of the objectives of this
study, which was to expand scholarly work regarding resistance movements into national
security, interstate conflict prevention, and integrated deterrence discourse. Since many countries
utilize combat power theory in their doctrines and discourse, including the United States, Russia,
and China, it provided a recognizable, understandable, and trusted framework for analysis that
would resonate among security studies scholars (Anderson & Engstrom, 2009; Martin, 2013;
Montgomery, 2014; Roberts, 2015; U.S. Joint Chiefs, 2016; Vest, 2017).
Utilizing combat power theory as a positivist framework contributed to quantitative
examination of resistance as a deliberate means of achieving security objectives from a military
science lens. Study #1 yielded several specific and relevant findings for theorists and
practitioners. The findings depicted in chapter four (see Tables 16 and 17) enable a wide range of
exploration of the dataset specific to the outcomes of interest, such as comparing the variables
associated with success/progress in regime change vs. territorial secession vs. anti-occupation
movements to determine patterns, outliers, vulnerabilities, or opportunities. For example,
international media coverage is associated with success/progress of all of the examined
movement outcomes and is therefore a critical variable to either defend or degrade when
supporting or opposing resistance movements. Similarly, the findings enable the exploration of
differences and similarities between variables associated with success or progress. These layers
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of additive understanding of resistance movements are useful to the exploration of multi-year
movements, where progress occurs overtime, not in a single year.
Information ubiquity has changed the nature of interstate conflict. The review of
combat power literature identified three key theoretical distinctions worth revisiting and
discussing here to assist in reflecting on findings and essential takeaways of the study. First, the
researcher noted in the literature review that the origins of combat theory stemmed from early
twentieth century military theorists seeking to reconcile emerging technologies, such as tanks
and airplanes, with the works of classical military theorists. Combat power theory derived
largely from the work of British military theorist, J.F.C. Fuller, who posited that emerging
technology would fundamentally alter the character of war. This proposition goes to a core
pondering when reflecting upon the findings of the research – how has the technology of mass
communication (e.g., internet, social media, satellite communication etc.) affected the definition
and conduct of interstate conflict in the contemporary environment? In consideration of this
prompt, a primary finding of complementary study #1 was the significant relationship between
international media coverage and success/progress in all types and forms of resistance
movements. It is worth noting that the dataset for study #1 (1945-2006) corresponds with the
early stages of the Information Age, however, the period of examination for study #1 does not
include the saturation of information associated with ubiquitous internet, social media, and
personal devices in the contemporary period (Borkovich & Noah, 2014).
The literature review regarding information activities indicated that information activities
would be critical to the success of all resistance movements. The data analysis did not support
this supposition. However, information activities are associated to progress of resistance
movements (international media; r = .260; domestic media; r = .168, and resistance outreach to
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the media; phi = .113). The information activity with the greatest effect in the study was the
effect of international media coverage on the progress of a territorial succession movement
(.338).
Surprisingly, study #1 did not indicate a significant relationship between resistance new
media and success/progress. One possibility is that this finding illuminates a shortcoming of the
data set in that it only codes resistance movements up to 2006, which would not include the
effects of mass communications expansion experienced with the launch of the iPhone (2007) or
widespread use of social media, such as Facebook (2010). Therefore, study #1 points to the
significance of information activities to resistance success/progress; however, it does not indicate
a change to the very nature of interstate conflict in the contemporary period. However, study #2
revealed a great richness and complexity of contemplations, communications, and actions from
the most senior security leaders in the U.S., Russia, and China regarding the fundamental shift in
priority to information as a form of interstate conflict and competition.
In recent years, the term ‘information warfare’ has grown in usage in Western, Russian,
and Chinese professional military journals and doctrine (Gery et al., 2017; Simons, 2020;
Wortzel, 2014). Of note, the detailed study of information as a critical operational element is still
a burgeoning characteristic of security studies, as U.S. security doctrine only added information
to the combat power framework in 2018. Furthermore, as noted in the literature review, when
revealing the inclusion of information as an element of combat power in a leading U.S. defense
professional journal, a senior U.S. defense official emphasized the significance of the addition by
opining, “within the changing environment, information may prove to be the preeminent
commodity and decisive factor in military operations,” (Grynkewich, 2018). A myriad of official
statements and media reporting regarding the Russian incursion of Ukraine in 2022 further
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indicate the primacy of information within interstate conflict, including deliberations at the
United Nations Security Council. During these deliberations in June 2022, leaders from around
the world, including Russia and China, posited a range of views highlighting the centrality of
information to interstate conflict in the contemporary period, bringing “information warfare to
the forefront of geopolitical conflicts” (United Nations Security Council, 2022). One speaker at
the deliberations, Jared Cohen, CEO of Jigsaw and Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council of
Foreign Relations noted, the Russian incursion of Ukraine provided a “crystal ball” for the future
of interstate conflict where, “like land, air and sea, the Internet has become a critical domain to
occupy during war,” (United Nations Security Council, 2022).
Viewed through Fuller’s theoretical lens of combat power, the findings of this present
research are consistent with multiple viewpoints extant in the literature, indicating that the
technology of mass information has greatly impacted, if not altered, the character of interstate
conflict and war in the contemporary period. Therefore, the findings of this research, which
indicate the central role of information in resistance movements as a form of interstate conflict,
are germane and additive to the literature. From the perspective of conflict resolution, conflict
management, or conflict prevention, these findings present opportunities and challenges to the
field. The identification of opportunities for conflict resolution includes extant research that
indicated “shifts in international public support reduce conflict intensity” through social media
(Zeitzoff, 2016). Other research indicated, “newer communication technologies are being used to
amplify and harmonize for conflict management, prevention and peacebuilding [including]
improve early warning, monitor peace, and promote peacebuilding before and during conflict”
(Mamoona & Fozia, 2018). The prominent role of information in conflict presents challenges to
conflict resolution approaches, including concerns over individual privacy on social media
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(Mamoona & Fozia, 2018), and “increased polarization and group-targeted violence” (Brown &
Livingston, 2018).
Fear drives Russian and Chinese approaches to resistance. The second theoretical
distinction identified in the literature review worth revisiting was the critical perspective of
Fuller’s overly positivist and numerical approach that focused too much on technological
performance and did not adequately account for the intangible and humanistic nature of warfare.
This theoretical distinction was important to the design of the study, which sought address this
call for balance between quantitative and qualitative methods. Furthermore, Hart’s emphasis on
the humanistic nature of warfare was essential to exploring the topic. In study #1, the dataset
captured some of the humanistic aspects of conflict in limited, but important ways. For example,
the data fields in the NAVCO 2.0 dataset that coded defection from security forces and defection
of state leaders attempted to capture a complex humanistic variable involving change in loyalty,
emotions, and personal risk. Study #2 allowed for deeper exploration of humanistic variables
with its qualitative design, resulting in a much more nuanced and richer understanding of the
topic that embedded historical, cultural, and personal factors behind the perspective, thoughts,
and decisions of the most senior security leaders in the U.S., Russia, and China. During the
iterative content analysis process, themes emerged that revealed the humanistic considerations
advocated by Hart, including palpable fears of regime change, fear of cultural change, and fear of
loss of control among Western, Russian, and Chinese security leaders. Hart’s theoretical lens
emphasizing humanistic aspects of interstate conflict helped provide insights in study #2,
particularly the content analysis of Putin’s statements regarding the 2022 Russian incursion of
Ukraine. These statements indicate a stark sense of fear within the Putin regime of resistance
movements and a corresponding fear of loss of control of the population.
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The findings of this research are consistent with other contemporary scholarly works.
These include works which indicate that Putin’s fear of people movements was the driving force
behind his decision to invade the Ukraine in 2022 (Cuomo & Latypova, 2022; Mitchell, 2022;
Person & McFaul, 2022). Similarly, PRC security leaders continue to implement measures to
control information and view a variety of interstate matters, such as trade, through the lens of
fear of people movements for the purposes of “protecting China’s political security” (Nakazawa
2019; Slaten 2020).
Combat Power Theory adds depth for practitioners and scholars. The third
theoretical distinction identified in the literature review worth revisiting was a detailed
description of how and why combat power theorists recognize seven dimensions of combat
power: command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection,
sustainment, and information (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018). This consideration provided a
positivist framework to explore a subject held largely within interpretivist social science circles
and enabled a different and novel approach to the subject. Further, this basis enabled a
comprehensive and layered analysis of a large data set resulting in both statistically significant
and relevant findings from the formative period of resistance (1945-2006). The resulting
identification of significant relationships between success/progress in specific types of resistance
movements and specific variables relevant to security studies scholars and practitioners provided
tangible points of comparison, discussion, and application.
Further, the utilization of the seven dimensions of combat power as a framework for
analysis had the effect of clearly revealing shortcomings in the dataset and the body of scholarly
work it represents. The most robust dimension of combat power coded in the dataset was
information, which greatly benefited the study. However, the critical dimensions of intelligence,
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protection, fires, sustainment, and command and control were mostly absent from the dataset,
resulting in an incomplete picture of the organizational variables most related to success/progress
in resistance movements. This limitation creates the potential for a skewed understanding of the
relative significance of the variables coded in the dataset.
This shortcoming of inclusion of these critical dimensions of resistance in scholarly work
is further evident upon examination of practitioner discourse regarding resistance. One resistance
practitioner resource, Full Spectrum Resistance, dedicated entire chapters to discussion of
protection, sustainment, command and control, and the role of intelligence in resistance
movements stating, “good intelligence allows small groups with few resources to defeat larger
opponents; resistance movement have specific intelligence needs and ample sources for good
information” (McBay, 2019). Likewise, regarding the fires dimension of combat power,
extensive reporting from the Russian incursion in Ukraine indicated widespread use of
homemade incendiary devices, known as Molotov cocktails, by members of the civilian
population violently resisting the Russian invasion (Mateus, 2022). Similarly, anti-Taliban
resistance forces in Afghanistan known as the National Resistance Front, noted their efforts to
stockpile weapons in preparation for a protracted resistance effort, “We still have a large
stockpile of weapons from the war against Soviet occupation, and the first wave of resistance
against the Taliban in the 1990s, because we feared this day would come” (Ershad, 2021).
Similarly, in Taiwan, fear of a Chinese invasion akin to the 2022 Russian incursion of Ukraine,
spurned renewed planning and training to arm civilian resistance forces (Yang, 2022). Overall,
contemporary media reports and practitioner discourse indicate gaps in scholarly work regarding
the functional components of resistance movements. Utilizing combat power theory as a lens to
examine resistance movements allows for a more robust exploration of the resistance from a
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security studies perspective. Overall, study #1 utilized combat power theory as a positivist
framework to help transition thinking related to resistance movements into security discourse.
The positivist nature of combat power theory provided an appropriate theoretical framework to
conduct a quantitative study focused on RQ#1: what are the significant relationships between
combat power variables and success/progress in resistance campaigns during the formative
period from 1945-2006 whose goals are regime change, territorial secession, or anti-occupation?
The researcher addresses RQ#1 in more detail in the following paragraphs by exploring specific
variables from the dataset.
Blended, not bifurcated study of resistance. Study #1 found that the variables of
combat power that significantly associated with overall success of resistance movements were:
radical flank, security force defectors, and state defectors (Table 17). Of interest, although the
literature highlights a higher success rate of non-violent movements compared to violent
movements during the examined period (1945-2006), the literature does not highlight many nonviolent resistance movements that also include a violent component. Furthermore, only 191 of
1,704 (11.2%) coded resistance years were purely nonviolent movements (e.g., the primary
method of the movement was coded as nonviolent in the dataset, and the movement did not have
a radical (violent) flank).
This analysis begins to improve understanding of resistance movements from a security
studies perspective by expanding the understanding of resistance beyond a principled approach
emphasizing non-violence to a more holistic understanding that allows for consideration of the
practical implications of a blended use of violent and non-violent methods in resistance
movements. Taking a deeper look at resistance movements by examining progress (vs. success)
of all resistance movements revealed a more nuanced understanding of critical resistance
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variables: radical flank, security force defectors, domestic media coverage, state defectors,
international media coverage, foreign support, and resistance movement media outreach. The
analysis of progress in resistance movements resulted in a larger effect of the radical flank
variable when compared to success.
The findings of this study improved understanding of resistance movements beyond the
bifurcated approach, which tends to simplify resistance movements as either violent or
nonviolent. Instead, this study points to an understanding of the blended nature of resistance
movements. This concept is consistent with recently published practitioner resources, which
note, “militancy can work by itself, but militancy can also up crucial space for larger moderate
groups; and militancy can magnify the impact of moderate tactics” (McBay, 2019). As a
contemporary example, the blended use of nonviolent and violent resistance methods, including
both nonviolent protests and the use of incendiary weapons by the civilian population, has also
been a distinguishing feature of Ukrainian efforts to resist the 2022 Russian incursion (Mateus,
2022; Sky News, 2022).
While this research study was not designed to specifically evaluate or advocate for the
use or nonuse of violent or nonviolent resistance methods, these findings are additive to a
significant body of western scholarly work that may preference nonviolent methods, often with
an unspoken underpinning of a western academic world view and liberal value system that may
or may not reflect the universe of thought within the security sector or within the halls of
government in Russia or China. The intent of discussing these findings is to address one of the
stated purposes of this study: to gain an understanding of resistance from a security studies
perspective and from the perspective of Russian and Chinese security leaders, perhaps reducing
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blind spots and helping to gain a holistic understanding of resistance that is beneficial to scholars
and practitioners.
From the perspective of state utilization of resistance as a form of interstate conflict, the
Ukrainian national resistance to the Russian incursion provides additional insights into the
research focus of this study looking at resistance as a form of interstate conflict. According to
media reports, the Ukrainian ability to resist the Russian incursion resulted from several years of
efforts to develop the concepts, laws, organizations, and resources to enable a national resistance
effort. According to a senior U.S. security leader:
Kyiv saw this coming and prepared its people. Ukraine passed a law in July of 2021
authorizing the creation of the Territorial Defense Forces and laying out a structure for
integrating local militias in each of the 25 oblasts, or regions, and in the largest cities.
That law also made provisions for the formation of a resistance force in the event of
Russian occupation. The Territorial Defense Forces were largely in place when Russia
invaded this past week. When more than 130,000 citizens volunteered to take up arms,
there was a designed structure in place for them to step into. (Repass, 2022)
The law, known as, “On the Fundamentals of National Resistance” was developed with
the help of Western security planners and based on a practitioner model of resistance called the
Resistance Operation Concept that includes both violent and nonviolent activities (Winkie,
2022). Western scholars that advocate for the traditional privileging of nonviolent methods, and
bifurcation of resistance between violent and nonviolent methods, maintain that primarily
nonviolent campaigns “often succeed despite intra- or extra movement violent flanks, but seldom
because of them” (Chenoweth & Schock, 2016). This perspective is grounded in their assessment
that violent flanks tend to reduce overall levels of participation in the movement, thereby
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negating their model that indicates that the primary strength of nonviolent movements is mass
participation (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2016).
However, study #2 cast doubt on these perspectives. Content analysis findings indicated
that Russia has developed deliberate methods that “break the strategy” of these western
resistance methodologies that are grounded in nonviolent methods by ruthlessly escalating
violence against them beyond a level deemed acceptable by western value systems. The purpose
of these actions is to reduce participation in the movement, while at the same time orchestrating
mass public pro-regime demonstrations to counteract anti-regime protests. Scholars note that
violent regime repression of resistance movements can backfire. However, this requires media
coverage to an audience that can affect regime decision-making (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2016).
Other scholars point out the limitations of this approach in cases where the regime can
manipulate media coverage or the media coverage is otherwise ineffective at spurning action
within an audience that can influence regime decision-making (Beissinger, 2022). These
dynamics were observable during the 2022 Russian incursion of Ukraine. During the incursion,
the Putin regime manipulated information about the incursion to the domestic Russian audience,
minimizing domestic pressure on the regime, despite international media coverage that mobilized
a global audience which had a minimal influence on regime decision-making (Beissinger, 2022).
As noted in the previous section, the findings of study #1 and study #2 are consistent with
several practitioner models. One model slightly shifted away from the bifurcated approach by
describing a resistance continuum. The continuum depicts a range of resistance where the level
of violence is indexed against the legal status of participants and third-party involvement (Agan
et al., 2019). In the first stage, non-violent illegal political acts (civil disobedience) are conducted
by citizens/residents of the affected country, and third-party involvement would be unlawful. The
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next stage, referred to as rebellion, involves short-term violent engagements, such as riots,
conducted by rebels subject to domestic criminal law. The third stage is insurgency, and the
fourth stage is belligerency, characterized by open warfare and control of territory conducted by
formalized groups of armed belligerents. A useful evolution beyond bifurcation of methods of
resistance, this methodology still falls short of accounting for blended use of nonviolent and
violent methods (Agan et al., 2019).
Another emerging practitioner model, called the Resistance Operating Concept (ROC),
depicted a blended vs. bifurcated view of resistance. Germane to the focus and research
questions of this study, the ROC defined resistance from the perspective of state actors as a form
of interstate conflict, called national resistance. As opposed to a form of intrastate conflict,
national resistance is, “a nation’s organized, whole-of-society effort, encompassing the full range
of activities from nonviolent to violent, led by a legally established government (potentially
exiled/displaced or shadow) to reestablish independence and autonomy within its sovereign
territory that has been wholly or partially occupied by a foreign power” (Fiala, 2020). This
Western practitioner model provides a robust depiction of resistance as a form of interstate
conflict and reinforces the findings of study #2, which indicate that Russia has already
conceptualized and operationalized the appropriation of resistance as a form of interstate conflict
within gray zone campaigns.
Taken together, the findings of the present study, contemporary research, and ongoing
resistance practices indicate a set of nuanced tradeoffs necessary to explore when examining
resistance holistically. Overall, the findings of this research, which indicate the blended nature of
violent and nonviolent methods, are additive to ongoing scholarly discussions on an unsettled
area of study regarding resistance movements.
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Protecting or Targeting the Loyalty of Security Forces
When it comes to the maneuver element of combat power, study #1 indicated that
security force defectors had the greatest effect on success/progress of resistance movements.
This variable associated with the greatest effect on the progress of territorial succession
movements (.432). This finding is consistent with the findings from study #2, which revealed
pro-Russian separatists in the Donbas in 2014 experienced initial progress in their secession
movement when joined by several thousand defectors from Ukrainian security forces. Security
defectors were associated with a similar level of effect (.204-.279) with progress in regime
change movements and success in territorial succession movements.
Both study #1 and study #2 indicated the criticality of regime loyalty of security forces.
This conclusion is consistent with the literature and actions of Russian and PRC security leaders.
The PRC places great emphasis on the loyalty of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to the
regime. In the words of PLA senior leadership, the military must “resolutely listen to Chairman
Xi’s command, be accountable to Chairman Xi, let Chairman Xi rest assured,” (Tian, 2021).
Underscoring the importance of preventing security force defections amongst popular uprisings,
in 2021, the PLA opened an “exhibition center about the PLA garrison in Hong Kong, where
there have been large-scale anti-government protest,” (Tian, 2021). An analysis of the 2022
Russian incursion of Ukraine noted that Russian security forces have not defected in large
numbers, despite numerous setbacks, because Putin has implemented numerous measures to
screen, monitor, and disincentivize members of security forces from defecting (Casey, 2022).
Interestingly, apparently understanding the value of security force defectors, during the Russian
incursion, the Ukrainian government sought to incentivize defectors from Russian security forces
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by offering up to $1,000,000 and “secrecy, a safe stay in Ukraine and support in obtaining new
documents and an exit for a third country,” (Papenfuss, 2022).
The findings of this study were consistent with other scholarly research on security force
defections, which indicated that security force loyalty is effectively maintained through a shared
national identity (Hancock & Gurung, 2018), not necessarily determined by whether a resistance
movement is violent and nonviolent (Anisin, 2020). The emphasis on shared national identity as
a means of preventing defections among Russian forces, while encouraging defections among
Ukrainian forces was evident in Putin’s statement announcing the 2022 Ukrainian incursion:
I would also like to address the military personnel of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Comrade officers, Your fathers, grandfathers and great-grandfathers did not fight the
Nazi occupiers and did not defend our common Motherland to allow today’s neo-Nazis to
seize power in Ukraine. You swore the oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people and not
to the junta, the people’s adversary which is plundering Ukraine and humiliating the
Ukrainian people. I urge you to refuse to carry out their criminal orders. I urge you to
immediately lay down arms and go home. (Putin, 2022)
Overall, the variable of security force loyalty/defectors is a complex and critical element
of how state actors approach resistance movements as a form of interstate conflict. This study,
the literature, and recent events indicate that, for a state actor to leverage a resistance movement
as a form of interstate conflict, it is important for the state actor to place emphasis on security
force loyalty, as was the case of Ukrainian security forces defecting to the side of pro-Russian
separatists in the Donbas in 2014. Alternatively, in the case of a state actor defending against
resistance movements, it is important for the regime to cultivate the loyalty of security forces, as
is the case with Russia’s and PRC multi-layered efforts to maintain the loyalty of security forces.

126
Key Variables and Takeaways from Color Revolutions
When it comes to better understanding resistance from the perspective of Russian and
Chinese security leaders, examining Color Revolutions is key. The data set from study #1 coded
the Rose, Tulip, and Orange Revolutions as regime change movements. According to study #1,
the combat power variables significantly associated with success and progress of regime change
movements are (1) radical flank; (2) security force defectors; (3) state official defectors; (4)
international media coverage; and (5) resistance outreach to the media.
An examination of the individual data fields for the Rose, Tulip, and Orange Revolutions
provides several insights relevant to the research questions. The Rose Revolution contained four
out of five significantly associated variables when it achieved success in 2003. The Tulip
Revolution also included four out of five of these variables when it achieved success in 2005. In
the years that the Orange Revolution (Ukraine) achieved little/no progress (2001, 2002, 2003),
international media coverage was present, however the movement lacked defectors or a radical
flank. In the year that the Orange Revolution achieved significant concessions (2004), four out of
five of these variables were present in the movement. The significant change in 2004 was the
addition of security and state defectors to the movement. The sudden change from no progress in
2003 to achieving significant concessions in 2004 highlights the impact on the success of a
movement when security force defectors support the resistance effort. Each of the three selected
movements contained either a radical flank or security defectors in the years they achieved
significant progress or success towards regime change.
Resistance Theory
The literature review highlighted key aspects of resistance theory necessary to inform and
frame the research. First, in structuring the research, the researcher paired the interpretivist
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nature of resistance theory with an exploratory research question and qualitative study. This
formulation resulted in complementary study #2. This study focused on addressing the literature
gap of a lack of research that utilizes combat power theory and resistance theory to examine
Russian and Chinese appropriation of resistance forces in the contemporary period, 2006-2022,
as a form of unconventional warfare in deliberate gray zone interstate conflict. Study #2 focused
on addressing RQ#2: How do the elements of combat power significantly associated with
success/progress in resistance movements from 1945-2006 help us understand the doctrines,
words, and actions of Russian and Chinese government officials regarding state appropriation of
resistance for gray zone campaigns from 2006-2022?
The West, Russia and China each view resistance differently. The review of
resistance literature identified two key theoretical distinctions that I will quickly revisit to assist
in reflecting on the findings and takeaways of the study. The first theoretical distinction was
establishing a multi-discipline depiction of resistance. The study situated resistance movements
within contentious politics as a form of political warfare, within comparative politics as a type of
social movement, and within military science as a form of unconventional warfare. This framing
allowed for a rich exploration of resistance with intellectual space for holistic examination of the
diversity of state actor approaches to resistance movements.
This approach proved valuable, as the content analysis in study #2 revealed quite
different formulations of resistance by the U.S., Russia, and China. Russian discourse situated
resistance mostly as a form of unconventional warfare, whereas Chinese discourse situated
resistance via the Great United Front as a form of political warfare, while U.S. discourse tended
to situate resistance as a social movement. These are simplistic characterizations; however, they

128
are useful in providing a lens for gaining better understanding of how others situate and hence
operationalize resistance methodologies.
Further, these characterizations are consistent with other scholarly research. Scholars note
that Russian approaches to resistance are heavily militarized, including Russian security leaders
defining opposition resistance movements as valid military targets and terrorists (Bouchet, 2016;
Moscow Times, 2022; Putin 2022). Russian security discourse includes the offensive use of
resistance movements within military campaigns as a form of “new type” warfare (Cordesman,
2021; Freier, 2016; Gerasimov, 2013). By comparison, scholars described PRC efforts to coerce
and leverage people movements in Taiwan as a form of political warfare (Cole, 2019). These
scholars characterize the intent of PRC efforts in Taiwan via the United Front as covert regime
change resulting in Taiwan unification with the PRC by, “directly capture local politicians,
municipal leaders, grassroots organizations, the agricultural and fisheries sectors, the tourism
industry, land development” (Cole, 2019). This political warfare approach includes five
objectives consistent with resistance methods:
(a) corrode, bypass and manipulate democratic institutions, elections, and public trust
therein; (b) undermine morale of the targeted society and weaken resistance to Beijing’s
objectives by exacerbating feelings of abandonment, isolation and inevitability; (c) sow
confusion, exacerbate divisions and contradictions within society; (d) co-opt elites,
businesspeople, politicians, retired military officers, civil society, and the media; and (e)
coerce the CCP’s opponents. (Cole, 2019)
This approach is decidedly non-violent in nature and stands in stark comparison to the
militaristic approach taken by Russia. However, it shares many of the same critical resistance
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elements indicated in this study: manipulation of information and media, garnering defectors
from state leaders and security forces, and instilling and capitalizing on fear.
The content analysis process of study #2 yielded an unanticipated third country of study
regarding state appropriation of resistance methodologies for interstate conflict – the U.S.
Already discussed in the previous section, was a documented U.S. formulation of state use of
resistance methods called, the Resistance Operating Concept (ROC). According to media reports,
the ROC formed the basis for the establishment of a national resistance effort in Ukraine and
other countries. Additionally, both the Russian and Chinese security discourse datasets were rich
with details regarding their perceptions of U.S. appropriation of resistance methods, namely the
utilization of NGOs to fund, foment, and fuel Color Revolutions. However, the researcher did
not locate a Western scholarly work, or U.S. government archival document, statement, or policy
to support these claims. Furthermore, the U.S. government officially debunks this narrative as
one of “Russia’s Top Five Persistent Disinformation Narratives” stating, “These baseless
accusations often target local and international civil society organizations, as well as independent
media that expose human rights abuses and corruption. The Kremlin seeks to deny that people in
neighboring countries could have agency, dignity, and independent aspirations to advocate for
themselves, just as it denies these qualities to the people of Russia” (U.S. Department of State,
2022). Nevertheless, the dataset clearly indicated a strong perception of this reality by Russia and
China. Additionally, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC published a “fact sheet” with
numerous allegations of the role of a U.S. NGO, the National Endowment for Democracy
(NED), funded by the U.S. Congress, in supporting Color Revolutions (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the PRC, 2022). The veracity of these claims were uncertain. However, they are
included here as a depiction of Chinese perception, or a depiction of Chinese misinformation. I
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included this finding as a fourth possible formulation of state appropriation of resistance
movements, largely a form of pro-democracy social movement, heavily influenced by cultural,
legal, and historical bias towards nonviolence.
In summary, the study situated resistance movements within contentious politics as a
form of political warfare, within comparative politics as a type of social movement, and within
military science as a form of unconventional warfare. This allowed for a rich exploration of
resistance with intellectual space for holistic examination of the diversity of state actor
approaches to resistance movements. The findings of this research were consistent with other
scholarly works. These indicated security leaders leverage resistance for interstate conflict in a
variety of formulations. Russia leverages resistance as a form of unconventional warfare,
whereas PRC leverages resistance via the Great United Front as a form of political warfare,
while Western countries leverage resistance via the Resistance Operating Concept as a form of
national defense, and potentially via pro-democracy nonviolent social movements.
Integrated Deterrence Options
The literature review identified a gap in concepts for deterrence of Russian and Chinese
appropriation of resistance in gray zone campaigns as a strategy of international conflict
prevention. The tenets of deterrence theory, deterrence by punishment, and deterrence by denial,
were discussed in the theoretical foundations of the study. This information highlighted gaps in
existing U.S. deterrence paradigms and a call by the U.S. Secretary of Defense to establish a
more robust deterrence paradigm called, Integrated Deterrence (Austin, 2021; see Chapter 1,
Table 3).
These gaps and theoretical foundations formulated the basis for research question three
(RQ#3): How can we better understand options to deter Russian and Chinese appropriation of
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resistance for gray zone campaigns? The quantitative and qualitative studies provided
understanding of specific factors to defend or pursue in regime change, territorial succession, or
anti-occupation resistance movements. The identified factors provide insights that contribute to
scholarly and practitioner efforts to develop integrated deterrence concepts to discourage Russian
and Chinese gray zone activities that manipulate information and exploit people movements to
prevent conflict and human suffering.
U.S. deterrence paradigms clearly did not dissuade Russian aggression in Ukraine in
2014 or 2022. Russia was undeterred from these actions despite NATO having “an aggregate
conventional and nuclear supremacy over Russia,” (Lanoszka, 2016). This reality exposed
shortcomings in traditional U.S. and NATO deterrence paradigms centered on nuclear
punishment and extended deterrence. Analysis and wargames indicate credible deterrence by
denial of Russian aggression using large-scale conventional forces would be costly, militarily
infeasible, or risk escalation to nuclear conflict (Koffman, 2016). Furthermore, the deployment
of large-scale conventional forces could have the unintended consequence of advancing Russian
gray zone efforts by providing additional physical and cognitive objectives for Russia to exploit
with irregular and cognitive campaigns. These concerns resulted in the calculated U.S. decision
and public messaging to limit the number of U.S. forces deployed to Poland during the 2022
escalation cycle leading up to the Russian incursion into Ukraine (Garamone, 2022). The
outcome is a scenario consistent with the one envisioned by Robert Jervis, where mutual nuclear
deterrence “allowed U.S. adversaries to use force below the nuclear level whenever it was to
their advantage to do so” (Jervis, 2009). In fact, Russian gray zone campaigns seem to create
“sub-conventional” freedom of maneuver (Koffman, 2016). Russia does this with the threat of
large-scale conventional force, including the Russian utilization and public messaging of
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hypersonic weapons during the Ukrainian incursion (Kirby, 2022). Stated another way, existing
paradigms resulted in a stalemate between nuclear and conventional force. The problem then is
that Russian “irregular capabilities remain largely unaddressed by any ideas put forward so far”
(Koffman, 2016).
To address these challenges, an integrated deterrence effort would include both irregular
denial and irregular punishment activities suited to gray zone campaigns. Given Russia’s and
China’s integration of nuclear, conventional, and irregular capabilities, described previously in
the study, it is unlikely that standalone employment of irregular deterrence would be sufficiently
effective. However, the integration of irregular deterrence alongside conventional and nuclear
deterrence could help achieve effective integrated deterrence.
On the denial side, irregular deterrence would disrupt or degrade capability needed by
Russia or China in gray zone campaigns. This action involves denying them the combat power
variables, identified in study #1, that are significantly associated with success/progress of
resistance movements. These concepts include favorable international media coverage,
security/state defectors, and radical flank, depending on whether the contemplated action focused
on regime change, territorial succession, or anti-occupation.
The findings from study #2 enable refinement of these options. If Russia is the focus of
the contemplated irregular deterrence option, measures to limit/expand NGO activity, influence
youth/student organization activity, influence oligarchs, or limit/expand legal permissiveness of
people movements could yield an irregular deterrence effect through cost imposition in these
areas. Alternatively, if China is the focus of the contemplated irregular deterrence option,
measures to limit/expand NGO activity, degrade business, degrade deniability/stealth, or
limit/expand legal permissiveness of people movements could yield an irregular deterrence effect
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through cost imposition in these areas. Similarly, irregular deterrence by denial could include
making Russian or Chinese objectives hard to keep, if taken. This approach would involve
imposing costs on a level that outweigh the benefits of holding on to the objective, or in other
words, “in case all else fails, Eastern European allies must make themselves indigestible to a
Russian occupation” (Kroenig 2015). Indeed, in the context of the ongoing Russian incursion in
Ukraine, it is worth noting a statement made by the Ukrainian Minister of Defense prior to the
incursion, “Moscow’s military dominance in terms of aircraft and conventional weapons would
be of limited use against the kind of domestic resistance Ukraine could muster” (Zagorodnyuk
and Khara 2021). This statement suggests the viability of anti-occupation resistance approach to
deterrence by denial.
Similarly, regarding an overt Chinese military action to occupy and control Taiwan,
scholars assess that deterrence by denial anti-occupation resistance methods would likely be
more effective than deterrence by denial through traditional military means (McKinney et al.,
2021). Consistent with the findings in complementary study #1, scholars assess that Taiwanese
resistance information activities, especially international media coverage, and the existence of a
radical flank would be essential elements of an effective Taiwanese anti-occupation resistance to
Chinese aggression (Ellis, 2020).
On the punishment side, irregular deterrence could credibly threaten Russian or Chinese
interests with irregular means that degrade the critical variables identified in study #1 and #2.
This tactic involves targeting combat power variables, identified in study #1, that are
significantly associated with success/progress. These factors include advancing unfavorable
international media coverage and encouraging security/state defectors.
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The findings from study #2 enable refinement of these options. If Russia is the focus of
the contemplated irregular deterrence option, measures to limit/expand NGO activity, limit proregime youth/student organization activity, influence oligarchs, or limit/expand legal
permissiveness of people movements could yield an irregular deterrence effect through cost
imposition in these areas. Alternatively, if China is the focus of the contemplated irregular
deterrence option, measures to limit/expand NGO activity, degrade business, degrade
deniability/stealth, or limit/expand legal permissiveness of people movements could yield an
irregular deterrence effect through cost imposition in these areas.
On the punishment side of irregular deterrence, credibly threatening or signaling
capability and intent to leverage or support a regime-change resistance movement would likely
affect the escalation cycle differently than an anti-occupation movement. The 2022 Russian
incursion of Ukraine provides an exemplar to explore these dynamics. Keen to manage an
escalation cycle dominated by the threat of nuclear exchange, third party nations have sought to
balance a level of support to Ukraine sufficiently effective to meet anti-occupation objectives
while clearly communicating a lack of intent to provide support sufficient to impose regime
change internal to Russia. These dynamics would likely be similar if contemplating the level of
support to anti-occupation resistance movements vs. regime-change resistance movements as
irregular deterrence options. However, when compared to the other forms of deterrence by
punishment options available (e.g., nuclear, global strike, cross-domain), irregular deterrence
could provide deterrence by punishment options at a lower level of damage, escalation risk, and
counterstrike risk than the others.
Irregular deterrence would offer a more complete solution to the challenge posed by the
U.S. Secretary of Defense and security scholars to formulate integrated deterrence options
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(Austin, 2021; Crombe et al., 2021; Delafield et al., 2022; Green et al., 2017; Hicks et al., 2019;
Jones, 2019; Robinson, 2020). It is more complete because it expands deterrence discourse to
include irregular deterrence alongside conventional and nuclear deterrence. The table below
reflects how irregular deterrence addresses gaps in deterrence theory and their relationship with
types of resistance movements (see Table 25).
Table 25
Integrated Deterrence Matrix
Punishment

Denial

Nuclear

Triad

Extended

Conventional

Global Strike

Robust

Cyber/Space

Cross-domain

Tailored

Gray Zone

Regime Change
Resistance

Anti-Occupation
Resistance
Conclusion

The purpose of the study was to expand understanding of resistance as a form of
interstate conflict and irregular deterrence as a form of conflict prevention. From a conflict
prevention and security studies perspective, complementary study #1 examined the formative
period of resistance from 1945-2006 to understand the variables significantly associated with
success and progress in three specific types of resistance movements: (1) regime change, (2)
territorial secession, and (3) anti-occupation. Complementary study #2 specifically explored the
perspectives of Russian Federation and People’s Republic of China security leaders regarding
resistance in the contemporary period from 2006-2022. The study had three objectives: (1) to
explore resistance holistically; analytically focused on the outcomes of the movement, rather
than bifurcating the analysis based on the method of resistance (violent/nonviolent); (2) to
advance exploration of the relationships between specific critical variables of resistance
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movements and outcomes in regime change, territorial secession, and anti-occupation resistance
movements more specifically than found in the literature to discern nuanced differences in the
variables associated with their success or progress; and (3) to contribute to, and spurn, the study
of resistance in conflict prevention and security studies discourse.
The study benefited theorists and practitioners by (a) learning more about resistance
methodologies from the formative (1945-2006) and contemporary periods (2006-2022); (b)
increasing understanding of resistance from the perspective of Russian Federation and People’s
Republic of China (PRC) security leaders as a form in interstate conflict, and (c) exploring
options to enhance integrated deterrence paradigms. By gaining a specific understanding of
critical variables of resistance in the formative period in complementary study #1, the research
established a security studies basis for complementary study #2, which explored Russian and
Chinese policy, doctrines, and actions regarding resistance in the contemporary period. Overall,
the study resulted in findings that address four researchable gaps in the literature centered on
gaining better understanding of resistance movements from a security studies perspective
(Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011) and contributing to the development of “capabilities to better
compete and deter gray zone actions” (Biden, 2021). The figure below depicts relationships and
synthesis between the findings from complementary study #1 and study #2 (see Figure 3).
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Figure 3
Synthesis of study #1 and study #2

Taken together, the words and actions of Russian security leaders revealed in study #2
clearly indicated that the Russian Federation has the demonstrated intent, will, and capability to
leverage people movements and resistance methodologies as strategic tools of the state for
interstate conflict. Russia’s methods and approaches for doing so are consistent with the findings
in study #1, heavily influenced by the Color Revolutions, with emphasis on the combat power
variables of information, security/state defectors, and radical flank. Complementary to findings
of study #1, study #2 indicated that other variables critical to the “protest potential” of a
population include NGO activity, youth/student organization activity, oligarch influence, and
legal permissiveness. For example, the 2022 Russian incursion in Ukraine provided specific
observable insights into the interplay between oligarchs and resistance movements, a largely
unexplored topic of study within the resistance literature. On one hand, it seems that Ukrainian
oligarchs wielded a significant amount of influence in favor of the 2014 and 2022 Ukrainian
resistance against Russia (Nitsova, 2022). While on the other hand, despite U.S. sanctions
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against them, Russian oligarchs have remained largely unmoved in their support for Putin
(Blinken, 2022). The identification of these variables is conceptually consistent with the
literature; however, they are additive to the literature as a specific list of variables for further
research and analysis to further understanding of resistance movements.
Similarly, the words and actions of Chinese security leaders found in the data set clearly
indicated that the PRC has the demonstrated intent, will, and capability to leverage people
movements and resistance methodologies as strategic tools of the state for interstate conflict.
China’s methods and approaches for doing so are consistent with the findings in study #1 and
heavily influenced by the Color Revolutions, with an emphasis on the combat power variables of
information, and security/state defectors. However, deviating from the Russian data set, the
combat power variable of a violent radical flank did not significantly emerge from the Chinese
data set. Instead, the Chinese methods of appropriation of resistance seem to preference subtle
and non-violent methods. Complementary to findings of study #1, study #2 indicated additional
critical variables associated with PRC approaches to resistance movements including NGO
activity, legal permissiveness, impacts on business, and degree of deniability/stealth.
Understanding the nuanced differences between critical variables in different types of
resistance movements provides valuable insights for theorists and practitioners. From a security
studies perspective, defending or pursuing these factors provides a blueprint for options to deter
or disrupt Russian or Chinese gray zone actions, depending on the type of resistance movement.
For example, irregular deterrence of a PRC invasion of Taiwan could include deterrence by
denial through the establishment of a credible Taiwanese national anti-occupation resistance
effort that would include the blended use of violent and nonviolent resistance methods to impose
costs on potential PLA occupiers, including the robust use of information that amplifies the
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negative impact of Chinese aggression on mainland businesses, the use of radical flanks, and
proactive measures to encourage defections from PLA forces, while preventing defections from
Taiwanese resistance elements or public leaders.
From a deterrence by punishment perspective, the research clearly indicated that the
regimes of both Russia and China are concerned with internal challenges from domestic regime
change resistance movements. As such, signaling credible capability and will to leverage regime
change resistance movements internal to Russia or China could provide an irregular deterrence
option within a broader integrated deterrence approach. Both the power and political sensitivity
of signaling support for regime change internal to Russia or China was demonstrated during the
2022 Russian incursion of Ukraine when President Biden, and numerous other Western leaders
quickly walked back and minimized Biden’s statement, “this man cannot remain in power”
(Stewart et al., 2022). The U.S. Ambassador to NATO quickly clarified, “The U.S. does not have
a policy of regime change in Russia. Full stop.” (Stewart et al., 2022). Interestingly, the U.S.
Secretary of State added, any decision about Russia’s leadership was “up to the Russian people”,
perhaps leaving an open door to the methods presented in this study. These are a few examples
of how the findings of this research could be used to formulate irregular deterrence options
through combinations of either the defense of, denial of, or disruption of the critical resistance
variables identified in this study.
Recommendations
The study indicated three recommendations. First, additional exploration that expands the
study of resistance from a security studies perspective is warranted. As indicated in the study, the
majority of the data fields in the NAVCO 2.0 dataset were outside the scope of the conflict
prevention and military science scope of this study. Future research and data collection would
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benefit from resistance data collection indexed against all seven elements of power. This step
would enable a more complete analysis of resistance from a security studies perspective.
Additionally, the creators of the NAVCO 2.0 dataset are developing the NAVCO 2.2 dataset that
will code additional resistance movements through 2019. The creators plan a public release of
the dataset in 2022. The release of this dataset would support a continuation of the research line
of this study and allow for additional insights regarding information activities of resistance
movements during the period of ubiquitous information technology from 2006-2022. Second,
additional research should further develop conflict prevention framework for gray zone
campaigns.
Finally, as this research was completed contemporarily with ongoing developments in the
Russo-Ukrainian War in 2022, additional research on the resistance methods utilized during the
Russian incursion of Ukraine would greatly benefit the study of resistance from a conflict
prevention and security studies perspective. Numerous scholars and media reports
contemporaneously indicate there are substantial lessons to be learned from the 2022 Ukrainian
resistance methods employed against the Russian incursion (McManus, 2022; Horton 2022). A
similar perspective was reflected by Taiwan’s foreign minister who commented, “We try to see
what we can learn from Ukraine in defending ourselves…we can learn from Ukraine civil
defense” (Cohen 2022). Taken together, it is clear the study of resistance is germane and likely
will remain very relevant to security studies and conflict resolution scholars and practitioners for
the foreseeable future. It is time to start the next study that will build off the findings of this
study to develop better understanding and options to manage this burgeoning form of interstate
conflict.
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Appendix A: Exemplars of Russian Security Discourse
The following figure include slides from General Gerasimov’s presentation pertaining to
Color Revolutions as published in Cordesman (2014; see Figure A1).
Figure A1
Methodologies and locations of Color Revolutions

Cordesman (2014) provided additional perspective through slides from the Minister of
Defense of Belarus’s presentation pertaining to deliberation of U.S. capability and intent to
foment Color Revolutions and cooperation between Russia and Belarus (see Figure A2).
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Figure A2
Role of external actors in Color Revolutions
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An additional presentation pertaining to Color Revolutions was presented by a senior
leader from the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, as presented by Cordesman (2014;
see Figure A3).
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Figure A3
Color Revolutions as warfare and a threat to Russian security

Cordesman (2014) provided further understanding of the stance of the Minister of
Defense of Belarus regarding “information confrontation” in Color Revolutions (see Figure A4).
Figure A4
Information confrontation against Color Revolutions

